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1 Introduction 
The continuing harmonization of European law led to regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 ruling 
that all publicly traded companies in the European Union have to prepare their consolidated 
financial statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
for financial years starting on or after 1 January 2005. At the same time, many other non-
member countries in Europe also started to require IFRS, at least for specific sectors.1 The 
obligatory transition to IFRS is one of the most important challenges for European banks in 
the last few years. For many banks, the changeover from national Generally Accepted Ac-
counting Principles (GAAP) to International Financial Reporting Standards means a lot of 
changes concerning accounting assumptions in general. There are many differences in the 
accounting rules, starting with the objective that financial statement information according to 
IFRS is more suitable for investors to make well-founded investment decisions whereas local 
GAAPs serve as information instruments for many kinds of stakeholders.2 Prior to the appli-
cation of IFRS in banks, critics often claimed that the application of IFRS might favor procyc-
lical lending, i.e., reducing the amount of debt in bad times and enhancing lending in good 
times, thereby intensifying booms and recessions. Some critics even identified the application 
of fair values in the valuation of many assets and liabilities as one fundamental problem 
(Soderstrom and Sun 2007, p. 689). 
 
One of the reasons for the introduction of IFRS in Europe was the harmonization of account-
ing rules in order to make financial statement information comparable and transparent for 
financial statement users. However, the technical implementation of IFRS leads to surging 
costs for banks and firms in other industries in terms of preparation and auditing costs for 
their financial statements according to the new rules. One reason is that banks very often have 
to prepare consolidated financial statements in addition to national GAAP financial statements 
so that two accounting systems are used simultaneously. Another reason is that IFRS increase 
costs by imposing additional requirements in the preparation process. The application of IFRS 
would only make sense for firms and capital markets if these additional costs of preparing the 
financial statements are compensated by the benefits arising through the application, i.e., 
lower information costs and transaction costs as well as capital costs which can be interpreted 
as expressions of increasing market transparency and efficiency. Therefore, the central ques-
tion in this work is whether the application of IFRS in European banks really led to increasing 
                                                 
1
 For example, countries such as Hungary, Poland, or Switzerland (for specific sectors). 
2
 See Ashbaugh and Olsson (2002, p. 108) and Hung and Subramanyam (2007, p. 624). 
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transparency, market efficiency and accounting quality. If this question can be positively an-
swered, the application might lead to economic benefits. Otherwise, the benefits of the appli-
cation of a common accounting system have to be questioned in light of additional prepara-
tion costs. 
 
Market efficiency and transparency can be measured by several dimensions. One dimension is 
the abnormal market reaction after the dissemination of new information on capital markets. 
Another dimension of efficiency costs are costs in terms of frictional losses of markets, e.g., 
bid-ask spreads. Another way to query the superiority and benefits of an accounting system is 
the question of accounting quality, which might be defined as stringency and information 
value of an accounting system. Accounting quality can be measured by, e.g., value relevance 
of accounting information, i.e., how strong the financial statement information is reflected in 
market values of the respective firm. In other words, one might ask if financial statement in-
formation is useful and, therefore, incorporated in investors’ decisions. Another aspect of ac-
counting quality is the reduction of earnings management. In order to answer the question 
whether IFRS are positive for the markets, the following investigation addresses these issues 
and tries to cover each of the dimensions.  
 
However, one has to be cautious, since empirical investigations in this strand of literature of-
ten use the effect of a change in information policy, i.e., a change in accounting system, and 
relate this aspect to the measures of information efficiency mentioned above. This presumes a 
direct link between cause and effect which can be dangerous in relationships where connec-
tions between these two are far from compulsive and definite. In fact, the links are often am-
biguous and obvious results could also be created or distorted by concurrent causes for which 
many sources seem to exist in empirical capital market investigations. One mitigation could 
be the use of robustness checks, in order to minimize the potential distorting influences of 
concurrent causes. In this kind of investigations, one decisive premise is that there is a resil-
ient and robust connection between changes in accounting policies and measurable effects on 
information efficiency. It is based on a semi-strong form of capital market efficiency which 
has to be accepted as a basic premise. Many of the studies referred to in the following chap-
ters more or less implicitly or explicitly build their argumentation on this basis. Many of them 
concentrate on the transition to IFRS from one perspective only. In other words, they use just 
one dimension of information efficiency in order to measure possible transitional effects.  
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This is different in our studies. We restrict the investigation to one industry widely neglected 
in the investigation of transition effects – banks. Furthermore, our studies cover the period of 
the mandatory application of IFRS in 2005 in Europe which is different to many prior studies 
investigating voluntary transitions. Additionally, one central advantage of our studies is that 
they shed light on the transition to IFRS from different angles using different measures of 
information efficiency in four studies while focusing on the banking industry in Europe. 
Therefore, we should be able to gather a more comprehensive picture by putting the pieces of 
the puzzle together. If we are able to find substantial evidence of lower information cost and 
higher information efficiency that is attributable to the accounting system in most studies it 
could be safe to say that there is a robust and measurable effect, which is a clear advantage 
over prior studies only shedding light on the connection between the transition to IFRS and 
economic benefits from one point of view.  
 
In the first part, covering Chapter 2 and 3, the direct effects of the transition to IFRS are in-
vestigated. Chapter 2 concentrates on changes in balance sheets. We do this by comparing 
national GAAP financial statements before IFRS became obligatory and their restated IFRS 
counterparts for the same year. Furthermore, the sources for changes in equity are identified, 
and their impact on regulatory equity capital. Chapter 3 studies the market reaction to the pub-
lication of quarterly earnings announcements. One focus is on the abnormal market reaction 
after the publication of earnings which is measured by abnormal returns and variances. The 
second part concentrates on the indirect effects after the IFRS transition. Chapter 4 investi-
gates the development of information efficiency and market liquidity for a longer period be-
fore and after the transition, while Chapter 5 concentrates on the value relevance of account-
ing measures and earnings management. In Chapter 4, the impact of IFRS on market effi-
ciency and transparency is studied using several measures, such as bid-ask spreads, turnover, 
the number of daily zero returns, and the price impact of trades. Also, the long-term develop-
ment of market valuation is investigated using Tobin’s Q and price-to-book value. Chapter 5 
concentrates on the impact of the transition on the value relevance of accounting measures. 
Value relevance is measured by the relation between book values and market values. To begin 
with, the Ohlson model is tested (Ohlson 1995). Furthermore, the relevance of single financial 
statement items is studied. In the second part of Chapter 5, possible changes in earnings man-
agement are investigated. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the results and provides a conclu-
sion.  
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2 Transition to IFRS: The Effect on Balance Sheets of European 
Banks3 
2.1 Introduction 
One explicit goal of IFRS4 reporting is the information supply of users of financial statements 
about the economic situation of a company.5 The comparability of financial statements be-
tween companies and across country borders is one implicit objective of IFRS. The transition 
is a very important topic since consolidated financial statements of companies whose equity 
securities are traded on a regulated market in the European Union have to be prepared under 
IFRS for financial years starting 2005.6 For many companies the transition implies mainly, 
among other differences to local GAAP, fundamental changes in the valuation of assets and 
liabilities. It is often argued that the application of IFRS completely changes the structure of 
balance sheets since there is no uniform format for balance sheets and income statements 
(Hoogendoorn 2006, p. 25).7 The changes are highly correlated with the amount of financial 
assets and liabilities measured at fair value contributing a great deal to the balance sheet items 
of financial institutions (Armstrong et al. 2010, p. 34). The application of the fair value meas-
urement under IFRS led to the reluctance of some continental European countries to apply the 
new accounting rules.8 One interesting question arising at this point is how the application of 
different accounting standards changes the general picture of financial statements. Another 
question to be answered is which implications transition effects might have on regulatory re-
quirements of banks. This matter becomes even more urgent with reference to the fact that in 
countries of the European Union IFRS figures can be used as a basis to calculate consolidated 
regulatory capital later on.9  
 
 
                                                 
3
 Together with Prof. Dr. Jens Grunert, Tuebingen University. 
4
 For purpose of convenience and to simplify matters, we refer to IFRS, comprising both International Account-
ing Standards (IAS) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) that are issued both by the Interna-
tional Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 
5
 See IASB Framework as of 2001, paragraph 12. 
6
 See Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 which is often referred to as “IAS regulation“. 
7
 E.g., IAS 30 sets out only a very basic structure for financial statements of banks. 
8
 For example, France strongly opposed against IAS 39 since it feared an increased volatility through the appli-
cation of fair value in accounting, see Aisbitt (2006, p. 117), or Armstrong et al. (2010, pp. 34-35 and pp. 38-39). 
For a different opinion on the influence of fair values, see Cairns (2006). 
9
 See CRD Directive 2006/48/EC, Article 74(1). 
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Having these ideas in mind, we study a sample of consolidated annual reports of 56 European 
banks, both listed and unlisted. In order to ensure a consistent IFRS transition environment, 
we analyze solely annual reports of banks changing to IFRS in 2005, and, in some cases 2006, 
to rule out any influences of varying transition periods and differing regulations.10 Concretely, 
we study the restated 2004 consolidated financial statements under IFRS, published in 2005, 
and compare them to the original financial statements under local GAAP for 2004.11 The ba-
sic idea is that we are able to compare the same economic conditions under two different re-
porting regimes. Using this approach, we try to study specific changeover effects on financial 
institutions’ balance sheets and analyze the contribution of specific standards to changes of 
reported equity. In order to examine potential differences in the transition, we also use 
changes in the variability of reported figures to measure those changes. Additionally, we try 
to identify differences and impacts on accounting for listed and unlisted banks and analyze 
whether prior accounting backgrounds and traditions have implications for IFRS reporting. As 
a last point, we endeavor to identify the transition impact on regulatory capital.  
 
Concentrating on the entire sample, we find that there are profound and significant effects on 
individual balance sheet items related to financial assets in the transition from local GAAP to 
IFRS. The positive effect on equity is mainly caused by the abandonment of the funds for 
general banking risk, the recognition of dividends and valuation effects of financial instru-
ments. Cross-sectional variability increases in some reported balance sheet items due to the 
changeover. Furthermore, we find, on average, a slightly stronger reaction for unlisted banks 
in some balance sheet positions. However, the study has its limitations. We fail to draw a 
clear picture for specific effects based on accounting backgrounds and traditions. Contrary to 
the commonly mentioned concerns of the IFRS implementation inflating regulatory capital, 
we observe that the transition has rather, in general, a negative effect on the total level of 
regulatory capital.  
 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the relevant re-
search that has already been done on the topic of accounting regimes and changeover effects. 
In section 2.3, the investigated hypotheses are introduced. Section 2.4 describes the dataset 
and the applied research design, followed by section 2.5 where empirical results are pre-
sented. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter. 
                                                 
10
 We use 2006 financial statements if these are the first to be mandatorily prepared in accordance to IFRS rules. 
This is the case for some banks with deviations in their financial years. 
11
 See Hung and Subramanyam (2007), using a comparable approach. 
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2.2 Literature 
The topics analyzed by empirical studies concerning the transition from local GAAP to IFRS 
can be classified into two categories: Effects on balance sheet items and changes in account-
ing quality which is often measured indirectly by value relevance and information efficiency. 
The main findings are highlighted in the following. 
 
The first strand of literature examines specific balance sheet effects due to the transition to 
IFRS. Aisbitt (2006) mainly discusses the influence on the book value of equity analyzing UK 
companies. Overall, no significant effect can be found. However, individual balance sheet 
items exhibit (minor) changes.12 The latter result is in line with Ormrod and Taylor (2004). 
They state that the change in the accounting basis to IFRS could have unexpected conse-
quences for reported figures without differences in the company’s economic situation. Hung 
and Subramanyam (2007) investigate financial statements of German companies, excluding 
banks switching from German GAAP to IAS between 1998 and 2002. They ascertain an in-
crease in book values of equity and assets. Furthermore, they determine a higher variability of 
book value and income due to the application of IFRS. Closest to our paper is the investiga-
tion of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS 2006). The changes to the 
main balance sheet items containing financial assets and liabilities for banks in 18 countries 
are discussed.13 CEBS (2006) observe that the balance sheet total increases 9% due to the 
raise of financial assets and liabilities. In contrast, total equity decreases 5% causing a nega-
tive impact on regulatory capital.  
 
In a second strand, the quality of different accounting regimes is discussed. Information con-
tent and decision usefulness are self-imposed topics of the IFRS-based financial statements 
which has implications for their information value. Information value in turn is measured – 
for example – by using value relevance as the effect of balance sheet items or profit or loss 
items on market value or information efficiency measures such as market liquidity or cost of 
capital. Many of these studies focus on the difference between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. Bartov, 
Goldberg and Kim (2005) investigate German companies listed at the ‘Neuer Markt’ over a 
period from 1998 to 2000 which have to use either IAS or U.S. GAAP for their financial 
statements. They find that earnings under IAS and U.S. GAAP have higher value relevance 
                                                 
12
 See Aisbitt (2006, p. 123). It has to be mentioned that no significance tests have been conducted. 
13
 The study only shows some basic descriptive statistics mainly for financial assets and liabilities without con-
sideration of statistical significances. Another decisive drawback is that 5 of the 18 countries already apply IFRS 
or local GAAP comparable to IFRS which means that there is no unambiguous transition database to IFRS used, 
see CEBS (2006, p. 2). It has to be noted that Germany is not part of the sample.  
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than earnings prepared under German GAAP. Bae, Tan and Welker (2008) identify that dif-
ferences in accounting systems are associated with the forecast accuracy of financial analysts. 
They observe that analyst following increases after transition to IAS through analysts with 
IAS experience. Investigating the mandatory application of IFRS in a worldwide study, Daske 
et al. (2008) conclude that capital markets perceive the new accounting rules positively by 
exhibiting higher market liquidity and lower cost of capital for these firms. However, they 
also find that mandatory adopters profit less by the adoption when directly compared to vol-
untary adopters. They also point out that concurrent institutional background changes play a 
crucial role in the capital market effects which makes it difficult to measure the contribution 
of the change in accounting systems. The results of the studies suggest that accounting infor-
mation seems to have an impact on capital markets, albeit they often lack information in re-
spect to specific differences in accounting information contributing to these observations 
which seems a relevant aspect to investigate. 
 
We contribute to the literature of accounting transition in several ways. Firstly, we examine a 
sample consisting of banks only. This is an interesting aspect since most of the previous in-
vestigations do not take banks into consideration, mainly in view of the fact that these institu-
tions embody a special kind of business and do not fit in datasets consisting of companies 
from industrial sectors. From this point of view, new insights into the transition effects on 
single balance sheet items, especially on equity, and balance sheet structures of banks in gen-
eral can be expected. Secondly, we want to add to the strand of literature examining the ef-
fects on balance sheet variability by investigating the immediate transition effects. Thirdly, in 
addition to the question of how balance sheet structures change due to the transition to IFRS, 
we also investigate the hypothesis that the changeover effect is stronger for banks that are not 
publicly traded on regulated markets. Fourthly, another interesting question arises from the 
fact that we investigate a European sample, i.e., the banks in the sample exhibit differences in 
accounting system backgrounds and traditions. Fifthly, we examine the transition impact on 
consolidated regulatory capital.  
 
 
 
  
 
8 
 
2.3 Hypotheses 
As already outlined above, the application of the new accounting standards means fundamen-
tal changes in accounting assumptions and techniques. The major part of our sample are banks 
that are situated in continental European countries and are dominated by continental European 
accounting traditions, e.g., the principle of prudence, and cost-based valuation. Those ac-
counting traditions have been further aligned by European directives.14 Under IFRS, pruden-
tial accounting is abandoned in favor of a true and fair view principle which is reflected, for 
example, by the fair value valuation of many financial assets and liabilities and by the reversal 
of the fund for general banking risk as a measure of prudence which is not allowed under 
IFRS. Therefore, our expectation is that there is a significant change in balance sheet posi-
tions due to the changeover to IFRS accounting.  
 
H1: The transition to IFRS will cause significant value changes to balance sheet items of 
banks. 
 
In booming markets we should be able to identify stronger value increases for items measured 
at market values.15 As opposed to industry companies, banks have more financial instruments 
with quoted market prices both on the asset and the liability side of balance sheets. A direct 
market valuation (mark-to-market) of these assets and liabilities is easier to carry out, and 
falling back on valuation methods (mark-to-model) is not necessary in this case. On the other 
hand, in recessions, necessary impairments on items measured at market prices mean greater 
corrections in value. In other words, the valuation at fair value might cause greater volatility 
in the annual accounts of financial institutions. A greater market value orientation of IFRS 
might amplify the variability in reported figures for individual balance sheet items as a conse-
quence of the transition to IFRS both cross-sectionally by reducing smoothing effects of local 
GAAPs and over time. This is in contrast to the variability in figures reported under prior na-
tional GAAP regimes. These often allow hidden reserves and are claimed to have an income-
smoothing effect due to the possibility of discretionary valuation.16 Therefore, we should be 
able to observe a greater cross-sectional variance in individual balance sheet items between 
                                                 
14
 See several council directives, e.g.  the fourth and seventh directive (78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC) as well as 
the council directive (86/635/EEC) specific for financial institutions.  
15
 For a definition of fair value, see for example IAS 39.AG69-39.AG82. In IAS 39.48A the best evidence of fair 
value is defined by the ‘quoted prices in an active market’. 
16
 See Hung and Subramanyam (2007, p. 637), investigating the difference in cross-sectional variance between 
German accounting regulation and IFRS. 
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figures reported under IFRS and local GAAP, especially in items which are strongly affected 
by market values. Hence, we can state 
 
H2: The cross-sectional variability is greater under IFRS than under local GAAP  
requirements for balance sheet items strongly affected by market values.  
 
A difference between unlisted and listed companies is that unlisted firms are, on average, less 
dependent on market valuation and market developments due to their closed ownership struc-
ture. An exception might be banks having issued debt securities. A reason for this is that the 
owners of unlisted banks may rather have individual access to company information and, 
therefore, financial statement information does not need to satisfy the information require-
ments of capital markets. Additionally, unlisted banks are often subject to private or politi-
cally influenced objectives and specific businesses with specific goals, e.g., public sector 
banks or home savings and loan associations. Consequently, we claim that unlisted banks use 
ex ante an even more conservative and prudent approach to valuation of financial assets and 
liabilities, contrary to listed banks for which it is commonly suggested to use less conservative 
valuation approaches in order to signal competitiveness and attractiveness to capital markets. 
Therefore, we predict that unlisted banks experience a stronger reaction through the applica-
tion of IFRS. This leads to our third hypothesis 
 
H3: Unlisted banks record higher changes in balance sheet items than listed banks. 
 
The transition to IFRS represents a major change in elementary assumptions concerning ac-
counting purposes for most continental European banks. In the relevant literature, basically, a 
dichotomous differentiation in accounting systems is made, identifying code law and common 
law countries.17 Code law countries are usually identified by a number of institutional factors 
in order to separate them from countries with a common law tradition. There are several insti-
tutional factors associated with accounting quality, for example, capital structure, develop-
ment of capital markets, and ownership structure.18 Usually, common law economies are as-
sociated with stronger equity markets. Furthermore, financial statements are claimed to serve 
better the principle of providing decision-useful information to investors and follow the con-
cepts of fair presentation, thus possessing higher accounting quality. IFRS are strongly asso-
                                                 
17
 For an overview, see, e.g. Meek and Thomas (2004, pp. 29-31).  
18
 See, e.g. La Porta et al. (1998). For an overview on these topics, see Soderstrom and Sun (2007). 
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ciated with these ideas.19 Countries associated with common law economies are, for example, 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. It is often claimed that equity markets in 
code law economies in which most of continental European countries can be classified are 
less developed since they are stakeholder-dominated rather than shareholder- or investor-
oriented and accounting serves several purposes.20 In tendency, in these economies account-
ing systems are more interdependent with tax accounting and influenced by ideas of creditor 
protection, prudent valuation and debt financing. Therefore, it is interesting to study the ef-
fects of the implementation of IFRS in continental European countries, i.e., the application of 
common law-based accounting in traditionally code law-oriented economies.21 For companies 
in countries with a stronger association to code law, the application of IFRS should cause 
greater adjustments to balance sheet items.22 On the other hand, there is less impact expected 
on balance sheets for companies from common law countries. Two not mutually exclusive 
reasons might be identified for this: First, these accounting regimes make use of comparable 
valuation principles prior to changeover, since the basic ideas of IFRS originally stem from 
the common law area. Second, they are more familiar with the application of common law 
accounting. From this point of view, we can stipulate our fourth hypothesis 
 
H4: The impact of the transition effects on balance sheet items is higher for banks located 
in a country with a code law accounting tradition. 
 
Lastly, another interesting matter is the question whether the newly adopted IFRS do have any 
impact on regulatory figures. Many banks in the dataset report tier ratios for both local GAAP 
and IFRS in 2004 on a pro-forma basis.23 One example is that an increasing amount of finan-
cial assets valued at fair value under the application of IFRS leads either to an increased posi-
tion of revaluation reserves (category: available-for-sale) or growing profits if the assets are 
valued at fair value through profit or loss. Independent of the categorization of the financial 
items, both categories could lead directly or indirectly to an increase of the regulatory capital 
base by inflating Tier I capital which is the central limit for the regulatory capital base. In 
                                                 
19
 See IASB Framework as of 2001, paragraph 12. 
20
 Exemplary for code law countries, German accounting rules serve several purposes, as for example the calcu-
lation of distributable income and taxable income, see Nobes (2006, p. 235). 
21
 Some authors argue that a dichotomous classification cannot be maintained. See, for example, d’Arcy (2001).  
22
 Christensen, Lee and Walker (2007, p. 343) put it differently by stating that “…German IFRS adopters will 
typically experience a greater leap in disclosure quality.” 
23
 The possibility to use IFRS consolidated financial statements as a basis to measure the regulatory capital was 
enacted by CRD Directive 2006/48/EC, Art. 74 (1), transforming the CEBS (2004) propositions concerning 
‘prudential filters’ into European law. The directive was implemented on national levels in single EU member 
states. However, this possibility did not exist in 2005 yet.  
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other words, the application of fair value on specific assets might lead to a disclosure of hid-
den (and therefore unrealised) reserves, i.e., a shift from Tier II to Tier I capital. Generally, 
hidden reserves have to be resolved, since they distort the true and fair view principle stipu-
lated in the IFRS Framework.24 Therefore, we can postulate 
 
H5: The application of fair values in IFRS has a positive impact on regulatory capital, 
i.e., there is a positive change in the Tier I capital ratio and the total capital ratio. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 See IASB Framework as of 2001, paragraph 37. 
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2.4 Database and Research Design 
In order to ensure comparability, the first financial statements according to IFRS have to be 
published in combination with pro-forma information under IFRS for all amounts reported for 
the previous year, i.e., the comparative period.25 The basic idea in this study is to compare the 
last consolidated financial statements according to previous GAAP requirements with the re-
stated figures under IFRS of the transition period accounts (Hung and Subramanyam 2007). 
Concretely, in the financial statements of 2005, we find the restated IFRS figures for the pre-
vious year (comparative period 2004) and compare them to the original balance sheet in local 
GAAP in the annual report of the year 2004. Another way to enable comparability is the 
obligatory reconciliation of equity items from previous GAAP to IFRS or the voluntary publi-
cation of the IFRS opening balance sheets for the first IFRS reporting period.26 As outlined in 
Hung and Subramanyam (2007), with this idea in mind it is possible to compare the same 
economic situation within a specific year resulting in different accounting entries in the bal-
ance sheets. In other words, there are two balance sheets reflecting identical events, albeit 
drawing a different picture and possibly conveying different implications to the addressee.  
 
One problem arising from the comparison is the determination of an unambiguous transition. 
This is due to the fact that IFRS 1 –First-time Adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards, came into force in 2004 and hence, the transition considering IFRS 1 did not have 
to take place until 2004.27 So as to exclude any kind of mismatch from different changeover 
regulations, we use IFRS reports which were prepared after the end of 2004 in order to work 
with a sample as homogenous as possible with identical IFRS in force at that time. This also 
reduces potential selection biases through voluntary early adoptions before 2005. Further-
more, to rule out biasing time lag effects in the enforcements of IFRS standards we decided to 
use the annual reports for the financial year ending in 2005, and 2006 for banks with devia-
tions in financial years, respectively.  
 
As a starting point, we use Bankscope which is a dataset comprising thousands of banks 
around the world and limit our search to banks located in the European Union and Switzer-
land. Furthermore, we restrict the search to banks that are considered at the highest level from 
an owner’s perspective and have no identified shareholder with the majority of shares accord-
                                                 
25
 IFRS 1.36. See IFRS 1.IG63 for an example of a reconciliation of balance sheet, income statement and equity. 
26
 IFRS 1.39-40. 
27
 First-time adoptions for earlier transitions had to consider SIC-8 – First Time Application of IASs as the Pri-
mary Basis of Accounting. 
  
 
13 
 
ing to Bankscope. In a second step, we use total assets as of 2006 as the criterion to identify 
the largest bank groups according to the Bankscope dataset. 28 With these preparations done, 
we start with a basis of 100 banks and try to investigate whether they adopted IFRS in 2005 
for their consolidated accounts, see Table I.  
 
Table I: Descriptive Statistics 
Countries
Total Sample
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxemburg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
4
2
2
24
1
0 0
1
1
1114 0 0 3
2 3
5
1
0
10
3
2 2
1 1
of IFRS Data
7 20
Insufficient Data/
Data not available
56100 17
4 0 0
3
2 0 0
10 2 0
1
1
3
0
0
0 4
0
0
2
4 1 0
0
012
0 0
0
16 9
2
4
2
0 0 610
4 0 0 4
0
1
Total
1
1
6 0 3 2
0
Early Adoption Dataset usedOther GAAP
4
0
1
This table contains descriptive statistics for the total sample. The second column 'Other GAAP' comprises the number of annual reports which were
prepared in accordance with other GAAP, e.g., as a result of a delayed application of IFRS. The third column 'Early Adoption of IFRS' summarizes banks
that implemented IFRS before 2005. The fourth column 'Insufficient Data/ Data not available' contains all banks for which comparisons are not feasible or
reasonable, e.g., due to unavailability of annual reports, incomplete balance sheet data or other inadequacies. Hence, the last column depicts our final
sample of banks that use IFRS for the first time in 2005 and 2006, respectively.
 
Of those banks, 17 prepared their financial statements in accordance with local GAAP or U.S. 
GAAP in 2005. This is often the case for banks that are not required to apply the new ac-
counting rules since they are not entities with listed equity which are required to prepare their 
statements according to IFRS under the EU regulation or are allowed to use U.S. GAAP in-
                                                 
28
 We complete manually the missing figures for total assets. The dataset was set up in June 2011. In order to 
ensure that banks are also included that may no longer exist, we include both banks labeled active and inactive in 
the dataset. For some banks, total assets as of 2006 are not available since they are established later. Those banks 
are not used in the final dataset. We also manually correct the dataset for banks that are no consolidating banking 
groups and for which only aggregated balance sheets of the member banks are provided (consolidation code 
“A1“).  
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stead.29 Seven already implemented IFRS before 2005, further reducing the sample. A group 
of 20 banks was excluded since there were, e.g., no annual reports available for the years 
2005 and 2004, comparability problems of balance sheet structures or overall insufficient in-
formation that prevents a reasonable comparison. This reduces our dataset to a final sample of 
56 banks. Additionally, in order to identify the sources of changes in equity, we also gather 
information about the transition effects on equity for those 56 banks by using equity recon-
ciliations showing sources of changes in equity due to the transition. These limitations reduce 
the dataset of equity changes to 27 banks in the respective section of the study.30  
 
For the code law and common law classification in H4, we follow the basic idea outlined by 
Nobes (1983, p. 13) by putting banks from Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
in one cluster, which we will refer to as common law. The other cluster code law consists of 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. In addition to that, we also put observa-
tions from Denmark, Finland and Portugal in the cluster code law and Luxemburg in common 
law, following an extended classification of Doupnik and Salter (1993).31 Furthermore, we 
add banks from Austria and Greece to code law since those countries are closely associated 
with classic code law traditions. Hence, we count 44 banks in the cluster of countries with a 
code law background and 12 banks in the cluster common law. 
 
In order to get an impression of the regulatory impact of the first-time adoption of IFRS in 
H5, we gather information about the capital ratios, i.e., information concerning the Tier I ratio 
and the total capital ratio, if available. Sometimes there is no information available whether 
the ratios changed in the course of the transition or whether the ratios are simply reprinted 
from previous reports with or without further reference to the applied accounting system. In 
this case, we drop these observations. We obtain a sample of 34 pairs of observations of the 
Tier I ratio, and 35 of the total capital ratio, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 See for example, Delvaille, Ebbers and Saccon (2005, p. 144) discussing this possibility for German firms. 
30
 Often, banks publish changes in equity across the transition period which means that the changes cannot be 
solely attributed to changes in accounting systems but are also affected by the business activities during that 
period. Another drawback is that some banks report only the changes in equity positions, and do not refer to the 
reasons or accounting standards that cause the change. 
31
 See Doupnik and Salter (1993, p. 51) who extend the classification to fifty countries.  
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Standardized Definition of Balance Sheet Items 
IFRS does not require companies to use a completely uniformly defined and obligatorily ap-
plicable balance sheet structure (e.g., Hoogendoorn, 2006, p. 25). There were requirements 
concerning the basic items in the balance sheets and profit or loss outlined for banks in IAS 
30.32 However, they only outlined the most basic assets and liabilities and profit or loss items. 
In 2007, IAS 30 was replaced by IFRS 7 which is not sector-specific. A problem to be solved 
is the fact that the basic requirements concerning the balance sheet structure allow companies 
some autonomy in the presentation of their financial statements. Therefore, we face a two-
sided dilemma: On the one hand, balance sheet line items on a very detailed level could be 
applied bearing a higher risk of gaps and wrong classifications. On the other hand, using a 
highly aggregated level lowers information content considerably, albeit enabling comparabil-
ity. An aggregation of some balance sheet items is necessary in order to ensure comparability 
among the balance sheets of the sample and to avoid classification errors. Another argument 
in favour of an aggregation is that the investigation starts at the item of the previously applied 
GAAP. In financial statements under national GAAP there are often balance sheet items that 
cannot be categorized unambiguously into one specific IFRS account and vice versa. There-
fore, we use a two-step approach and classify all balance sheet items into a standardized for-
mat to enhance comparability of the single items in a first step, basically following a categori-
zation depending on IAS 30 and the OECD (2005) report of bank profitability.33 However, we 
extend the classification by introducing specific balance sheet items relating to insurance spe-
cific items which might also be separately presented and evaluated through the transition. In 
cases where the description of the balance sheet item is ambiguous and cannot be unambigu-
ously attributed to one accounting item according to our classification, we extend the analysis 
to the notes of the financial statements in a second step. The categorization is as follows: 
• On the asset side, Cash and Balances at Central Banks comprise cash and cash 
equivalents as well as deposits at central banks.  
• The items Loans to other Banks and Loans to Customers comprise all granted loans to 
the respective group, such as loans, advances or to customers or credit institutions as 
well as receivables.  
• The item Strategic Investments contains balance sheet items such as long-term partici-
pating interests, investments in associates, or joint ventures.  
                                                 
32
 See IAS 30.19 and IAS 30.10. 
33
 OECD (2005), pp. 7-9. 
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• Insurance-related Assets contains all insurance related assets if they are separately 
shown in the balance sheet, for example, investments on behalf of insurance policy-
holders, insurance investment portfolios, or long-term insurance business assets.  
• On the liability side, Loans from Banks and Customer Deposits consist of the liabili-
ties of the bank owed to those respective groups, such as deposits due to credit institu-
tions or customers. The item Insurance-related Liabilites comprises, for example, li-
abilities under insurance contracts, liabilities to policyholders as well as insurance 
specific technical reserves.  
• The items Other Assets and Other Liabilities, respectively, comprehend all accounts 
which cannot be classified into one of the other items. Examples for Other Assets are 
property, plant and equipment, goodwill, investment property, or accruals or ‘other as-
sets’ as presented by the banks. Other Liabilities are, for example, accrual accounts, 
tax or subordinated liabilities, provisions, retirement liabilities or ‘other liabilities’. 
Total Equity comprises shareholders’ equity components provided by the banks as 
well as minority interest.  
 
We use a balance sheet classification that could particularly give insights into the effect of the 
recognition and valuation of financial instruments, i.e., the application of IAS 32 and IAS 39. 
Due to this, we use the balance sheet item called Securities and Financial Assets at Fair 
Value on the asset side. This category comprises, for example, financial assets held for trad-
ing, all kinds of debt securities and equity shares held by the bank as well as hedging deriva-
tives – if explicitly stated in the balance sheet. Under IFRS the classification contains finan-
cial securities referring to held-to-maturity, all securities and other financial assets that are 
categorized as at fair value through profit or loss, held for trading, and available-for-sale.  
 
On the liability side there is Securities and Financial Liabilities at Fair Value containing, for 
example, issued debt securities, certificates, bonds or short positions and derivatives, if ex-
plicitly presented in the balance sheet. Under IFRS, the items included also comprise financial 
liabilities at fair value through profit or loss, if available. The crucial question is how these 
items will react under IFRS accounting in comparison to the previously published GAAP fig-
ures.  
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We are aware that the changes in the items can be attributed to both changes in valuation and 
reclassifications. Therefore, in order to separate the pure valuation effects, we also analyze the 
changes in equity in order to identify the sources of valuation changes, which directly or indi-
rectly have to influence equity. Through this, we should get a more complete impression of 
how much the change in the accounting system actually influences the valuation of assets and 
liabilities and the structure of balance sheets and how much of the effects is only attributable 
to pure reclassifications. 
 
Calculation of Changes 
In order to ease comparisons, we try to gather balance sheet information based on a full appli-
cation of the standards IAS 32, IAS 39 and IFRS 4 which have to be obligatorily applied for 
fiscal years starting on or after 1st January 2005. In some cases, the standards have already 
been applied voluntarily at the end of the prior year for comparison reasons. Therefore, we 
follow the rule to use the data covering these standards – if available – at the end of 2004 or 
the opening balances for 2005. 
 
To compare the figures of the reports, we simply calculate the change in percent for every 
balance sheet item caused by the transition and calculate the unweighted average across all 
banks, i.e., the average value. In order to measure the changes in percent in the balance sheet 
items and to prevent distortions, we abstain from including items with no value under either 
IFRS or local GAAP, since a calculation of changes would not be reasonable in this case. 
Mainly, this is the case for insurance related assets that are explicitly stated under only one 
accounting system. In Table II, the number of values for each item and accounting system are 
reported separately. In order to test for significance of means and differences between means 
we use a common t-test (two-tailed), and a Wilcoxon signed rank test to test the significance 
of medians and differences in medians.  
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2.5 Empirical Results 
Total Sample (H1) 
Testing H1 for the entire sample, it can be clearly shown that there is a strong change in bal-
ance sheet structures. Turning to Table II, we find that the average change in balance sheet 
totals amounts to +5.48% (+3.30%).34 This result supports our hypothesis H1 of a significant 
change since both the mean and the median are highly significant (1%-level). This result is 
also supported by the results of CEBS (2006) finding an even stronger reaction of +9% for the 
balance sheet total.35 
 
Securities and Financial Assets at Fair Value shows a remarkable leap of +60.51% 
(+38.89%) and is highly significant for both means and medians (1%-level). This fact is 
mainly confirmed by the findings of CEBS (2006) for which, after recalculating the figures 
according to our classification, an increase in financial assets of over 50% can be observed. 
For this reaction basically two potential reasons can be identified: The first reason concerns 
the new classification of financial items. As already mentioned above, we try to capture this 
effect using a higher aggregation level of the position of financial assets which reduces the 
potential distortion effect of reclassifications. The second reason is the revaluation effect of 
the securities items under IFRS, i.e., the disclosure of hidden reserves, which, consequently, 
has to be also responsible for the strong increase. This observation unambiguously shows the 
change due to the transition to IFRS, strongly confirming hypothesis H1.  
 
For Strategic Investments a reduction of -36.89% (-44.60%) can be observed. The main rea-
son for this observation is that under IFRS only investments in associates and jointly con-
trolled entities are considered whereas under most local GAAPs, there are also other equity 
securities separately considered that are held as strategic investments. Under IFRS, those eq-
uity securities are mostly reclassified in accordance to IAS 39, e.g., to available-for-sale, in-
creasing the item Securities and Financial Assets at Fair Value. However, the reclassification 
effect from Investments has to be rather low, since it only contributes to a minor part of the 
total item value under local GAAP (1.2 %).  
 
 
                                                 
34
 Unless otherwise expressed, we report medians in parentheses. 
35
 See CEBS (2006, p. 2-3). 
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Insurance-related Assets experience a decline of -31.48% (-4.13%) which is significant to the 
10%-level only. Under local GAAP, for example, this item comprises assets in insurance op-
erations whereas under IFRS, this item refers to financial assets for which the policyholders 
bear the risk. Furthermore, sometimes mentioned in the financial statements, insurance con-
tracts with very low risk have to be considered investment contracts. Thus, potential reclassi-
fications reducing Insurance-related Assets explain to a lesser degree the overall reclassifica-
tions, since the contribution to total assets of that position under local GAAP if explicitly 
stated is rather small, i.e., about 7.6%.  
 
As a consequence, the item Capital and Reserves is expected to increase since asset items 
valued at fair value, which are not classified as at fair value through profit or loss, have to 
change the value of the reserves directly. However, this item shows no significant reaction, 
even though the magnitude seems to be in line with -5% in the observations of CEBS (2006). 
 
CEBS (2006, p. 2-3) find that although revaluation reserves increase strongly, the reaction is 
offset by the first-time adoption effect of post-employment obligations and a reduction in mi-
nority interests for preference shares held by third parties that are accounted for as debt under 
IFRS. We classified the fund for general banking risk as well as minority interests in total 
consolidated equity which makes a direct comparison more meaningful, albeit reducing the 
comparability of single effects. From a creditor’s perspective, an equity reduction might be 
negatively interpreted on first glance at the balance sheet. However, recalculating the ROE 
yields a higher profitability which might be positively perceived by equity investors. An in-
depth analysis of transition effects on equity is carried out below in the discussion of equity 
changes. 
 
Loans to Other Banks containing loans and advances to other banks shows no significant re-
action, whereas Loans to Customers increases by a highly significant +2.40% (+0.89%). The 
largest increases reported can be attributed to consolidation effects and securitized loans that 
were not included under local GAAP. One observation is that the reactions of Loans to Other 
Banks are caused, for the most part, by reclassifications to other financial items that are cate-
gorized at fair value.  
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Table II: Total Sample – Changes of Single Balance Sheet Items 
Grundblatt Umstellung 2005
Assets Mean t-value N
(Median) Wilcoxon comp. LGAAP IFRS N > 0 N = 0 N < 0
Cash and Balances with Central Banks +10.99% 1.53 55 55 55 30 13 12
(+0.00%) 2.65 +++
Loans to other Banks -4.02% -1.51 56 56 56 33 1 22
(+0.31%) 0.28
Loans to Customers +2.40% 3.13 *** 56 56 56 39 0 17
(+0.89%) 3.34 +++
Securities and Fin. Assets at Fair Value +60.51% 6.26 *** 56 56 56 51 0 5
(+38.89%) 5.89 +++
Strategic Investments -36.89% -5.11 *** 50 53 52 11 1 38
(-44.60%) -4.56 +++
Insurance-related Assets -31.48% -2.16 * 9 17 25 3 0 6
(-4.13%) -1.36
Other Assets -12.34% -1.42 56 56 56 18 0 38
(-25.00%) -3.36 +++
Liabilities
Loans from Banks -3.01% -1.36 56 56 56 28 5 23
(+0.00%) -0.39
Customer Deposits -1.31% -1.86 * 56 56 56 21 4 31
(-0.16%) -1.84 +
Securities and Liabilities at Fair Value +58.13% 4.85 *** 56 56 56 52 0 4
(+27.59%) 6.23 +++
Insurance-related Liabilities -3.59% -0.56 18 18 38 7 1 10
(-0.88%) -0.61
Other Liabilities -18.33% -3.12 *** 56 56 56 19 0 37
(-22.93%) -3.30 +++
Capital and Reserves -3.18% -1.45 56 56 56 27 0 29
(-1.06%) -1.31
Balance Sheet Total +5.48% 5.46 *** 56 56 56 49 0 7
(+3.30%) 5.24 +++
Balance Sheet Total IFRS (in Thousand €) 13,631,284                 
N
This table depicts the changes in percent of single balance sheet items. The second column shows the change in percent for the respective
balance sheet position in the changeover from local GAAP to IFRS. The corresponding values in the third column report the respective
values for the t-test statistics. ***,**,* indicate significance on the 1%-,5%,-10%- level for a t-test (two-tailed). The values in
parentheses show the median values for the respective change for each balance sheet position. The values in italics in the third column
indicate the test values for a Wilcoxon signed rank test. +++,++,+ indicate a significance to the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level.
N denotes the number of observations in the comparison (comp.), the number of observations under LGAAP and IFRS, respectively. 'N >
0',  'N < 0' and 'N=0' denote the increases, decreases and observations with no change in the specific line item.
 
The item Other Assets shows a negative reaction of -12.34% (-25.00%) concerning means 
(medians) which is, however, significant only concerning medians. One main factor leading to 
a reduction is that under many local GAAPs derivatives are included in Other Assets. Accord-
ing to IFRS, they are explicitly accounted for at fair value in financial assets. In addition, this 
item contains the remainder that is not affected directly by banking-specific business and 
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comprises simply items, such as positions relating to property, plant and equipment, goodwill 
and intangible assets. However, as the focus of our investigation is on items related to banking 
and Other Assets accounts only for a minor part of total assets, we do not intend to speculate 
about this observation and instead concentrate on the reactions of bank-specific positions in 
the following.  
 
The financial liability position Securities and Liabilities at Fair Value shows a highly signifi-
cant reaction with +58.13% (+27.59%) according to means and medians (1%-level). The reac-
tion is attributable, for a large part, to the reclassification of derivatives that were classified as 
‘other liabilities’ until the changeover.  
 
Customer Deposits exhibits a negative reaction with -1.31% (-0.16%) which is significant for 
both means and medians. However, the slight decrease might source in various reasons, e.g., 
reclassifications as well as valuation changes. 
 
To summarize, we find that the reaction in single balance sheet items is a strong signal for a 
profound change in basic accounting assumptions concerning inclusion and measurement of 
items, strongly supporting our first hypothesis H1. 
 
Sources for Equity Changes 
In order to identify the specific changes in equity, we analyze the main sources for the 
changes in shareholders’ equity in the transition to IFRS. In Table III, we classify the main 
changes in shareholders’ equity which are expressed as a percentage of equity under previous 
GAAP. As the overall change in equity is +1.58% (+2.40%), this seems to be contrary to the 
results of the previous section. However, we have to keep in mind that the “aggregate item” 
Capital and Reserves in the previous section also contains the fund for general banking risk 
under local GAAP, and minority interests. Additionally, in this section we work with a 
smaller subsample of 27 banks which is nearly half the sample of the previous section. 
 
We find that several items change especially strongly: The fund for general banking risk cov-
ers non-specific banking risks which was allowed under many national GAAPs according to 
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the European Directive on bank accounts.36 In the transition to IFRS, the fund for general 
banking risk has to be resolved and reclassified to reserves.37  
 
Another positive effect stems from dividends which are recognized as a liability according to 
local GAAP have to be reversed and accounted for in equity. The reason for this is that ac-
cording to IFRS dividends have to be accounted for in equity until they are approved by the 
shareholders. Under several local GAAPs dividends are accounted for as a liability when they 
are proposed by a bank’s management. The application of IAS 32, IAS 39 and IFRS 4 has a 
positive impact on equity. In order to identify separate effects, we attempt to classify the 
sources into the specific accounting standards.38 
 
Overall, we find that valuation of financial instruments increases equity. One effect contribut-
ing a great deal to the increase is that many financial assets that were previously recognized at 
amortized cost are now categorized as available-for-sale. This implies a fair value valuation of 
these assets with a positive effect on ‘other comprehensive income’ in equity. 
 
Another positive effect can be reported from Goodwill accounting which leads on average to 
an increase of 2.06 %. One effect often reported is that Goodwill was written off over time 
according to some local GAAPs while according to IFRS it is subject to an impairment test. 
Therefore, equity has to be adjusted for the Goodwill depreciation already recognized.  
 
Tax effects such as deferred tax assets that were previously not accounted for according to 
local GAAP, increase equity on average by 1.42%. 
 
 
                                                 
36
 See Article 38 of the Directive 86/635/EEC, ruling the details of the Fund for general banking risks prior to 
IFRS. 
37According to IAS 30.50-IAS 30.52, any changes have to be separately disclosed as appropriations of retained 
earnings. 
38
 In some cases, we have to make assumptions since some of the effects of the application of IAS 32, IAS 39 
and IFRS 4 are reported only in combination and could not be separated. We try to classify these effects based 
on further explanations given in the financial statements. If not, we add them to the largest effect available. Ho-
wever, in total, they are immaterial.  
  
 
23 
 
Table III: Average Adjustment of Equity Through Transition 
Grundblatt Umstellung 2005
Source Mean N
(Median)
Treasury Shares (IAS 32) -2.25% 9
(-1,74%)
Profit or Loss (IAS 8)/ Dividends (IAS 10) 3.93% 14
(4.88%)
Funds for General Banking Risk (IAS 30) 6.97% 6
(6.10%)
Intangible Assets (IAS 38), PP&E (IAS 16), 0.15% 24
Investment Property (IAS 40) (0.07%)
Gains and Losses on Financial Instruments (IAS 39) 1.43% 26
and Insurance Contracts (IFRS 4) (1.02%)
 - Financial Instruments (IAS 32/39) (w/o Debt/Equity) 2.21% 26
(1.71%)
 - Debt/Equity (IAS 32) 1.35% 10
(1.75%)
 - Insurance Contracts (IFRS 4) -2.59% 13
(-1.43%)
Employee Benefits (IAS 19), Share-based Payments (IFRS2) -5.45% 26
(-1.23%)
Goodwill/ Goodwill Impairment (IFRS 3/IAS 36) 2.06% 16
(1.33%)
Investments in Associates (IAS 28), Business Combinations (IFRS3), 0.67% 20
Consolidated and Separate Financial Statements (IAS27) (0.00%)
Tax Effects (IAS 12) 1.42% 20
(-0.32%)
Leases (IAS 17) -0.40% 9
(-0.05%)
Other -0.17% 24
(0.05%)
Total Average +1.58% 27
(2.40%)
This table depicts the average and median effect of single adjustments on equity, as share of
local GAAP equity. N denotes the number of banks in this calculation.
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A negative effect on equity is caused by accounting for employee benefits (IAS 19) such as 
salaries or pension benefits and share-based payments (IFRS 2), reducing equity by 5.45%. 
Very often changes in the basic assumptions such as discount rates, growth rates, or the retro-
spective application of the new rules are reported to have a negative effect on the recalcula-
tion of employee benefits. An offsetting effect might have share-based payments in the transi-
tion since option plans are accrued until the shares and options are available according to 
IFRS. Under local GAAPs, option plans are often reported to be accounted for as expenses in 
the year they arise.  
 
According to IFRS, treasury shares and short positions in the respective options have to be 
directly deducted from equity leading to a reduction of -2.25%. The rationale is that under 
local GAAPs these shares and options are often recognized as assets with an offsetting bal-
ance sheet entry in equity.  
 
Comparably, accounting for insurance contracts reduces equity on average by -2.59%. One 
major effect mentioned is that the value of in-force business decreases in the course of the 
transition which means that liabilities from insurance contracts are higher than the expected 
future payments leading to adjustments in equity.  
 
The accounting for leasing reduces equity on average by -0.40%. One effect mainly reported 
results from the application of different depreciation methods for operating lease assets under 
local GAAP and IAS 17. The largest effects can be seen from banks using a different depre-
ciation method under UK GAAP prior to transition.  
 
Cross-sectional variance (H2) 
In order to test H2 and to check for variability in reporting between accounting systems, we 
calculate the cross-sectional variance for every balance sheet item under national GAAP rules 
and IFRS.39 Then we test for equality of variances using a common F-test. Since the F-test is 
sensitive to deviations from non-normality, we also use the Levene’s Test and the Brown-
Forsythe Test as robustness checks. For purpose of better interpretations, we also provide the 
standard deviations for both IFRS and local GAAP in order to make the direction of changes 
transparent, i.e., an increase or decrease in variance.  
 
                                                 
39
 Hung and Subramanyam (2007, p. 637) use a comparable approach to investigate the cross-sectional variabil-
ity of their sample of German companies. 
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In Table IV, we find that there is a significant increase in cross-sectional variance after transi-
tion in balance sheet items strongly related to valuation at fair value. Especially the items 
concerning securities and financial assets at fair value, and financial liabilities at fair value, 
respectively, are significant for all tests applied at least at the 10%-level. This means that a 
greater variability is imported in crucial items of the reported balance sheets by using IFRS, 
and especially by the application of IAS 39 on financial assets and liabilites leading to reclas-
sifications and revaluations, supporting H2.  
 
The variability on Strategic Investments decreases after the application of IFRS. This is at-
tributable to the recognition of investments in associates and joint ventures. To be classified 
as an associated company in the consolidated financial statements of the investor, it has to 
have significant influence over the investee. This is usually presumed if the investor holds at 
least 20% of the voting power according to IAS 28. Under many local GAAPs, this position 
comprises also, e.g., equity securities which were held as fixed assets and participating inter-
est of which many did not reach the 20% shareholdings to be accounted for at equity. After 
transition, those were treated as financial assets according to IAS 39 leading to reclassifica-
tions of those assets.  
 
As mentioned above, one main reason for the variability decrease in Insurance-related Assets 
might be that for assets for some insurance contracts with no significant insurance risk borne 
by the bank, the respective contracts are treated as investment contracts. The underlying fi-
nancial assets are then reclassified into the financial asset categories according to IAS 39 and 
are, therefore, in many cases not separately stated in the financial statements. These results are 
in line with the observations of Hung and Subramanyam (2007, p. 637) who identify a greater 
fair value orientation as a possible reason for increasing the differences across companies un-
der IFRS.  
 
The observation of a greater cross-sectional variance in balance sheets after transition to IFRS 
can be interpreted ambivalently. On the one hand, a greater cross-sectional variance can be 
seen positively by the fact that, after transition, differences between single banks become 
more obvious in terms of widening the possible scale for reported balance sheet figures. Ab-
stractly, this means that differences between investment alternatives become more transparent 
for investors to make investment decisions since they better reflect differences in the individ-
ual economic situations of companies (e.g., Barth et al. 2008, p. 471). Following this reason-
  
 
26 
 
ing, it becomes easier for an investor to put those banks in an investment order on the basis of 
balance sheet analysis according to the accounting system with higher variances. On the other 
hand, we have to keep in mind that the cross-sectional variability could be influenced – if not 
dominated – by a one-time effect of the transition.  
. 
  
 
27 
 
Table IV: Total Sample –Test of Differences in Cross-Sectional Variances between National GAAP and IFRS 
Assets STD IFRS N STD LGAAP N STD IFRS/ F-Test Prob Liabilities STD IFRS N STD LGAAP N STD IFRS/ F-Test Prob
STD LGAAP Levene Test Prob STD LGAAP Levene Test Prob
Brown-Forsythe Prob Brown-Forsythe Prob
Cash and Balances 5,244            55 4,271               55 1.23 0.66                  13% Loans from Banks 37,297         56 50,119              56 0.74 1.81                  3% **
with Central Banks 0.81                 37% 1.71                 19%
0.26                 61% 0.60                 44%
Loans to other Banks 24,906          56 36,098             56 0.69 2.10                  1% *** Customer Deposits 125,364       56 124,291            56 1.01 0.98                  95%
3.02                 9% + 0.01                 92%
1.17                 28% 0.00                 95%
Loans to Customers 135,227        56 129,726           56 1.04 0.92                  76% Securities and Liabilities 123,700       56 42,279              56 2.93 0.12                  0% ***
0.01                 92% at Fair Value 15.58               0% +++
0.00                 96% 5.35                 2% °°
Securities and Fin. Assets 153,341        56 76,092             56 2.02 0.25                  0% *** Insurance-related Liabilities 43,176         38 55,986              18 0.77 1.68                  18%
at Fair Value 8.79                 0% +++ 2.27                 14%
2.96                 9% ° 1.14                 29%
Strategic Investments  1,348            52 2,372               53 0.57 3.10                  0% *** Other Liabilities 25,199         56 46,720              56 0.54 3.44                  0% ***
11.12                0% +++ 11.43               0% +++
3.66                  6% ° 4.39                 4% °°
Insurance-related Assets 17,245          25 39,518             17 0.44 5.25                  0% ***
14.27               0% +++
6.55                 1% °°
Other Assets 22,073          56 33,082             56 0.67 2.25                  0% *** Capital and Reserves 14,377         56 15,990              56 0.90 1.24                  43%
7.18                 1% +++ 0.31                 58%
2.72                 10% 0.07                 79%
Balance Sheet Total 317,370        56 279,843           56 1.13 0.78                  35%
0.45                 50%
0.13                 72%
Total Sample
This table depicts the test statistics for the hypothesis that cross-sectional variances for single balance sheet items are the same under local GAAP and IFRS. 'STD IFRS' and 'STD LGAAP' report the respective cross-sectional standard deviations of the respective balance
sheet items (in million Euro). The third column depicts the direction of the change, i.e. cross-sectional variance is larger under IFRS reported figures if 'STD IFRS/STD LGAAP' >1. The bold values in the fourth column depict the test statistics of a common F-test. The
bold values in the column 'Prob' show the respective probability. ***,**,* indicate a significance on the 1%-,5%,-10%- level for a common F-test. The values in italics depict the test statistics of a Levene's Test. The values in italics in the column 'Prob' show the
respective probability. +++,++,+ indicate a significance on the 1%-,5%,-10%- level for a Levene's Test. The last values depict the values of a Brown-Forsythe test statistics replacing the mean in the Levene-Test by the median. The last values in the column 'Prob' show
the respective probability of the respective Brown-Forsythe test statistics. °°°,°°,° indicate a significance on the 1%-,5%,-10%- level for a Brown-Forsythe test statistics . 
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Listed and unlisted banks (H3) 
Another interesting insight is expected from a division into the subsamples of listed and 
unlisted banks. As already hypothesized in H3, the reaction of unlisted banks is expected to be 
higher due to the necessity of more adjustments caused by the transition to IFRS.  
 
In Table V, we can observe a similar reaction of total assets for 44 banks in Listed in compari-
son to the 12 in Unlisted. Different reactions of unlisted and listed banks can be reported from 
Loans to other banks with no significant reaction for unlisted banks and a negative and sig-
nificant reaction of -6.01% (-0.39%) for listed banks. Testing for differences confirms the 
perception of two individual reactions of each subsample, basically supporting H3. For listed 
banks, one cause often reported for the decrease is the reclassification of reverse repos from 
loans and advances to other credit institutions which are, for example, separately disclosed or 
categorized as held-for-trading or available-for-sale and are recognized, as a consequence, at 
fair value after transition.  
 
We have to be cautious about interpreting the differences in Insurance-related Assets due to 
very small sample sizes. For listed companies, the decrease can be attributed to the insurance 
contracts that are treated as investment contracts due to their low insurance risk. Usually, the 
respective assets are therefore reclassified and recognized as financial assets. However, for 
both Loans to other banks and Insurance-related Assets, differences in the reactions are only 
significant for means, but not for medians. This indicates that some large reactions influence 
these balance sheet items.  
 
For Securities and Financial Liabilities at Fair Value, we find that the increase in means for 
listed banks is about twice the reaction for unlisted banks. For both groups of listed and 
unlisted banks, the reclassification of derivatives, e.g., hedging derivatives and recognition in 
a separate line item, leads to an increase in this position. Furthermore, other reclassifications 
of financial liabilities as well as a valuation at fair value of some liabilities contribute to the 
increase. This would also explain the decreases in Other Liabilities as the position in which 
the derivatives were usually recognized prior to transition.  
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Table V: Listed and Unlisted Banks - Change of Single Balance Sheet Items 
Grundblatt Umstellung 2005
Veränderungen in % Auswertung: Means ***,**,* t-test 1%-,5%,10% two tailed test
Assets Mean t-value N Mean t-value N Mean t-value
(Median) Wilcoxon (Median) Wilcoxon (Median) Wilcoxon
Cash and Balances with Central Banks +3.01% 0.83 12 +13.21% 1.45 43 -10.21% -1.04
(+0.00%) 0.91 (+0.01%) 2.56 ++ (-0.01%) -0.57
Loans to other Banks +3.25% 1.52 12 -6.01% -1.83 * 44 +9.26% 2.36 **
(+0.99%) 1.49 (+0.18%) -0.39 (+0.82%) 1.36
Loans to Customers +1.82% 1.11 12 +2.56% 2.92 *** 44 -0.74% -0.40
(-0.52%) -0.24 (+1.58%) 3.59 +++ (-2.10%) -1.72 +
Securities and Fin. Assets at Fair Value +66.31% 2.36 ** 12 +58.93% 6.00 *** 44 +7.38% 0.25
(+45.15%) 2.35 ++ (+38.89%) 5.36 +++ (+6.26%) -0.44
Strategic Investments  -29.52% -2.11 * 12 -39.22% -4.63 *** 38 +9.70% 0.59
(-44.42%) -1.88 + (-44.60%) -4.18 +++ (+0.18%) 0.93
Insurance-related Assets +4.43% 1.60 2 -41.74% -2.48 ** 7 +46.17% 2.70 **
(+4.43%) 1.34 (-45.55%) -1.86 ++ (+49.98%) 1.46
Other Assets +19.82% 0.64 12 -21.11% -3.10 *** 44 +40.93% 1.28
(-0.41%) -0.16 (-27.19%) -3.56 +++ (+26.77%) 1.76 +
Liabilities
Loans from Banks +3.31% 0.69 12 -4.74% -1.92 * 44 +8.04% 1.48
(+0.38%) 0.31 (+0.00%) -0.58 (+0.38%) 0.76
Customer Deposits -2.57% -1.71 12 -0.97% -1.21 44 -1.60% -0.94
(-1.93%) -1.54 (-0.12%) -1.20 (-1.81%) -0.92
Securities and Liabilities at Fair Value +25.78% 2.94 ** 12 +66.95% 4.51 *** 44 -41.17% -2.39 **
(+18.04%) 2.51 ++ (+32.67%) 5.68 +++ (-14.63%) -1.62
Insurance-related Liabilities -21.41% -1.00 2 -1.36% -0.20 16 -20.05% -0.89
(-21.41%) -1.00 (-0.88%) -0.26 (-20.53%) -0.84
Other Liabilities +13.60% 0.77 12 -27.04% -5.30 *** 44 +40.64% 2.21 **
(+10.79%) 0.94 (-28.84%) -4.11 +++ (+39.64%) 2.52 ++
Capital and Reserves -2.30% -0.43 12 -3.42% -1.42 44 +1.12% 0.19
(-1.80%) -0.39 (-0.55%) -1.30 (-1.25%) 0.10
Balance Sheet Total +5.66% 2.52 ** 12 +5.42% 4.79 *** 44 +0.23% 0.09
(+3.96%) 2.28 ++ (+3.30%) 4.84 +++ (+0.66%) 0.44
Unlisted Listed Listed vs. Unlisted
This table depicts the changes in percent of single balance sheet items for the subsamples of listed and unlisted banks. The first
column of each sample shows the change in percent for the respective balance sheet position in the changeover from local GAAP
to IFRS. The corresponding values in the second column show the respective values for a common t-test (two-tailed). ***,**,*
indicate a significance on the 1%-,5%,-10%- level for a two sided t-test. The values in parentheses show the median values for the
respective change for each balance sheet item. The values in italics in the second column indicate the test values for a Wilcoxon
signed rank test. +++,++,+ indicate a significance to the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level.
The column 'Listed vs Unlisted' depicts the differences in means for the respective balance sheet position in the changeover for
each pair of corresponding subsamples. The corresponding values in the second column show the respective values for the
common t-test statistics. ***,**,* indicate a significance on the 1%-,5%,-10%- level for a t-test (two-tailed). The values in
parentheses show the difference in median values for each balance sheet item. The values in italics in the second column indicate
the test values for a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. +++,++,+ report a significance to the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level.
 
However, for listed banks, we find higher amounts of derivatives and other financial liabilities 
that are reclassified, e.g., hedging derivatives that are shown in this position. Furthermore, the 
shares of liabilities using fair value seem to be generally higher leading to a stronger increase. 
This may be also attributable in part to the fact that listed banks often make use of financing 
by tradable liabilities that can be valued at fair value.  
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To summarize, we find evidence of different reactions between unlisted and listed banks. 
Listed banks show greater reactions concerning financial liabilities due to the transition to 
IFRS which may be caused by higher levels of derivatives that are separately stated and more 
financial liabilities that are valued at fair value after transition. This perception is confirmed 
by the higher increase in Securities and Financial Liabilities at Fair Value for listed banks, 
refuting H3. 
 
Accounting regimes in force prior to transition to IFRS (H4)  
As already hypothesized in H4, the specific accounting system differences between local 
GAAP and IFRS should be reflected by the total change in balance sheet items due to transi-
tion to IFRS. The differences between the country-specific accounting regimes have been 
reduced due to the increasing harmonization developments in the European Union in the last 
decades. Nevertheless, using the classification of common law and code law countries, we 
should be able to identify country cluster specific differences depending on the institutional 
background and especially on the accounting background. As stated in H4, the effects of the 
transition to IFRS are greater for companies from countries of the code law cluster since the 
institutional environment is “more distant” from the IFRS accounting practice which, in gen-
eral, is claimed to be situated closer to common law accounting.  
 
In Table VI, Balance Sheet Total virtually reports comparable reactions for both means and 
medians concerning both subsamples. However, we can observe a significant negative reac-
tion of Strategic Investments for the subsample of Code Law only. Therefore, we have to be 
careful when interpreting the results. The main reasons mentioned for the decrease are in-
vestments in non-consolidated investments, i.e. long term equity investments in securities 
which are recognized as financial assets according to IAS 39. As mentioned above, prior to 
transition, those investments are shown separately as a separate item within the item Strategic 
Investments. For Common Law banks, we are unable to find a significant reaction at all. This 
reaction is in support of H4. 
 
For Securities and Financial Liabilities at Fair Value we notice significant reactions accord-
ing to means and medians for both subsamples. However, we fail to find evidence for two 
dichotomous groups since testing for differences lacks significance, although the reaction for 
common law is about 60% to 100% higher. One of the main reasons for the reactions are, as 
mentioned above, the reclassifications of derivatives into this item which in turn would ex-
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plain, at least in part, the significant reductions of Other Liabilities for both groups. The re-
ductions in this item match, more or less, the increase in Securities and Financial Liabilities 
at Fair Value. However, the reported transition reactions are higher for common law, contra-
dicting H4.  
 
Table VI: Common and Code Law - Change of Single Balance Sheet Items 
Grundblatt Umstellung 2005
Assets Mean t-value N Mean t-value N Mean t-value
(Median) Wilcoxon (Median) Wilcoxon (Median) Wilcoxon
Cash and Balances with Central Banks +8.90% 1.01 43 +18.47% 2.06 * 12 -9.57% -0.76
(+0.00%) 1.32 (+0.86%) 2.73 +++ (-0.86%) -2.67 +++
Loans to other Banks -4.82% -1.69 * 44 -1.09% -0.16 12 -3.73% -0.50
(+0.22%) -0.02 (+3.95%) 0.55 (-3.73%) -1.26
Loans to Customers +2.43% 3.27 *** 44 +2.27% 0.95 12 +0.16% 0.06
(+0.89%) 2.89 +++ (+1.01%) 1.65 * (-0.12%) -0.58
Securities and Fin. Assets at Fair Value +62.21% 5.84 *** 44 +54.27% 2.32 ** 12 +7.94% 0.31
(+48.07%) 5.33 +++ (+20.94%) 2.67 +++ (+27.13%) 0.78
Strategic Investments -43.31% -5.53 *** 42 -3.21% -0.22 8 -40.10% -2.46 **
(-62.52%) -4.60 +++ (+2.44%) 0.07 (-64.97%) -2.44 ++
Insurance related Assets -26.66% -1.90 4 -35.33% -1.40 5 +8.68% 0.30
(-24.84%) -1.83 + (+1.67%) -0.405 (-26.51%) -0.49
Other Assets -8.33% -0.77 44 -27.02% -3.42 *** 12 +18.69% 1.40
(-23.23%) -2.54 ++ (-32.10%) -2.43 ++ (+8.86%) 0.56
Liabilities
Loans from Banks -4.61% -2.01 * 44 +2.87% 0.48 12 -7.48% -1.17
(+0.00%) -0.58 (+0.04%) 0.20 (-0.04%) -0.62
Customer Deposits -1.31% -1.69 * 44 -1.31% -0.76 12 -0.00% -0.00
(-0.15%) -1.60 (-1.28%) -0.90 (+1.13%) 0.15
Securities and Liabilities at Fair Value +50.96% 4.53 *** 44 +84.40% 2.21 ** 12 -33.44% -0.84
(+25.96%) 5.56 +++ (+55.92%) 2.82 +++ (-29.96%) -0.92
Insurance related Liabilities -6.39% -1.38 9 -0.78% -0.06 9 -5.62% -0.43
(-2.85%) -1.13 (+0.00%) 0.12 (-2.85%) -0.66
Other Liabilities -15.43% -2.19 ** 44 -28.97% -3.18 *** 12 +13.54% 1.18
(-17.17%) -2.53 ++ (-28.84%) -2.28 ++ (+11.67%) 0.84
Capital and Reserves -2.23% -0.83 44 -6.68% -2.46 ** 12 +4.46% 1.17
(+0.34%) -0.30 (-9.47%) -2.04 ++ (+9.82%) 1.46
Balance Sheet Total +5.16% 5.49 *** 44 +6.64% 2.03 * 12 -1.48% -0.44
(+3.30%) 4.66 +++ (+2.81%) 2.43 ++ (+0.49%) 0.04
Code Law Common Law Code vs Common
This table depicts the changes in percent of single balance sheet items for the subsamples of banks from common law-oriented and code law
countries. The first column of each sample shows the change in percent for the respective balance sheet position in the changeover from local
GAAP to IFRS. The corresponding values in the second column show the respective values for a common t-test statistics. ***,**,* indicate a
significance on the 1%-,5%,-10%- level for a t-test (two-tailed). The values in parentheses show the median values for the respective change for
each balance sheet item. The values in italics in the second column indicate the test values for a Wilcoxon signed rank test. +++,++,+ indicate a
significance to the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level.
The column 'Code vs Common' depicts the differences in means for the respective balance sheet position in the changeover for each pair of
corresponding subsamples. The corresponding values in the second column show the respective values for the common t-test (two-tailed).  ***,**,* 
indicate a significance on the 1%-,5%,-10%- level for a two sided t-test. The values in parentheses show the difference in median values for each
balance sheet item. The values in italics in the second column indicate the test values for a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. +++,++,+ report a significance
to the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level.
 
A comparable observation can be made for the item Capital and Reserves for which we find a 
significant decrease in equity only for common law. This does not indicate common law 
banks have a significantly lower need for accounting adjustments or are able or willing to 
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reduce the transition effects due to their experience with the previously applied accounting 
systems which was believed to lead to lower adjustments in the transition to IFRS. 
 
Our results do not indicate that due to the ‘closer’ accounting regime for banks in the Com-
mon law subsample prior to the changeover, the adjustments of Common Law banks to be 
significantly lower. However, we hypothesized those banks to be more experienced and better 
able to interpret and apply the IFRS accounting rules in their favor, reducing adjustment ef-
fects. Our results provide only mixed evidence for the differences in application effects de-
pending on previous Common Law and Code Law accounting practice. Therefore, we find 
only some evidence and just weak support for hypothesis H4. 
 
Regulatory impact (H5) 
Our results so far show that the introduction of IFRS increases the values of financial instru-
ments on both assets and liabilities. This might lead to an increase in the capital buffers of a 
bank. As stated in H5, we expect higher regulatory capital ratios due to the transition to IFRS.  
 
In Table VII, we find that there is a decrease due to the changeover to IFRS in both Tier I and 
total capital ratios for almost all subsamples. For regulatory figures not to be influenced by 
accounting effects, so called prudential filters were proposed by CEBS (2004) on consolidated 
accounting figures in order to make them applicable for regulatory purposes. However, these 
had to be implemented by national authorities.40 Therefore, the banks published the corre-
sponding figures mostly on a pro-forma basis which were usually not commented in detail. In 
the absence of binding rules in all countries and some divergence in supervisory practices at 
the time of the transition, we have to be cautious in interpreting the results.41  
 
The observations yield that the application of IFRS leads nearly symmetrically to lower ratios 
across all subsamples, except for Unlisted. This result is in line with the observations of 
CEBS (2006) finding similar developments. Using unweighted means, the relative decrease of 
the Tier I capital ratio in the total sample with -2.34% is significant (5%-level) for means 
whereas the relative effect on total capital ratio amounts is not significant. This indicates a 
reduction in Tier I capital and a transition to other levels of regulatory capital since the risk 
                                                 
40
 For example, in Germany the Konzernabschlussüberleitungsverordnung (KonÜV) ruling the prudential filters 
for German banks came into force in 2007.  
41
 See CEBS (2006a) for an overview of divergences in the applicability of regulatory funds across countries in 
the European Union. 
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weighted assets remain unchanged respectively in the calculations of both quotas. This result 
is in line with CEBS (2006, p. 2) finding that first-time adoption leads to a decrease in own 
funds which is attributable mainly to a reduction of reserves. They also find that the applica-
tion of prudential filters eliminates the effect of revaluation reserves caused by fair value, 
which is partly offset by the possibility to include those revaluation reserves in Tier II capital. 
 
Table VII: Regulatory Impact 
IFRS Local GAAP Change 
(abs.)
 Change 
(rel.)
Average 
Individual 
Change
t-value Wilco-
xon
N
Total Sample 8.26% 8.46% -0.20% -2.34% -2.25% -2.21 ** -1.94 + 34
Listed 8.09% 8.36% -0.26% -3.14% -3.06% -2.84 *** -2.38 ++ 28
Unlisted 9.03% 8.93% 0.11% 1.18% 1.53% 0.63 0.42 6
Common Law 8.23% 8.47% -0.24% -2.82% -2.78% -1.80 -1.63 10
Code Law 8.27% 8.45% -0.18% -2.13% -2.03% -1.55 -1.34 24
IFRS Local GAAP Change 
(abs.)
Change 
(rel.)
Average 
Individual 
Change
t-value Wilco-
xon
N
Total Sample 11.59% 11.64% -0.05% -0.42% -0.40% -0.51 -0.15 35
Listed 11.50% 11.57% -0.07% -0.63% -0.53% -0.64 -0.11 29
Unlisted 12.07% 12.01% 0.06% 0.54% 0.23% 0.10 0.00 6
Common Law 11.12% 11.28% -0.16% -1.43% -1.36% -1.13 -0.68 10
Code Law 11.78% 11.79% 0.00% -0.03% -0.02% -0.02 0.19 25
Tier I Ratio
Total Capital Ratio
This table depicts average regulatory capital ratios published in the respective annual reports under IFRS or local GAAP for the year 2004. The
first panel 'Tier I Ratio' comprises regulatory core capital which is the central limit for the capital adequacy calculation. The second panel
'Total Capital Ratio' depicts the total regulatory equity as percentage of total risks taken by the bank. The column 'Change (abs.)' indicates the
absolute change of the regulatory ratio, whereas 'Change (rel.)' depicts the change in relation to the ratio published under the prior GAAP
regime. 'Average Individual Change' shows the average across all indivudal changes, i.e. unweighted average of changes. The column 't-value'
reports the t-value according to a common t-test (two-tailed) on average individual changes. ***,**,* indicate a signficance on the 1%-,5%- or
10%-level.The corresponding median values are not reported. The column 'Wilcoxon' depicts the test statistics according to a Wilcoxon signed
rank test. +++,++,+ indicate signficance on the 1%-,5%- or 10%-level according to the Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
 
This is in line with our observations of a stronger decrease in the Tier I ratio and no signifi-
cant effect on the total capital ratio. A reduced Tier I capital might also be caused by increases 
in the corrections of intangible assets and Goodwill that have to be deducted from Tier I capi-
tal. For example, the impairment-only approach for Goodwill through the IFRS application 
would, in the absence of a triggering event, lead to higher corrections of Tier I capital over 
time. Financial assets classified available-for-sale are valued at fair value with changes di-
rectly recognized in equity. The effect of the revaluation reserves of the financial assets are 
neutralized through the prudential filters. Those revaluation reserves can only be recognized 
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as Tier II capital (CEBS 2004, p. 3). For unlisted banks, we find that the absolute levels for 
both the Tier I and total capital ratios are generally higher. However, we observe a strong and 
significant decrease in the Tier I capital ratio (total capital ratio) for listed banks with -3.06% 
(-0.53%). However for Unlisted, we cannot confirm this observation. The overall effect dis-
cussed above seems to be driven by the negative impact on listed banks. 
 
Turning to the subsamples of common law and code law countries, neither for the common 
law subsample nor for banks from code law countries can significant reactions for banks on 
Tier I capital be reported. Concerning total capital ratios, we make a comparable observation. 
 
To summarize, the strongest reactions are reported from the sample of listed banks, those 
banks that are commonly supposed to possess more tradable assets and liabilities in their port-
folios. The application of fair value does not lead to a substantial inflation in regulatory fig-
ures which can be interpreted positively by banking regulators at first glance. Counter-
intuitively, a negative impact of IFRS reporting on regulatory capital can be observed for 
listed banks, refuting our hypothesis H5 and also refuting the common suspicion of IFRS ex-
panding the regulatory capital base of banks. This result is in line with the findings of CEBS 
(2007) investigating the impact of prudential filters on regulatory capital for later periods. 
However, it has to be kept in mind that all reported figures are on a pro-forma basis at this 
date. Therefore, they might be distorted by subjective influences and country specific ar-
rangements in absence of binding rules throughout Europe to calculate regulatory capital 
based on IFRS figures at that time.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
We find that there are profound effects on single balance sheet items of banks due to the tran-
sition from local GAAP to IFRS. The effects on items of financial assets and financial liabili-
ties record the largest increases, documenting fundamental changes in assumptions underlying 
the new accounting regime. The in-depth analysis of changes in equity shows that most of the 
positive effects stem from the cancellation of the fund for general banking risk, the recogni-
tion of dividends in equity and valuation effects of financial instruments. Comparing the 
cross-sectional variance across single balance sheet items for both GAAP regimes shows that 
there is a significant increase for items strongly related to financial instruments. However, we 
do not find evidence of higher reactions for the transition of unlisted banks. In fact, the con-
trary reaction can be observed for some items. The division into countries with common law 
and code law orientation does not lead to clear results. For code law countries, we are able to 
find some balance sheet items to react more in the transition to IFRS, in support of our hy-
pothesis. However, the mixed evidence suggests that banks from countries with an accounting 
regime ‘closer’ to IFRS do not experience significantly weaker adjustments of all balance 
sheet items due to application of the new rules. This fact questions allegations of a smoother 
transition by a superior anticipation of the new rules’ impact. Turning to the regulatory im-
pact, we find that there is a significant reduction of Tier I capital which is the central figure to 
determine total regulatory capital. Nevertheless, dividing the sample into subsamples does not 
yield unambiguous results. However, it has to be kept in mind that these figures were only 
voluntarily provided on a pro-forma basis by the reporting banks. 
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3 Information Value of Earnings Announcements and the 
Obligatory Transition to IFRS - The Case of European 
Banks  
3.1 Introduction 
The mandatory application of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the Euro-
pean Union for consolidated financial statements in 2005 imposes many changes on basic 
assumptions towards financial reporting. (Continental) European countries already had more 
or less comparable accounting systems until 2005 since every member country of the Euro-
pean Union had to implement prior EC Directives.42  
However, contrary to the gradual accounting harmonization in the EU, many of the account-
ing systems’ basic assumptions have changed with the transition to IFRS. Firstly, starting 
with the objectives of accounting, local GAAP financial statements often served several pur-
poses before, for example as information instruments for equity investors as well as creditors 
and banks (e.g., Daske 2006, p. 336). Secondly, the accounting rules often closely interacted 
with tax regulations or other regulatory duties. For example, elements of the financial state-
ments were also partly used in the calculation of taxes.43 IFRS accounting rules better serve 
the information needs of investors in that IFRS financial statements are supposed to provide 
information mainly for capital market participants in order to enable rational investment deci-
sions, i.e., primarily equity investors but also debt investors.44 Therefore, IFRS are often be-
lieved to be superior in meeting the information needs of capital markets.  
 
Additionally, the banking business is often claimed to be particularly opaque in that banks are 
non-transparent concerning their asset and liability structure.45 Furthermore, prior to IFRS 
adoption, the impact and consequences of the application of IAS 39 led to discussions in the 
European Union, since the standard’s requirements led to grave changes in the valuation and 
presentation of financial instruments and hedge accounting which is highly relevant for bank-
                                                 
42
 For an overview, see, e.g., Joos and Lang (1994, p. 145-147). For a short review of the EU harmonization 
efforts, see Soderstrom and Sun (2007), p. 677-678. 
43
 One example for the close interaction between tax accounting and financial accounting is the tax-book-
conformity in Germany. For the influence of taxation on accounting, see Joos and Lang (1994), p. 145. Concern-
ing tax alignment in some European countries, see for example Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006, p. 1008). 
44
 See for example, Auer (1996, p. 593), Bonse (2004, p. 22) or Soderstrom and Sun (2007, p. 680). 
45
 See Morgan (2002). In the following, for purpose of convenience, “banks” and “banking institutions” are re-
ferred to synonymously.  
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ing institutions.46 Therefore, if IFRS reports are superior information instruments, the applica-
tion should lead to a leap in a bank’s transparency in comparison to local GAAP requirements 
prior to transition.  
 
In this chapter, we investigate the information value for a sample of large European banks for 
both local GAAP and IFRS earnings announcements in a classic event study approach at first. 
Besides the question if stronger market reactions to earnings announcements for the different 
accounting regimes can be observed before and after mandatory transition to international 
standards, we try to give an answer to whether the reaction to the obligatory first-time appli-
cation of IFRS is really dependent on the applied accounting system or whether other factors 
concurrently influence the effect as well. Therefore, the study attempts to identify other fac-
tors that influence the market reaction to the publication of the quarterly earnings announce-
ments, e.g., information concerning specific balance sheet items such as financial instruments 
or differences in the institutional and informational environment. Besides the absolute abnor-
mal return reaction to the earnings announcements, we use abnormal trading volumes in stock 
market reactions as an alternative measure. 
 
The initial finding is that the total market reaction is higher for earnings announcements of the 
IFRS subsample. However, an analysis of the influence specific factors refutes the responsi-
bility of IFRS accounting for this observation. Furthermore, the institutional environment 
seems to play a major role in the information value of earnings announcements, as well as the 
quality of the ex ante accounting rules in force. However, there is only weak evidence for 
accounting information concerning specific financial statement items being responsible for 
the reactions.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives a review of related literature, and de-
velops the hypotheses. Section 3.3 introduces the event study approach and the dataset used in 
this investigation. Section 3.4 presents the findings of the investigation, provides further 
analyses, robustness checks and a discussion. Section 3.5 summarizes the results and con-
cludes the chapter. 
 
                                                 
46
 As a consequence, only a carve-out version of IAS 39 was introduced in the European Union. For a discus-
sion, see Armstrong et al. (2010), p. 33-39, or Soderstrom and Sun (2007), p. 689. 
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3.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses 
3.2.1 Literature 
Basically, the investigations related to this study can be classified into two categories. The 
first strand of literature concentrates on the impact of earnings announcements on markets. 
The second stream investigates the information efficiency of accounting systems and their 
relation to the informational environment and institutional background. In the first strand, 
extensive literature has been testing market reactions to the publication of earnings an-
nouncements (e.g., Ball and Brown 1968; Beaver 1968; Auer 1996; Landsman and Maydew 
2002; DeFond, Hung and Trezevant 2007; Landsman, Maydew and Thornock 2012). Some 
studies concentrate specifically on the market reaction to the announcement of the change of 
the accounting systems (Karamanou and Nishiotis 2005; Armstrong et al. 2010).47 For exam-
ple, Armstrong et al. (2010) analyze the capital market reaction to 16 events that increase or 
decrease the probability of an IFRS adoption in the European Union. They find a positive 
market reaction to events increasing the probability of an IFRS adoption. However, they in-
vestigate only the effects of a commitment to the application of international standards in 
general which itself does not convey any valuable information concerning company specific 
application effects. Christensen, Lee and Walker (2007) concentrate on the announcements of 
the mandatory application of IFRS in the UK. They find that the mandatory adoption has ei-
ther a positive or negative effect on the cost of capital, depending on firm characteristics. 
With respect to the approach, Auer (1996) is closer to this investigation. He provides early 
evidence of the information effect, i.e., the market reactions to earnings announcements be-
fore and after the voluntary transition to IAS and EC Directives for a sample of Swiss firms. 
He shows that markets seem to appreciate the application of the new standards when meas-
ured by abnormal variances. However, he does not find evidence that market reactions differ 
significantly between both newly applied accounting regimes, indicating no fundamental dif-
ference in information content of their earnings announcements. Brixner (2011) investigates 
the market reactions to quarterly earnings announcements of European banks and detects no 
significantly higher information value of earnings announcements under the IAS accounting 
regime. In this closely related setup, he uses last quarters’ earnings per share as a best esti-
mate for next quarters’ earnings per share neglecting the dissemination of new positive or 
negative information in the meantime which might weaken the results. Furthermore, he uses a 
sector-specific index to measure abnormal returns which might additionally reduce the ef-
fects, especially in the light of an ongoing capital market integration. Landsman, Maydew and 
                                                 
47
 For a general overview, see Soderstrom and Sun (2007). 
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Thornock (2012) investigate the mandatory adoption of IFRS and find that information con-
tent of earnings announcements increases. They find that the effect is greater for countries 
with strong enforcement. 
 
It has to be kept in mind that many of the investigated transitions are voluntary adoptions of 
new accounting standards. Therefore, the results might be subject to a self-selection bias, i.e., 
only firms expecting to benefit from the application of new accounting standards voluntarily 
choose to implement these standards (e.g., Hung and Subramanyam 2007; Daske et al. 2008). 
Another argument is that the investigated firms are often larger in size which might have, in 
turn, implications for ex ante availability of information through alternative sources such as 
more intense analyst coverage leading to lower unexpected earnings.48 This would, however, 
contradict the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis (Fama 1970), except in the 
case when analysts are supplied with private, non-public information. Assuming a stable in-
formation policy of firms and using the same set of firms before and after the transition could 
be a mitigation in that the weakening effect on earnings could be comparable before and after 
transition. 
 
In a second stream, several investigations try to measure the transition to non-domestic ac-
counting standards by investigating effects on information asymmetry proxies, as cost of capi-
tal, bid-ask spreads, trading turnover, and forecast accuracy (e.g., Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001; 
Leuz 2003; Cuijpers and Buijink 2005; Daske 2006; Daske et al. 2008; Ernstberger and Vo-
gler 2008). Many studies acknowledge that the information effect on markets cannot simply 
be reduced to accounting standards but there are other factors that play a role, e.g., the institu-
tional background such as the influence of legal and political conditions. Therefore, a topic 
often referred to in extant literature is the influence of the institutional environment on ac-
counting rules and vice versa (e.g., La Porta et al. 1998; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 2003; 
Ding et al., 2007). Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) use several measures to distinguish be-
tween differences in institutional environment, e.g., outside investor rights, legal enforcement, 
and disclosure quality, and measure their influence on earnings management. They find that 
the institutional background plays a key role in the quality of reported earnings. Ding et al. 
(2007) investigate a sample of 30 countries and find several institutional factors such as the 
development of equity markets that explain the differences between local GAAP and IFRS. 
Furthermore, the information content of annual earnings announcements seems to increase 
with the quality of reported earnings and the enforcement of insider trading laws (DeFond, 
                                                 
48
 See Soderstrom and Sun (2007, p. 679) and Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001).  
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Hung and Trezevant 2007). The baseline finding of these studies investigating accounting 
systems is that firms from countries with a stronger institutional background and a lower ex 
ante information asymmetry benefit more from adopting international accounting standards.  
 
In order to exclude any influence of institutional differences on the results, two studies con-
centrate on German firms where they find a homogenous institutional setup (Leuz, 2003; 
Hung and Subramanyam, 2007) and positive effects from the application of international 
standards. For example, Leuz (2003) concentrates on the New Market. However, the univer-
sality of the results is questionable, since the firms in this market segment were foremost 
rather young and smaller start-up firms and often in the information technology industry. Fur-
thermore, it has to be noted that a booming market was investigated in this case. One disad-
vantage is that many studies do not comprise the effects of increased disclosure of bank hold-
ing companies due to their special nature of business. Only some papers concentrate on the 
analysis of bank transparency (e.g., Morgan 2002; Flannery, Kwan and Nimalendran 2004; 
Chipalkatti 2005; Ianotta 2006). For example, Chipalkatti (2005) studies the effect of in-
creased mandatory disclosure on Indian banks and finds that investors reward the improved 
information supply with lower asymmetric information cost and lower bid-ask spreads. 
Morgan (2002) finds that the opaqueness of specific bank assets such as loans or high shares 
of trading assets, are rewarded with higher disagreement among bond rating agencies. Ianotta 
(2006) draws comparable conclusions finding that specific financial assets increase uncer-
tainty if measured by bond ratings.  
 
Our study is different in several respects from previous investigations: Firstly, this dataset 
differs in that it is not restricted to voluntary adopters, but comprises obligatory adopters of 
international accounting rules for the most part.49 Therefore, it does not suffer from this po-
tential source of self-selection bias. Secondly, the sample comprises data from over a decade 
around the obligatory transition to IFRS and investigates specifically the reaction to earnings 
announcements of banks. Therefore, the main contribution of this study is that it is one of the 
few papers concentrating exclusively on European banks in a long term study and analyzing 
the determinants of information value of earnings announcements. Additionally, this investi-
gation adds to the literature on information content of banks’ earnings announcements by 
covering the period after the obligatory application of IFRS in Europe and banks that are still 
                                                 
49
 This is due to Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 which rules that IFRS have to be adopted mandatorily for con-
solidated financial statements by listed European companies for fiscal years starting on or after the beginning of 
2005. 
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in business after the banking crisis. Besides the information value of earnings announcements, 
the study is unique since it attempts to identify specific factors of the accounting system and 
institutional conditions that might influence the information content of earnings announce-
ments in the course of the first-time adoption of IFRS. In other words, it tries to answer the 
question of how much of the market reaction is attributable to the changed accounting stan-
dards themselves and whether institutional conditions such as legal systems, legal enforce-
ment, or rights of minority shareholders, might play a concurrent role in this relation. There-
fore, this study fills the gap in literature between the voluntary and mandatory adoption of 
IFRS in European banks and its information impact on capital markets. 
3.2.2 Hypotheses 
3.2.2.1 Information Value of Earnings Announcements 
From a theoretical perspective, the publication of firm-specific information decreases infor-
mation asymmetry and can change market prices and trading volumes (Diamond and Verrec-
chia 1991; Kim and Verrecchia 2001). The methodology applied in this paper rests on the 
presumption that earnings announcements are an adequate measure to transmit firm-specific 
information to the markets. The main assumption in this kind of investigation is that a larger 
absolute abnormal return might be interpreted as more unexpected information that is con-
veyed to the market. Concretely, if the earnings announcements of one accounting system 
convey more (unexpected) information value, this is reflected in higher absolute abnormal 
returns (Auer 1996, p. 598). Generally, the semi-strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothe-
sis (EMH) is assumed to hold, i.e., all publicly available information is reflected instantane-
ously in market prices and no investor is able to earn risk free profits using this information 
(Fama 1970).  
 
Increased levels of disclosure using IFRS should result in measurable economic benefits 
(Leuz and Verrecchia 2000, p. 92). Therefore, better information in terms of quality and quan-
tity of superior accounting standards should lead to greater market efficiency. The assumption 
is that financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS provide the markets with quan-
titatively and qualitatively more valuable information in contrast to the prior financial state-
ments following local GAAP requirements in Europe which is referred to as IFRS providing 
higher decision usefulness.50 More valuable information available to investors increases in-
formation efficiency which rises in consequence to the IFRS transition improving the estima-
                                                 
50
 E.g., IASB Framework as of 2001, paragraph 14. See for example, Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008), p. 471. 
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tion of firm values and leads to higher abnormal stock returns. Additionally, the effect is en-
forced by the reasons that more market participants are able to understand and process the 
IFRS information and are able to carry out comparisons across country borders.  
 
H1: Earnings announcements under IFRS lead to stronger market reactions.  
 
There should be a stronger market reaction observable due to the systematically higher infor-
mation content for earnings announcements using IFRS data, resulting in higher absolute ab-
normal returns. In order to separate effects into positive and negative unexpected information, 
the sample is divided into positive and negative changes according to the market reaction on 
event day, as to be outlined in section 3.3. Alternatively to the comparison of abnormal re-
turns, the variances of abnormal returns and abnormal volumes are analyzed as robustness 
checks with the expectation of higher values under IFRS.51 Thus, the reactions become inde-
pendent of the predicted direction by the return reactions on the event day. 
3.2.2.2 IFRS and Institutional Environment 
As outlined before, information efficiency in stock markets might be influenced by institu-
tional factors such as market structure, legal and political systems. The baseline finding of 
several studies introduced above is that firms from countries with a strong informational and 
institutional background such as efficient capital markets and strong enforcement, benefit 
more from adopting international accounting standards. Obviously, there is evidence for a 
relationship between information efficiency and the institutional background which enhances 
the processing of the new accounting information. In the year 2005, IFRS became mandatory 
for listed firms in the European Union.52 In this period, many banks in the sample adopted 
IFRS for the first time for their quarterly earnings announcements which might be an exem-
plary period with a relatively stable economic situation in Europe. One question that arises at 
this point is whether the accounting system used to provide information to the markets really 
contributes to information efficiency in a way that information content of earnings an-
nouncements is higher under IFRS and results in higher abnormal returns.  
 
H2: A stronger market reaction to earnings announcements is attributable to the 
higher information value of IFRS earnings announcements in 2005. 
                                                 
51
 The basic assumptions concerning the investigation of abnormal return variances are outlined in Auer (1998),  
p. 144-145. 
52
 Comparable requirements were introduced in Switzerland for large listed firms with an exception for banks 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008, p. 118-120). 
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The direct influence of IFRS accounting on abnormal returns of earnings announcements is 
investigated using an OLS regression setup while controlling for market specific institutional 
characteristics which might play a concurrent role in the market reaction of the earnings an-
nouncement.  
3.2.2.3 Accounting System Quality prior to Transition 
The investigation of first full year earnings announcements according to IFRS is especially 
interesting since these are the first that allow a full annual comparison of the results and pro-
vide an insight into the economic situation of a bank in relation to prior years’ situation pre-
sented under local GAAP. Furthermore, banks become comparable to competitors that already 
have been applying IFRS. If prior to transition accounting systems of “lower quality” in terms 
of information quality and quantity relevant to investors are applied by those banks, the first 
IFRS earnings announcements lead to a “level playing field” concerning both the type and 
quantity of information available to markets. Therefore, IFRS fill the “information gap” that 
increases with lower quality accounting systems prior to transition, i.e., accounting systems 
that used to provide less valuable information for investors. The larger the “information gap” 
that is filled, the higher the expected reactions should be. 
 
H3: The market reactions to the first full year earnings announcements in accordance 
with IFRS are higher for banks with “lower accounting quality” prior to transition 
 
The ex ante accounting systems are measured using two measures representing differences of 
accounting systems in relation to IFRS, as outlined in Ding et al. (2007). 
3.2.2.4 Opaqueness of Banking Specific Assets prior to Transition 
As mentioned above, one argument often referred to is that banks are generally perceived as 
being non-transparent or opaque concerning specific assets and liabilities (e.g., Morgan 2002; 
Ianotta 2006). Furthermore, hidden reserves are a common measure to build capital buffers in 
banks that external investors can neither identify nor measure.53 IFRS prohibit the use of such 
reserves since it prevents the bank from being transparent.54 The application of fair value also 
leads to a disclosure of hidden reserves and a value increase in the affected assets. Hence, 
more valuable information about assets and liabilities through IFRS is supposed to reduce 
                                                 
53
 They are the result of the fact that the value of an asset can increase above the initially paid price and/ or the 
current book value. Therefore book values for some assets might be systematically “too low”. 
54
 See IASB Framework as of 2001, paragraph 37. 
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uncertainty among investors and to shed light on the valuation premises, making opaque as-
sets and liabilities more transparent to investors.  
 
H4: The information value of first full year earnings announcements after IFRS adop-
tion increases with the higher ex ante share of opaque banking assets. 
 
The opaqueness of banking assets is measured using ex ante financial statement information 
about investments and loans, and is analyzed by the relation to the market reactions to the 
earnings announcements after the first-time adoption of international standards. 
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3.3 Dataset and Methodology  
3.3.1 Dataset 
For the empirical investigation, a time period of over a decade beginning 2000 and ending in 
2011 is used.55 As a starting point, we apply the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 Banks consisting of 51 
European banks.56 The websites of the respective banks are checked in order to identify the 
transition date and the exact publication date of the quarterly earnings announcements.  
 
The raw sample consists of 46 banks.57 For those 46 banks, we are able to gather 593 publica-
tion dates of quarterly results in local GAAP and 1061 publication dates after the transition to 
IFRS, cf. the dataset statistics in Table VIII.58 In order to ensure a consistent dataset, we 
solely use data for which both price and volume data is sufficiently available. As can be seen 
in Table VIII, we have to deal with a break in the structure of earnings announcements, since 
most of the local GAAP earnings announcements take place in the period before the manda-
tory transition to IFRS in 2005. 
 
In general, the availability of information about the dissemination of earnings announcements 
is lower in the early years of the observed period. After the mandatory transition, there is only 
one bank that still uses local GAAP for its semi-annual publication of earnings announce-
ments. This might cause bias, since there might be overlapping influences of other time-
dependent factors such as a growing capital market integration or economic cycles. In order to 
ensure a consistent investigation, we have to address this issue in our later analyses.  
 
                                                 
55
 In 2011, only the 2010 fourth quarter earnings announcements are considered. 
56
 The constituents of the index as of March 2011 are used in order to ensure that sufficient data concerning 
earnings announcements after transition is available. 
57
 Two banks are excluded because they use U.S. GAAP. For one bank sufficient earnings announcement infor-
mation is not available and for one bank information is only available for the year 2010 after a spin-off. Those 
were excluded from the dataset in order to prevent distortions. One bank was excluded because IAS and local 
GAAP were used simultaneously and there was inconsistent information concerning the transition date. Four 
banks in the dataset are the product of previous mergers or acquisitions. Therefore, we follow the rule that if the 
ISIN is available for one bank before the merger or acquisition this bank is included in the dataset. 
58
 The publication policies of banks strongly vary across the sample. Therefore, in some cases, the dataset con-
tains incomplete data concerning publication dates. 
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Table VIII: Descriptive Statistics on Earnings Announcements used in the Event Study  
Year
Total in % Total in %
2000 63 11% 9 0.85%
2001 91 15% 12 1.13%
2002 107 18% 12 1.13%
2003 134 23% 12 1.13%
2004 136 23% 12 1.13%
2005 51 9% 108 10.18%
2006 2 0% 162 15.27%
2007 2 0% 166 15.65%
2008 2 0% 170 16.02%
2009 2 0% 177 16.68%
2010 2 0% 176 16.59%
2011 1 0% 45 4.24%
Total 593 100.00% 1061 100.00%
179
178
46
172
1654
159
164
168
146
148
72
Announcements under IFRS Total per Year
Total
103
119
Announcements 
under Local GAAP 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the entire sample from 2000 to 2010. It consists of 593 (1061) earnings announcements pre
(post) IFRS adoption. The table presents a breakdown of the information into the year of the publication for the earnings announcement.
Data for the year 2011 corresponds to the earnings annoucements of the fourth quarter of 2010.
 
 
In Table IX, descriptive statistics on earnings announcements per country are depicted. Using 
a dataset of 46 banks should yield about 184 earnings announcements per year which should 
consequently lead to 1886 earnings announcements over 10.25 years. However, due to the 
data availability limitations nearly 88% of all theoretically available earnings announcements 
are used in the final dataset of the event study.59 All necessary market price and volume data 
to carry out this study is obtained via Datastream.  
 
                                                 
59
 For example, one reason is that some banks only reported their results semi-annually leading to a decrease in 
available data. 
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Table IX: Descriptive Statistics on Earnings Announcements per Country 
Country Local GAAP IFRS Total
Austria 0 66 66
Belgium 22 48 70
Denmark 59 72 131
Finland 6 23 29
France 60 92 152
Germany 0 43 43
Greece 47 71 118
Ireland 6 11 17
Italy 124 204 328
Norway 5 24 29
Portugal 34 48 82
Spain 97 132 229
Sweden 67 96 163
Switzerland 17 44 61
United Kingdom 49 87 136
Total 593 1061 1654 46
4
1
3
1
6
4
2
9
3
1
5
2
1
Banks
2
2
This table displays descriptive statistics for the final sample according to their geographic origin from 2000 to 2011 for
the quarterly announcements of the respective year. It consists of 593 (1061) earnings announcements pre (post) IFRS
adoption. 'Banks' denotes the number of banks located in a country.
 
3.3.2 Methodology 
3.3.2.1 Information Value of Earnings Announcements 
As already outlined above, the main assumption in this study is that a higher information 
value of earnings announcements results in a larger abnormal return. Therefore, if there is a 
higher absolute abnormal reaction due to earnings announcements based on one accounting 
regime, it follows that one accounting regime might convey more unexpected information 
content compared to another.60 Thus, unexpected information can be defined as information 
that just became available to the market and was not anticipated. The same statement is valid 
for variances of abnormal returns. A higher variance during an event window can be best in-
terpreted as more unexpected information involved in the process of pricing a stock.  
                                                 
60
 See Auer (1996) for an extensive discussion of that approach. 
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Testing hypothesis H1, we use a standard event study approach with abnormal returns (AR).61 
In order to apply the market model, the total return index Standard and Poors Europe 350 is 
used as a market index.62 This index takes into account the geographical component and is 
therefore the best estimate for the performance of the overall market in order to use the mar-
ket model. As an estimation period, a time of -171 to -11 trading days before the publication 
of the earnings announcements is used, i.e., a total of 160 trading days. In order to test for 
significance, the t-test proposed by Brown and Warner (1985) is applied. As a robustness 
check, the non-parametric rank test introduced by Corrado (1989) is used as a control for 
strongly biased distributions. This test is less sensitive to non-normality of distributions (Cor-
rado 1989; Corrado and Zivney 1992). 
 
Alternatively, trading volumes are investigated as robustness checks. The abnormal volumes 
(AV) during the event window are calculated by putting them in relation to the average vol-
ume of the estimation period. In order to test for significance, the non-parametric rank test of 
Corrado (1989) is applied. 
 
Auer (1996, p. 606) outlines a straightforward approach in order to distinguish between posi-
tive and negative abnormal returns. He uses yearly earnings of the preceding financial year as 
best proxy for earnings of the current financial year ending. If current year earnings are above 
previous year earnings, he expects that positive unexpected earnings lead to positive abnormal 
returns and vice versa. In order to prevent the sample from being biased, he works with abso-
lute values. A modified approach is used by Brixner (2011), applying earnings per share 
(EPS) values before and after the event. The assumption in this procedure is that last quarters’ 
EPS are the best estimate for the (expected) EPS. If there is a positive change in the values for 
EPS in a specific time period after the event, he infers that positive information was dissemi-
nated to the market by the earnings announcement. However this approach implicitly assumes 
that no new information is disseminated to the market between the publications of earnings 
announcements and neglects the informational effect of analysts’ coverage or other ad hoc 
announcements such as earnings warnings.  
 
 
                                                 
61
 For an overview on the event study methodology, see for example MacKinlay (1997). 
62
 Standard and Poors Europe 350 covers about 70% of the European market capitalization. This total return 
index accounts for both changes in market value and for dividends paid. Furthermore, a general market index 
reduces the influence of banks being considered similar as in a bank specific index. 
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To prevent problems of potential contradictory or conflicting information, we differentiate 
between positive and negative earnings through the informational effect on the event day it-
self. The implicit assumption is that the market price includes all available information and 
new information necessarily leads to market price adjustments. If there is a positive (negative) 
market reaction on the event day, reflected in positive (negative) abnormal returns, we assume 
that there is positive (unexpected) information disseminated to the market. This procedure is 
not dependent on any additional information and simply assumes a positive market reaction if 
there is positive unexpected information reaching the market. We are aware that this might 
lead to a potential overstatement of positive and negative return effects since we do not ac-
count for potential misconceptions in terms of overreactions of the market on the event day. 
Therefore, the absolute magnitudes may not be comparable to the market reactions of other 
studies. This holds especially true in cases for which there are market corrections in the days 
following the event day. However, an overreaction of the market on the event day which is 
corrected by the market in the subsequent trading days also provides some information about 
potential exaggerations and information efficiency in general. In order to exclude potential 
adverse effects resulting from this division into positive and negative market reactions, we 
also investigate variances of abnormal returns and abnormal volumes for each subsample.  
 
Additionally, we apply the following procedure as a robustness check and work only with 
absolute values. In order to measure the definitive influence of IFRS accounting on the infor-
mation value of the earnings announcements under investigation, we run a fixed effects re-
gression considering banks specific time-independent qualities and control for time-dependent 
effects by introducing year dummies. Concretely, we test the following simple model 
(Model I): 
 
 εβββ +++= ∑ jjitit ControlsIFRSAR 10]0[      (1) 
 
IFRSit is a dummy variable equal to one, if the earnings announcement takes place under the 
IFRS accounting regime. Controlsj denote the control variables using year dummies for time-
dependent and fixed effects for firm-specific and time-independent factors. In addition to the 
absolute value of abnormal return on event day (|ARit [0]|), we also investigate the absolute 
values of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for periods over the next one to five trading 
days (|CARit [0;1]|, |CARit [0;2]| and |CARit [0;5]|) as alternative proxies and robustness 
checks to measure the information value of earnings announcements. 
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3.3.2.2 IFRS and Institutional Determinants 
In order to shed light on hypothesis H2, the relation between market reactions to earnings 
announcements in 2005 and the influence of the institutional environment, a multivariate re-
gression analysis is applied. The goal of this section is to clarify whether IFRS has an addi-
tional impact on the information content of earnings announcements if measured by abnormal 
returns or whether the stock price reactions are instead determined by possibly concurrent 
effects of the institutional background or general market conditions. In order to exclude pos-
sible influences of time-dependent factors and exclude possibly time-variant influences on 
tested variables, we use the earnings announcements of 2005. During this period many of the 
banks apply IFRS for the first time which should result in especially strong “first-time adop-
tion” effects reflecting the strongly increased information value of earnings announcements. 
Furthermore, the risk of possible distortions in this year from a very low or very high number 
of observations according to one accounting system is lower. However, since sample sizes 
become very small, dividing the sample into negative and positive market reactions is not 
practicable. Therefore, absolute values of market reactions as in the previous section are in-
vestigated. Additionally, abnormal volumes on event day (AVit [0]) and the subsequent day 
(AVit [0;1]) are also used.  
 
The information value of earnings announcements is supposed to increase through IFRS. 
Therefore, we expect a measurable effect even in the presence of a strong institutional envi-
ronment that favors the quality of an accounting system. In order to capture the influence of 
the institutional environment on earnings announcements, we apply a proxy (LegalSystem) to 
control for the general background, dividing the sample in common law and code law coun-
tries. Furthermore, empirical findings suggest that institutional prerequisites such as a strong 
investor protection and stricter insider trading laws, are associated rather with common law 
countries than code law countries (e.g., La Porta et al. 1998, p. 1129; Beny 2005, p. 159). 
Therefore, we also use two proxies to explicitly control for the strength of legal enforcement 
(LegalEnforcement) and the level of protection of investor rights (InvRights) on a country-
level basis.63 We also control for the general stock specific return behavior by using the stock 
specific daily return variance prior to the earnings announcement. Concretely, we test the fol-
lowing model: 
 
                                                 
63
 Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) use a similar approach to measure the impact of those proxies on earnings 
management measures. 
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εββββββ ++++++
=
ititititit
it
StockVarcementLegalEnforInvRightsmLegalSysteIFRS
AR
543210
]0[ (2) 
 
IFRSit is a dummy variable equal to one, if the earnings announcement takes place under the 
IFRS accounting regime. LegalSystemit is a dummy variable equal to one, if the bank is domi-
ciled in a country with a common law origin, and zero otherwise. Concretely, as outlined by 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003, p. 516), banks from United Kingdom and Ireland are cate-
gorized as common law-based whereas the remaining banks are classified as code law-based. 
LegalEnforcementit represents the mean score of three values summarized by Leuz, Nanda 
and Wysocki (2003) and is standardized to 10 points.64 It consists of three measures that con-
trol for the judical system, the rule of law assessment, and the corruption index introduced by 
La Porta et al. (1998). InvRightsit is the country score for the anti-director rights established 
by La Porta et al. (1998), and is standardized to values between zero and five. 65 In combina-
tion, both variables control for the general institutional background and the specific market 
background. StockVarit is the stock’s daily total return variance measured over the estimation 
period, i.e., from -171 to -11 trading days before the earnings announcement. Alternatively, 
|ARit [0]| is replaced by |CAR it [0;+1]|, |CAR it [0;2]| and |CAR it [0;5]| as well as AVit [0] and 
AVit [0;1]. 
 
IFRSit is supposed to be positively related to absolute abnormal returns since the IFRS earn-
ings announcements lead to higher abnormal return reactions due to superior accounting in-
formation. LegalSystemit is expected to be positively related to absolute abnormal returns 
since companies from common law countries are traditionally more dependent on equity mar-
kets. InvRightsit is expected to exhibit a positive sign because strong investor rights make it 
interesting for many small investors to participate and lead to a potentially higher investor 
interest which results in higher abnormal returns. LegalEnforcementit is also positively related 
to the market reaction since a strong and reliable enforcement favors and promotes well-
functioning capital markets. The inclusion of StockVarit captures the effect of bank specific 
stock price sensitivity. This variable controls for the stock specific variability before the earn-
ings announcement.  
                                                 
64
 For purpose of convenience, the classification of Legalsystem and LegalEnforcement according to Leuz, 
Nanda and Wysocki (2003, p. 516) is applied. 
65
 The standardized values are scaled by the maximum value that an item can assume. 
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3.3.2.3 Accounting System Quality prior to Transition 
In this section, in order to investigate H3, we use two different measures to clarify the relation 
between pre-adoption accounting system quality and the impact on first full year earnings 
announcements. Furthermore, we try to give an answer to the question whether the observable 
reaction is influenced by the differences in accounting systems which are caused by financial 
statement information that was not available to investors prior to transition, or by reported 
information that was different from IFRS. In order to clarify this relation, two indexes Ab-
sence and Divergence are applied (Ding et al., 2007). Both indexes put accounting systems in 
relation to IFRS on a country basis. The first (Absenceit) denotes the number of international 
accounting standards that are not reflected by an equivalent standard in local GAAP rules 
while the second (Divergenceit) represents the accounting rules that require a different ap-
proach in local GAAP standards.66 StockVarit controls for stock specific price variability as 
outlined above. The following on the properties of the accounting system quality is estimated: 
 
 εββββ ++++= itititit StockVarDivergenceAbsenceAR 4210]0[    (3) 
 
The expectation is that coefficients on both indexes Absenceit and Divergenceit are expected to 
be positive, since a higher ex ante score denotes “lower accounting quality” in relation to 
IFRS and increases the benefits of a first-time adoption of IFRS caused by an alignment of 
accounting requirements and transparency gains due to the adoption of internationally ac-
knowledged accounting standards. Alternatively, |ARit [0]| is replaced by |CARit [0;1]| and 
AVit [0] and AVit [0;1]. 
3.3.2.4 Banking Specific Asset Structure prior to Transition 
As proposed by H3, the information value of the first IFRS full year earnings announcement 
increases with an ex ante higher share of opaque assets in a bank’s balance sheet. The reason 
is that the application of IFRS is supposed to convey more valuable information about a 
greater share of the previously opaque assets to the market. Morgan (2002) identifies loans as 
the most opaque assets in banks’ balance sheets and finds that raters’ uncertainty increases in 
a growing share of loans and trading assets. In the case of the specific banking asset structure, 
the ex ante opaqueness is measured using the following variables, and applying the following 
regression model:  
                                                 
66
 Both, Absence and Divergence, are given in absolute numbers. They are the result of the comparison to the 
treatment of 111 items under IFRS (Ding et al., 2007, p. 8). Both scores are scaled to the maximum value of 111, 
so that higher values indicate absence and divergence of accounting items in percent. 
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 εββββ ++++= itititit MVNetDebtsInvestmentAR 3210]0[    (4) 
 
Investmentsit denotes the bank’s investments, as a share of total assets available in Datastream 
four quarters before the publication of first full year earnings announcements in accordance 
with IFRS.67 Alternatively, we replace Investmentsit by NetLoansit representing the loans 
granted by a bank, excluding loan loss provisions, and is measured as a share of total assets 
for the same time period outlined above. Both measures are highly correlated due to the struc-
ture of the assets in banks which might lead to collinearity issues. NetDebtit is the share of 
debt to total assets of the bank four quarters prior to the end of the period. We also control for 
investor attention and other size effects using MVit as the natural log of the monthly average 
market value over the last year. Alternatively, we regress the specification for alternative de-
pendent variables. Therefore, we substitute |ARit [0]| by |CARit [0;1]| and AVit[0] and 
AVit[0;1]. 
 
Investmentsit and NetLoansit are expected to exhibit a positive sign. Both variables measure 
the ex ante share of opaque assets for which the new accounting system conveys more valu-
able information to the markets which is supposed to increase the information value after 
transition. NetDebtit is also expected to exhibit a positive sign, since, ceteris paribus, a more 
highly leveraged bank should be able to profit by more detailed and accurate accounting in-
formation in that it reduces the uncertainty for investors to evaluate the bank’s debt situation. 
Specifically, IFRS is supposed to provide more detailed and relevant information for larger 
shares of financial liabilities for investors carrying out such debt analyses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67
 For a further list of constituents of the respective measures, see Datastream. According to Datastream defini-
tion, Investments (WC02255A) includes but is not restricted to U.S. treasury securities, federal agency securities, 
state and municipal securities, federal funds sold, trading account securities, securities purchased under resale 
agreements, mortgage backed securities, federal funds, other securities, total securities available for sale, and 
other investments. Therefore, for purpose of this study, Investments is deducted by Other Investments 
(WC02250A). 
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3.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
3.4.1 Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements 
3.4.1.1 Positive Market Reactions 
In order to test the first hypothesis H1, we divide the sample into earnings announcements 
that are accompanied by positive and negative abnormal returns on event day reactions, re-
spectively, in order to distinguish between the directions of effects. As already outlined 
above, according to this differentiation, we use two subsamples which are initially investi-
gated separately in the following.  
 
The main finding is that the total market reaction to positive earnings announcements under 
local GAAP leads to an abnormal return of 1.93% on event day, i.e., the initial day of the an-
nouncement, see Table X. Highly increased trading volumes corroborate the perception of an 
impact of new information on the markets. The trading volumes for both reporting regimes 
are highly significant and in both cases about 180% of the usual trading volume. Highly in-
creased trading volumes for both subsamples depict new information reaching the market 
through the earnings announcements. For IFRS earnings announcements, there is a significant 
price reaction observable for the event with an abnormal return of 2.77% (1%-level) on event 
day. Thus, there is evidence that the publication of IFRS earnings announcements also leads 
to a sustained price reaction of the stock markets for positive market reactions.  
 
Independent of the explanation, there is a significant reaction for both reporting regimes. For 
both groups, trading volumes are at comparable levels. However, there is a higher reaction for 
positive IFRS earnings announcements which might be an indication of earnings announce-
ments conveying more unexpected information content to the markets and causing stronger 
abnormal returns. This finding seems to corroborate H1 for market reactions associated with 
positive market reactions on event day. 
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Table X: Abnormal Returns, Cumulative Abnormal Returns, and Abnormal Volumes for Positive Reactions on Event Day 
Dayt ARt t -value     CARt t -value AVt Dayt ARt t -value    CARt t -value AVt
-10 -0.03% -0.19 -0.03% -0.19 98% -0.293 -10 0.06% 0.24 0.06% 0.24 100%
-9 0.08% 0.48 0.05% 0.20 103% -0.053 -9 0.01% 0.03 0.06% 0.19 101%
-8 -0.08% -0.46 -0.03% -0.10 106% -0.134 -8 0.14% 0.61 0.21% 0.50 99%
-7 0.09% 0.53 0.06% 0.18 107% -0.397 -7 -0.10% -0.42 0.11% 0.23 97%
-6 0.10% 0.56 0.16% 0.41 98% 0.471 -6 0.06% 0.26 0.17% 0.32 97%
-5 0.12% 0.72 0.28% 0.67 107% 0.782 -5 0.05% 0.23 0.22% 0.39 103%
-4 0.07% 0.42 0.35% 0.78 109% 1.365 -4 -0.12% -0.51 0.10% 0.16 104%
-3 -0.21% -1.22 0.14% 0.30 109% 0.56 -3 0.04% 0.18 0.14% 0.22 104%
-2 -0.01% -0.03 0.14% 0.27 106% 0.878 -2 -0.02% -0.08 0.13% 0.18 107%
-1 -0.14% -0.79 0.00% 0.01 107% 1.471 -1 -0.03% -0.12 0.10% 0.13 118% ++
0 1.93% 11.28 *** +++ 1.93% 3.41 *** +++ 179% +++ 6.966 0 2.77% 11.76 *** +++ 2.87% 3.67 *** +++ 181% +++
1 0.15% 0.86 2.08% 3.51 *** +++ 157% +++ 5.682 1 0.33% 1.38 3.19% 3.91 *** +++ 159% +++
2 -0.08% -0.46 2.00% 3.25 *** +++ 125% +++ 3.24 2 0.03% 0.11 3.22% 3.79 *** +++ 126% +++
3 0.02% 0.14 2.02% 3.16 *** +++ 120% ++ 2.076 3 -0.11% -0.48 3.10% 3.52 *** +++ 121% +
4 0.05% 0.32 2.08% 3.14 *** +++ 121% + 1.832 4 -0.08% -0.35 3.02% 3.31 *** +++ 115%
5 0.03% 0.20 2.11% 3.09 *** +++ 127% + 1.708 5 -0.16% -0.68 2.86% 3.04 *** ++ 113% +
6 -0.06% -0.34 2.05% 2.91 *** ++ 117% 1.59 6 -0.03% -0.11 2.83% 2.92 *** ++ 114%
7 0.21% 1.23 2.27% 3.12 *** +++ 106% 0.407 7 -0.02% -0.11 2.81% 2.81 *** ++ 111%
8 -0.15% -0.89 2.11% 2.84 *** ++ 116% 0.793 8 -0.21% -0.87 2.60% 2.54 ** ++ 108%
9 -0.01% -0.07 2.10% 2.75 *** ++ 118% 1.118 9 -0.24% -1.01 2.37% 2.25 ** + 106%
10 -0.01% -0.07 2.09% 2.66 *** ++ 105% 0.625 10 0.19% 0.80 2.56% 2.37 ** + 105%
N 308 508
Local GAAP IFRS
308 308 508 508
This table displays abnormal returns (ARs) based on the market model returns for the entire event period calculated by using 308 (508) positive quarterly announcements. It also displays cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) starting on day [-10] and abnormal volumes (AVs). Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are tested for statistical significance using the parametric t -test of Brown and Warner (1985)
and the non-parametric rank test of Corrado (1989). ***,**,* represents the significance level at the 1%-,5%-,10%-level for a two-tailed t -test . +++,++,+ indicates significance at the 1%-,5%-,10%-level of a two-
tailed non-parametric rank test statistic of Corrado (1989). To test for significance of abnormal volumes (AVs), also the non-parametric rank test of Corrado (1989) is used. N denotes the total number of
observations.
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3.4.1.2 Negative Market Reactions 
For local GAAP announcements, the significant market reaction on the event day is -1.82% 
(1%-level), followed by an insignificant negative reaction the day after the announcement, see 
Table XI. The market reaction on the event day is highly significant according to the t-test as 
well as the non-parametric rank test. For negative IFRS earnings announcements, there is a 
stronger significant reaction on the event day with -2.58% (1%-level) which is followed by a 
further significant decrease of -0.46% (5%-level).   
 
The results indicate that there is a significant reaction to earnings announcements for both 
reporting regimes. Concerning abnormal volumes, there are greatly increased trading and sig-
nificant volumes during event windows for both subsamples, peaking on the event day with 
highly significant 180% (182%) for local GAAP (IFRS) announcements. This confirms the 
perception that markets process information in reaction to the earnings announcements. This 
corresponds basically to the observation of positive market reactions from above. For negative 
market reactions, we also find a higher market reaction with respect to IFRS earnings an-
nouncements which might indicate a higher information value in line with hypothesis H1. 
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Table XI: Abnormal Returns, Cumulative Abnormal Returns, and Abnormal Volumes for Negative Market Reactions on Event Day 
Dayt ARt t -value     CARt t -value AVt Dayt ARt t -value    CARt t -value AVt
-10 0.04% 0.23 0.04% 0.23 120% -0.472 -10 -0.04% -0.16 -0.04% -0.16 99%
-9 -0.02% -0.11 0.02% 0.08 102% -0.393 -9 0.19% 0.87 0.16% 0.50 98%
-8 0.02% 0.15 0.04% 0.15 97% -0.734 -8 -0.09% -0.42 0.06% 0.17 100%
-7 0.07% 0.45 0.12% 0.35 104% -0.627 -7 0.02% 0.09 0.08% 0.19 99%
-6 -0.05% -0.29 0.07% 0.19 106% 0.265 -6 -0.01% -0.06 0.07% 0.14 98%
-5 -0.02% -0.13 0.05% 0.12 101% 0.1127 -5 -0.12% -0.53 -0.05% -0.09 105%
-4 0.06% 0.34 0.10% 0.24 103% 0.8239 -4 0.04% 0.19 0.00% -0.01 108%
-3 0.05% 0.31 0.15% 0.33 103% -0.336 -3 -0.08% -0.37 -0.09% -0.14 105%
-2 0.18% 1.07 0.33% 0.67 104% 0.5571 -2 0.27% 1.22 0.18% 0.28 107%
-1 0.15% 0.92 0.48% 0.93 108% 1.5401 -1 0.24% 1.06 ++ 0.42% 0.60 111%
0 -1.82% -11.14 *** +++ -1.34% -2.48 ** +++ 180% +++ 6.3011 0 -2.58% -11.57 *** +++ -2.16% -2.92 *** ++ 182% +++
1 -0.11% -0.68 -1.45% -2.57 ** +++ 165% +++ 5.3061 1 -0.46% -2.05 ** + -2.61% -3.39 *** +++ 147% +++
2 -0.01% -0.08 -1.47% -2.49 ** +++ 126% +++ 2.9039 2 -0.18% -0.82 -2.80% -3.48 *** +++ 123% +++
3 0.07% 0.45 -1.39% -2.28 ** ++ 146% ++ 2.4749 3 -0.22% -0.97 -3.01% -3.62 *** +++ 118% ++
4 0.01% 0.09 -1.38% -2.18 ** ++ 127% +++ 2.8975 4 -0.20% -0.89 -3.21% -3.72 *** +++ 115%
5 -0.16% -0.97 -1.54% -2.35 ** ++ 120% ++ 2.1768 5 -0.10% -0.46 -3.31% -3.72 *** +++ 117% +
6 0.01% 0.04 -1.53% -2.27 ** ++ 118% ++ 2.4381 6 0.01% 0.02 -3.31% -3.60 *** +++ 110%
7 -0.05% -0.31 -1.58% -2.28 ** ++ 107% 0.978 7 0.11% 0.48 -3.20% -3.39 *** +++ 106%
8 -0.04% -0.25 -1.62% -2.27 ** ++ 112% 1.5157 8 -0.09% -0.42 -3.29% -3.40 *** +++ 103%
9 0.10% 0.63 -1.52% -2.08 ** ++ 112% 1.0879 9 0.01% 0.05 -3.28% -3.30 *** +++ 107%
10 0.12% 0.71 -1.40% -1.87 * ++ 113% 0.7404 10 0.03% 0.14 -3.25% -3.19 *** +++ 104%
N 285 553
Local GAAP IFRS
285 285 553 553
This table displays abnormal returns (ARs) based on the market model returns for the entire event period calculated by using 285 (553) negative quarterly announcements. It also displays cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) starting on day [-10] and abnormal volumes (AVs). Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are tested for statistical significance using the parametric t -test of Brown
and Warner (1985) and the non-parametric rank test of Corrado (1989). ***,**,* represents the significance level at the 1%-,5%-,10%-level for a two-tailed t -test . +++,++,+ indicates significance at the
1%-,5%-,10%-level of a two-tailed non-parametric rank test statistic of Corrado (1989). To test for significance of abnormal volumes (AVs), we use also the non-parametric rank test of Corrado (1989). N
denotes the total number of observations. Due to limited data availability, the number of observations in AVs may deviate.
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Mean, Medians and Variances 
We use a t-test and a Wilcoxon ranksum test in order to compare the means and medians for 
positive and negative market reactions. Testing for equality of means and medians for AR[0] 
refutes the alternative hypothesis to H1 of equal reactions at conventional levels, and testing 
for differences for CAR[0;1], CAR[0;2] and CAR[0;5] confirms the perception of two sepa-
rate subsamples for most means and most medians for positive and negative market reactions, 
see Panel A of Table XII. This cannot be reported testing abnormal volumes since both tests 
for means and medians cannot refute the perception of a common distribution at conventional 
levels for most comparisons which was already the impression from above.  
 
Turning to variances, we test for differences in variances using a variance ratio test (F-test) 
and a Levene test for homogeneity of variances, which makes fewer assumptions concerning 
the underlying distributions, see Panel B of Table XII. Both comparisons indicate that vari-
ances are highly increased for most abnormal returns and abnormal volumes in the subsample 
of IFRS earnings announcements which suggests a higher information value of IFRS earnings 
announcements concerning abnormal variances. However, with respect to variances of ab-
normal volumes there seems to be a higher variability in trading volumes for the local GAAP 
group which might be interpreted as a higher information value of local GAAP earnings an-
nouncements.  
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Table XII: Test of Equality of Means, Medians, and Homogeneity in CARs 
Panel A: Test for Equality of Means and Medians
Equality of Means Medians Equality of Means Medians
Wilcoxon Wilcoxon
Postive market t -value ranksum Negative market t -value ranksum
reactions (prob) (prob) reactions (prob) (prob)
LGAAP (308) - AR[0] 3.812 -      4.096 -        LGAAP (285) - AR[0] 3.155       3.186         
IFRS (508) (0.000) (0.000) IFRS (553) (0.002) (0.002)
CAR[0;1] 3.159 -      2.227 -        CAR[0;1] 3.398       3.734         
(0.002) (0.026) (0.001) (0.000)
CAR[0;2] 3.061 -      2.455 -        CAR[0;2] 3.785       3.511         
(0.002) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000)
CAR[0;5] 1.531 -      1.287 -        CAR[0;5] 4.337       4.501         
(0.126) (0.198) (0.000) (0.000)
AV[0] 0.237 -      2.352 -        AV[0] 0.182 -      1.753 -        
(0.812) (0.019) (0.856) (0.080)
AV[0;1] 0.276 -      1.601 -        AV[0;1] 0.747       0.737 -        
(0.782) (0.110) (0.456) (0.461)
Panel B: Test for Equality of Variances 
Postive market sd (LGAAP)/ Variance Ratio Test Levene Test Negative market sd (LGAAP)/ Variance Ratio Test Levene Test
reactions sd (IFRS) (prob) (prob) reactions sd (IFRS) (prob) (prob)
AR[0] 0.58 0.336       11.678       AR[0] 0.49 0.241       11.901       
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
CAR[0;1] 0.56 0.314       23.130       CAR[0;1] 0.55 0.297       8.178         
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)
CAR[0;2] 0.60 0.361       17.781       CAR[0;2] 0.55 0.306       16.113       
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CAR[0;5] 0.68 0.467       10.038       CAR[0;5] 0.65 0.420       13.588       
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
AV[0] 1.54 2.366       5.675         AV[0] 1.55 2.399       0.943         
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.332)
AV[0;1] 1.20 1.436       3.635         AV[0;1] 1.79 3.191       4.111         
(0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.043)
Panel A displays the test for equality of means and medians of IFRS vs LGAAP earnings announcements, divided into positive and negative market reactions. It
comprises 508 (553) positive (negative) IFRS earnings announcements, and 308 (285) positive (negative) earnings announcements in accordance to local GAAP. The
absolute values depict the test statistics in accordance to an ordinary t -test (means) and a Wilcoxon ranksum test (medians). The values in parentheses present the
respective probabilities for the test statistics.
Panel B displays the test for equality of variances between samples of IFRS vs LGAAP earnings announcements, divided into positive and negative market reactions. It
comprises 508 (553) positive (negative) IFRS earnings announcements, and 308 (285) positive (negative) earnings announcements in accordance to local GAAP. The
first column shows the respective quota of standard deviations. The absolute values depict the test statistics in accordance to an F-Test and a Levene Test. The values
in parentheses present the respective probabilities for the test statistics.
 
The comparison of positive and negative abnormal returns yields a significant reaction for 
both reporting regimes, indicating that information value is conveyed to the market. Hypothe-
sis H1 has to be refuted for trading volumes indicating comparable market reactions to the 
earnings announcement. However, there is an indication and necessary condition that IFRS 
earnings announcements might provide more information content in terms of higher abnormal 
returns, supporting the hypothesis H1 initially made. This would be in line with the basic re-
sults of Auer (1996) concerning abnormal return variances and contrary to the results of Brix-
ner (2011). As already discussed, the absolute magnitudes may not be comparable to prior 
studies. However, we have to clarify if IFRS are responsible for this finding and to exclude 
any negative or concurrent effect, e.g., time-dependent effect. In order to analyze the relation 
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between the return reaction to earnings announcements and the contribution of IFRS, we carry 
out the regression analysis as in equation (1) outlined above. 
 
Since we work with a dataset of 46 banks over a time period from 2000 to 2011, we have to 
make sure that our observations are not influenced by time-dependent effects such as the on-
going capital market integration. This concurrent capital market integration effect could be 
caused, for example, by the transition to a common currency in the European Union in 2002 
or the general activities to create a common capital market in Europe. Thus, we also control 
for time-varying effects such as general economic conditions in the European area in the dif-
ferent years, by including dummy variables for the single years in the regression analysis.  
 
The effect of IFRS on abnormal returns could also be influenced by bank-dependent qualities 
that do not vary over time since there are several observations for each bank in the dataset 
every year. We apply a fixed effects regression, since this kind of regression controls for any 
time independent causes between the individual banks and any estimators cannot be distorted 
by missing time-invariant qualities of the individual banks (Kohler and Kreuter 2006, p. 259). 
We exclude any effect of separating the sample into positive and negative market reactions by 
using absolute values of abnormal returns for the total sample of 1654 observations.  
 
Table XIII: Fixed Effects Regression Analysis on Abnormal Returns (Model (1)) 
|AR[0]| |CAR[0;1]| |CAR[0;2]| |CAR[0;5]|
Constant 0.030     *** 0.038     *** 0.039     *** 0.055     ***
(7.03) (7.57) (7.10) (9.25)
IFRS 0.001 -    0.001     0.002     0.001 -    
(-0.39) (0.50) (0.75) (-0.23)
Year Dummies, 
Firm-Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
R² 0.09       0.12       0.12       0.14       
F-Statistic (11.65) *** (9.60) *** (9.23) *** (15.58) ***
N 1654 1654 1654 1654
This table displays a fixed effects regression analysis on the absolute of the abnormal return (AR) at event day and the cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) using the total sample of 1654 earnings announcements. IFRS denotes a dummy variable equal to one if the
earnings announcement takes place under the IFRS accounting regime. Also included are dummy variables for each year of the
earnings announcement (not reported). The fixed effects regression covers any time independent qualities specific to each of the 46
banks in the dataset. The values in parantheses denote the t-values to robust standard errors. ***,**,* indicate significance to a (two-
sided) t-test on the 1%, 5% or 10%-level. The values of the F-test are presented in the line F-Stat. The corresponding ***,**,*
indicate significance to an F-test on the 1%, 5% or 10%-level. 
 
Table XIII displays the results of the fixed effects regression analysis. The estimated coeffi-
cient on IFRS changes signs and is not significant for any period of abnormal returns. We also 
run this fixed-effects model on the subsamples of positive and negative abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns (not reported). The application of both the original and absolute 
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values of abnormal returns as a dependent variable does not indicate that IFRS earnings an-
nouncements are related to significantly higher abnormal returns. Obviously, bank-specific as 
well as time-dependent effects rather seem to play a crucial role in the higher abnormal re-
turns. The observed higher reactions might be accounted for by the fact that most of the IFRS 
earnings announcements take place in the latter phase – starting about 2005 – of the investi-
gated period when the new accounting rules become mandatory. Therefore, the higher abnor-
mal returns might be explained by an increasing capital market integration in general or influ-
ences of the banking crisis which lead to increasing volatility in the markets or higher market 
reactions for the latter phase.68  
 
To summarize this section, even though finding higher abnormal returns for the IFRS sub-
sample, this does not seem to play a significant role in the market reaction of abnormal returns 
to earnings announcements of banks over the entire time period in this investigation. In com-
bination with the trading volume reactions around event day at comparable levels for both 
subsamples reported above, H1 has to be refuted. Only the comparison of abnormal return 
variances yields a contrary impression that IFRS might convey a higher information value 
which would be in line with the results of Auer (1996). 
3.4.2 IFRS and Institutional Determinants 
Since the structure of our data indicates that there may be a strong influence of time-
dependent effects, we run the following regression on the year 2005 where we find 51 local 
GAAP earnings announcements and 108 earnings announcements under IFRS. This is the 
year of the transition for most of the banks in the dataset and we are able to test H2 in a stable 
and comparable institutional setup. As outlined in H2, it is hypothesized that the market reac-
tion measured by abnormal returns is due to the higher information content of IFRS earnings 
announcements in the year 2005.  
 
Table XIV presents the correlation matrix for the independent and dependent variables for this 
investigation. As can be seen in the table, the correlations for the independent variables are 
not very high. The variance inflation factors (VIF) indicate that a potential distortion through 
multicollinearity of independent variables is also rather low.69 Unsurprisingly, the correlation 
                                                 
68
 This might explain the results of Brixner (2011) who uses a bank-specific index as market index. This sector-
specific index might be more volatile and stronger correlated with individual return specifications and therefore 
lead to regression results with lower abnormal returns. An increase in the capital market integration might also 
play a role in an increasing correlation. 
69
 Studenmund (2001, p. 258) refers to a common rule of thumb of a VIF > 5 as indicator for severe multicollin-
earity.  
  
 62 
 
of StockVar and the respective dependent absolute abnormal return measures indicates a posi-
tive relationship between stock price variability and the absolute height of the reaction. The 
correlation of IFRS and StockVar indicates a positive relation between IFRS and ex ante vari-
ability of stock prices. The correlation of InvRights and LegalSystem indicates that investor 
rights in common law countries might be better protected, maybe due to the greater tradition 
of equity financed markets. 
 
Table XIV: Correlation Matrix and Variance Inflation Factors 
AV 0 AV 01 |AR[0]| |CAR[0;1]| |CAR[0;2]| |CAR[0;5]| IFRS LegalSys. InvRights LegalEnf. StockVar VIF
AV 0 1.000
AV 01 0.919 * 1.000
|AR[0]| 0.297 * 0.328 * 1.000
|CAR[0;1]| 0.162 * 0.289 * 0.751 * 1.000
|CAR[0;2]| 0.141 0.256 * 0.740 * 0.874 * 1.000
|CAR[0;5]| 0.137 0.246 * 0.568 * 0.752 * 0.837 * 1.000
IFRS -0.148 -0.104 0.083 0.136 0.143 0.143 1.000 1.09
LegalSystem 0.047 0.009 0.168 * 0.150 0.103 0.063 -0.090 1.000 1.50
,
InvRights 0.059 0.005 0.116 0.110 0.133 0.060 0.051 0.548 * 1.000 1.51
LegalEnf. 0.351 * 0.328 * 0.177 * 0.050 0.083 0.104 0.108 0.180 * 0.160 * 1.000 1.07
StockVar -0.121 -0.094 0.213 * 0.228 * 0.308 * 0.294 * 0.175 * -0.053 -0.174 * -0.129 1.000 1.10
This table displays the correlation matrix for independent and dependent variables in the regression analysis. * indicates signficance
on the 5%-level. The last column 'VIF' presents the variance inflation factors for the independent variables in the regressions.
 
Table XV, Panel A, presents the results of the regression model measuring the impact of IFRS 
and institutional determinants on earnings announcements in 2005. In line with the predic-
tions, the coefficient estimates exhibit the expected signs. Remarkably, the ex ante stock re-
turn variability plays a significant role in the abnormal return on event day and the subsequent 
trading days. This suggests that higher stock market reactions can ‒ in part ‒ be explained by 
a generally higher stock price variance. LegalEnforcement reflecting the evaluation of 
strength of the enforcement seems to have a positive impact on event day. However, the esti-
mated coefficient loses power in the subsequent days. IFRS exhibits a positive coefficient. It 
does not seem to play a role in the market reactions due to earnings announcements in the 
year 2005. In other words, we could argue that IFRS does not lead to a superior information 
supply leading to higher abnormal returns in 2005. However, one might argue that in 2005 
many banks applied the new accounting system for the first time. This could lead to confusion 
in the market in the transition year, since investors are less experienced in processing the new 
information (Cuijpers and Bujink 2005, p. 513).  
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As a robustness check, we apply the regression analysis on abnormal volumes (AV[0], and 
AV[0;1]) as dependent variables in order to identify possible influences for which we found 
comparable trading volume levels before. In Panel B of Table XV, we find that the coefficient 
on IFRS is significantly negative for the regression on AV[0] even in the presence of the con-
trol variables. This suggests that trading volumes for IFRS earnings announcements in 2005 
are lower. This might be best interpreted as confusion among investors who may have prob-
lems interpreting the new accounting information. However, we also observe that the coeffi-
cient on LegalEnforcement is positive and significant which could be interpreted as a coun-
try’s enforcement playing a significant role in the height of investor interest leading to higher 
trading volumes. This observation is in line with the results of DeFond, Hung and Trezevant 
(2007) who find that earnings announcements are more informative in countries with a 
stronger institutional environment and better investor protection.  
 
To summarize, individual bank factors such as stock price variability, seem to play a more 
important role rather than the accounting system itself. More to the point, the impact of the 
accounting system seems to be limited in concurrence with the general institutional back-
ground for which we find only weak evidence of an impact on information value during 2005 
if measured by abnormal returns and abnormal volumes. Contrary to expectations, the new 
accounting system seems to have no significant impact on market reactions to IFRS earnings 
announcements in 2005. This refutes H2. 
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Table XV: Impact of IFRS and Institutional Determinants in 2005 (Model (2)) 
|AR [0]| |CAR [0;1]| |CAR [0;2]| |CAR [0;5]| AV [0] AV [0;1]
Constant -0.010 * 0.001 -0.009 -0.014 -2.053 *** -0.452
(-1.71 ) (0.14) (-0.92 ) (-1.17 ) (-2.74 ) (-0.89 )
IFRS (+) 0.001 0.004 0.003           0.004 -0.783 * -0.350
(0.35) (1.26) (0.94) (1.01) (-1.90 ) (-1.56 )
LegalSystem (+) 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.002 -0.403 -0.254
(0.97) (1.17) (0.21) (0.21) (-0.84 ) (-0.83 )
InvRights (+) 0.003 0.005 0.012 * 0.007 0.242 -0.070
(0.80) (0.79) (1.85) (0.85) (0.64) (-0.24 )
LegalEnforcement (+) 0.019 ** 0.005 0.013 0.023 5.593 *** 3.157 ***
(2.55) (0.48) (1.20) (1.63) (3.78) (3.79) 
StockVar (+) 56.888 ** 72.221 ** 106.379 *** 124.472 *** -1191.750 -564.837
(2.49) (2.22) (3.25) (3.78) (-0.48 ) (-0.35 )
Adjusted R² 0.084 0.066 0.117 0.092 0.135 0.104 
F -statistic 4.03 *** 2.58 ** 4.15 *** 4.52 *** 6.19 *** 3.84 ***
N 159 159 159 159 159 159 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns Panel B: Abnormal Volumes
This table presents the results of an ordinary least square (OLS) regression on informational value in absolute abnormal returns on event day und subsequent time periods (|AR [0]|), |CAR [0;1]|,
|CAR [0;2]| and |CAR [0;5]|) for 2005 earnings announcements (159 observations). The values in parentheses denote the t-values for the respective coefficients. We report t-values for White
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors only. ***,**,* indicate significance to the 1%-,5%-, and 10%-level to a ordinary t-test (two-sided). 
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3.4.3 Impact of Accounting System Quality Determinants prior to Transition 
As outlined in H3, the question to be answered in this section is which of the properties of 
accounting system quality in force before transition might influence the information value of 
first full year earnings announcements. Table XVI presents the correlation coefficients of in-
dependent and dependent variables. |AR[0]| is significantly negatively correlated with Ab-
sence. Comparably, Divergence is negatively correlated with AV[0;1]. For both correlations a 
positive value was expected. The VIFs indicate that multicollinearity among independent 
variables is not a problem in this dataset.  
 
Table XVI: Correlation Coefficients and VIFs 
AV [0] AV [0;1] |AR[0]| |CAR[0;1]| Absence Divergence StockVar VIF
AV [0] 1.000
AV [0;1] 0.730 * 1.000
|AR[0]| 0.382 * 0.230 1.000
|CAR[0;1]| 0.143 0.440 * 0.394 * 1.000
Absence -0.177 0.054 -0.603 * -0.024 1.000 1.04
Divergence -0.268 -0.388 * 0.118 0.036 -0.163 1.000 1.10
StockVar 0.093 -0.022 0.067 -0.022 0.060 0.245 1.000 1.08
This table displays the correlation matrix for independent and dependent variables in the regression analysis. * indicates
signficance on the 5%-level. The last column 'VIF' presents the variation inflation factors for the independent variables in
the regressions.
 
In Table XVII, the results of the OLS regression on absolute abnormal returns and abnormal 
volumes are presented. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient estimate on Absence is nega-
tively related to all dependent variables. However, it is only highly significant for the regres-
sion on |AR[0]|, after controlling for the magnitude of ex ante stock price variability. These 
observations are consistent with the notion that earnings announcements for first full year 
results are decreasing in a higher absence score, i.e., the more accounting rules that are not 
available in the local GAAP regime prior to adoption, the lower the information value of the 
first-time announcements in accordance with IFRS. This suggests a higher “accounting in-
formation gap” that is now closed under the application of IFRS leads – at least at first – to 
lower information value reflected by abnormal returns. In other words, this might be cau-
tiously interpreted as market confusion in the wake of the obligatory introduction of IFRS.  
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The coefficient on Divergence does not seem to have any significant impact on information 
value if measured by absolute abnormal returns as dependent variables. However, for the 
specifications on trading volumes Divergence is strongly negatively related to abnormal vol-
umes in both specifications. A similar interpretation as for Absence seems obvious. The 
higher the differences in accounting prior to the first-time adoption of IFRS, the lower the 
market reactions in terms of abnormal trading volumes. This suggests also some market un-
certainty due to confusing information that is now different to the information before which 
results in prudent behavior of market participants leading to lower trading activity.  
 
Table XVII: Multivariate Regression Analysis on Accounting System Quality (Model (3)) 
|AR 0| |CAR[0;1]| AV 0 AV[0,1]
Constant 0.034 ** 0.022 5.679 *** 4.751 ***
(2.14) (1.13) (3.57) (4.01) 
Absence (+) -0.096 *** -0.003 -3.784 -0.197
(-3.45 ) (-0.08 ) (-1.24 ) (-0.09 )
Divergence (+) -0.002 0.018 -11.353 * -9.409 **
(-0.04 ) (0.30) (-1.94 ) (-2.32 )
StockVar 31.561 -12.966 5746.566 1690.512 
(0.90) (-0.30 ) (0.81) (0.43) 
Adjusted R² 0.32 -0.08 0.09 0.09 
F -statistic 5.09 *** 0.05 2.13 2.62 *
N 40 40 40 40 
This table presents the results of an ordinary least square (OLS) regression of accounting system quality determinants of market reactions
measured in absolute abnormal returns at event day (|AR 0|), |CAR [0;1]| and abnormal volumes at event day (AV 0) and AV[0;1] for the
first full year earnings announcements in accordance to IFRS. The sample is reduced to 40 observations due to limited data availability.
The values in parentheses denote the t-values for the coefficients. We report t-values for White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors only. ***,**,* indicate significance to the 1%-,5%-, and 10%-level to an ordinary t-test (two-sided).
Absence denotes the number of international accounting standards that are not reflected by an equivalent standard in local GAAP rules,
whereas Divergence represents the accounting rules that require a different approach in local GAAP standards (Ding et al . 2007).
StockVar  is daily stock return variance over the estimation period.
 
As a robustness check, we also estimate the regression equation controlling for stock-specific 
characteristics via the natural log of the market value measured as an average over the last 12 
months instead of the stock return variance. This yields qualitatively the same results as in our 
analysis carried out above. 
 
This result is contrary to the expectation that especially local GAAPs of “lower quality” with 
many new accounting rules in place after transition experience a greater leap in transparency. 
However, it is in line with the observations from the investigation of accounting system rat-
ings in the previous section. There are several possible explanations for this result: As already 
mentioned above, investors and analysts might have difficulties in interpreting the new infor-
mation and may need some time to understand the new accounting information (Cuijpers and 
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Bujink 2005, p. 513) or may suffer some kind of “information overload” due to the IFRS ap-
plication. Another explanation could be that the local GAAP rules better serve the information 
needs of local markets as “best solutions”, i.e., they are better integrated in the institutional 
environment of the bank’s home country (Auer 1996, p. 590). Therefore, the first earnings 
announcements according to international accounting standards could have reduced the in-
formation value by introducing confusion. Since we find no evidence that the information 
value of the first-time earnings announcements under IFRS is higher for banks using “lower 
quality” accounting systems prior to adoption, this refutes H3.  
3.4.4 Banking Specific Asset Structure 
As outlined in H4, the information value is expected to increase in a growing share of opaque 
assets prior to transition. Table XVIII presents the correlations of the dependent and inde-
pendent variables of the regressions on asset structure. As suspected, NetLoans and Invest-
ments are highly negatively correlated since both asset groups account for a large part of as-
sets in the asset structure of a bank. Therefore, we abstain from including both variables si-
multaneously in the regressions as this could lead to a multicollinearity problem. Furthermore, 
we find that Investments is positively correlated with MV, whereas NetLoans is negatively 
correlated with it. This is an interesting observation, since higher market valuations seem to 
correlate with the asset structure, i.e., larger banks, with higher market values, seem to have 
higher percentages invested in market related Investments.  
 
Table XVIII: Correlations of Asset Structure 
AV[0] AV [0;1] |AR[0]| |CAR[0;1]| Investments NetLoans NetDebt MV VIF VIF
AV[0] 1.000
AV [0;1] 0.799 * 1.000
|AR[0]| 0.431 * 0.312 1.000
|CAR[0;1]| 0.177 0.268 0.590 * 1.000
Investments -0.349 * -0.426 * -0.036 0.082 1.000 1.13
NetLoans 0.303 0.446 * -0.092 -0.097 -0.886 * 1.000 1.31
NetDebt -0.104 -0.081 -0.024 0.096 -0.083 0.218 1.000 1.08 1.09
MV 0.066 -0.080 0.268 0.144 0.344 * -0.478 * -0.277 1.000 1.22 1.35
This table displays the correlation matrix for independent and dependent variables in the regression analysis. * indicates
signficance on the 5%-level. The last columns 'VIF' presents the variation inflation factors for the independent variables in the
respective regressions.
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In Table XIX, we present the results for the regression on banking specific asset groups that 
are often perceived as being opaque. In this panel, we report the regression results on first 
full-year earnings announcements under IFRS in 2005. Due to limited data availability, there 
are only 38 banks included. 
 
The results of abnormal returns as dependent variables suggest that the regressions are rather 
of low quality since the explanatory power of specifications is quite low. Better specified are 
the regressions on abnormal volumes where we are able to report significantly positive coeffi-
cient estimates for NetLoans which is in line with expectations. For Investments, contrary to 
expectations, we observe significantly negative coefficient estimates in the regressions on 
abnormal volumes. These observations provide two approaches for interpretations. 
 
Firstly, a higher share of NetLoans prior to adoption suggests an opaqueness concerning these 
assets that are becoming more transparent to investors through the application of IFRS. By 
inverse inference, this would suggest that a higher ex ante share of Investments seems already 
to be transparent to investors, causing a negative impact on the trading volumes along with 
the first full-year earnings announcements to IFRS. In other words, Investments were already 
transparent and easy to evaluate for investors before the application of IFRS.  
 
Secondly, as a higher share of loans always implies a lower share of investments as concur-
rent utilization of funds, investors reward a higher share of already transparent loans on the 
banks’ balance sheet – which purportedly stands for a lower riskiness in comparison to other 
investments – with a higher investors’ interest reflected in higher trading volumes. This would 
mean, however, that higher shares of Investments do not become transparent in the transition 
to IFRS. 
 
Following the second line of reasoning, this would mean that there is no higher “surprise” in 
the valuation of loans. More likely, market participants appreciate higher shares of loans since 
the IFRS accounting treatment is not completely different in comparison with the accounting 
regulations previously in force, whereas investments require rather different accounting 
treatments under the new accounting regime. For example, just considering the valuation of 
financial assets under IAS 39 requires quite different accounting treatments subject to the 
specific financial asset classification. Therefore, the first-time adoption leads rather to market 
confusion for the valuation of investments along with the first-time adoption leading to lower 
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trading volumes. This also would correspond to the explanation that a higher ex ante share of 
investments is still perceived as not being transparent in the transition to IFRS and markets 
are not, or not yet, able to interpret the new IFRS information concerning specific asset 
classes properly. This explanation would also be in line with the observations from prior sec-
tions and seems to be the reasonable deduction.  
 
Table XIX: Multivariate Regression Analysis on Asset Structure (Model 4) 
|AR [0]| |CAR[0;1]| AV [0] AV[0,1]
Constant -0.022 -0.013 1.938 3.266 *
(-1.06 ) (-0.51 ) (0.76) (1.94) 
Investments (+) -0.022 0.006 -6.710 * -4.725 **
(-0.96 ) (0.19) (-1.98 ) (-2.57 )
Net Debt (+) 0.007 0.023 -1.174 -0.942
(0.31) (0.73) (-0.55 ) (-0.65 )
MV 0.005 ** 0.003 0.267 0.043 
(2.19) (1.06) (1.28) (0.30) 
Adjusted R² 0.013 -0.043 0.095 0.126 
F -statistic 1.66 1.07 1.79 2.30 *
N 38 38 38 38 
|AR [0]| |CAR[0;1]| AV [0] AV[0,1]
Constant -0.026 -0.004 -4.183 -1.678
(-0.73 ) (-0.09 ) (-1.37 ) (-0.75 )
Net Loans (+) 0.005 -0.008 6.168 ** 4.940 **
(0.26) (-0.29 ) (2.07) (2.61) 
Net Debt (+) 0.006 0.024 -1.811 -1.445
(0.27) (0.77) (-0.81 ) (-1.03 )
MV 0.004 0.003 0.348 * 0.128 
(1.68) (0.91) (1.76) (0.91) 
Adjusted R² -0.006 -0.042 0.092 0.179 
F -statistic 1.42 1.15 2.14 2.35 *
N 38 38 38 38 
Panel B: First Full Year Earnings Announcements under IFRS and Net Loans
Panel A: First Full Year Earnings Announcements under IFRS and Investments
This table presents the results of an ordinary least square (OLS) regression on informational value in absolute abnormal returns on
event day (|AR [0]|), |CAR [0;1] |and abnormal volumes on event day (AV [0]) and AV[0;1] for the first full-year earnings
announcements in accordance to IFRS. The sample is reduced to 38 observations due to limited data availability. The values in
parentheses denote the t-values for the coefficients. We report t-values for White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.
***,**,* indicate significance to the 1%-,5%-, and 10%-level to a t-test.
Panel A is a regression on the influence of banking specific assets on information value of earnings announcements. Investments 
denotes the net investments one year prior to adoption of the bank’s investments, as share of total assets. 
In Panel B, NetLoans represents the value of granted loans, excluding loan loss provisions, as share of total assets, measured one year
prior to the adoption. NetDebt is net debt, as the share of total assets of the bank, measured one year prior to adoption. Additionally,
we control for firm size via MV which is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity for the respective bank, measured as a 12
month average prior to changeover. 
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As a robustness check, we also apply the regression analysis on the first quarter earnings an-
nouncements under IFRS using the last quarter’s asset structure information under local 
GAAP (results not reported). Interestingly, the coefficient estimates of Investments and Net-
Loans do not exhibit significant signs for the same specifications as above. However, we find 
that the coefficient estimate on NetDebt is significantly negatively related to market reactions 
for all specifications.  
 
Due to the ambiguity of the findings above, we have to be cautious in interpreting the results. 
This impression becomes even stronger when considering the rather low explanatory power of 
several of the tested model specifications above. However, we find no sustainable evidence 
that the first-time application leads to higher information value concerning opaque assets if 
measured by abnormal returns. Only the ex ante share of loans might be best interpreted as 
contributing to a higher trading volume. Therefore, based on the results in this section there is 
no sustainable evidence in support of H4. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
We analyze the information value of quarterly earnings announcements of European banks 
before and after transition to international accounting standards. We find that the information 
value after the obligatory transition to international accounting standards increases over time 
if measured by abnormal returns and variances of returns. However, testing the specific influ-
ence of IFRS while controlling for bank-specific characteristics and time-dependent effects, 
we reach the conclusion that there is no sustainable indication of IFRS being responsible for a 
superior information value of quarterly earnings announcements in general. However, we 
have to be cautious, since the sample is biased, i.e., observations of IFRS earnings announce-
ments take foremost place in the latter phase of our investigated period and the number of 
observations in the control group of local GAAP earnings announcements for this period is 
very low. 
 
Therefore, we carry out an analysis of the earnings announcements during 2005 for which we 
find a comparably stable setup. However, we are not able to find evidence suggesting IFRS 
earnings announcements possessing a higher information value while controlling for the insti-
tutional setup which seems rather to play a role in the information value of earnings an-
nouncements. An in-depth analysis of the reactions to first full year earnings announcements 
after the obligatory IFRS adoption yields that the information value seems to be lower for 
banks from countries which have accounting systems in place that are more divergent and 
have more accounting rules not available under local GAAP. This observation might be inter-
preted as the new accounting rules introducing confusion into markets at first which could be 
caused by a lower comparability of the accounting rules (Cuijpers and Buijink 2005, p. 513). 
An analysis of bank-specific balance sheet items indicates that the information value of first 
financial year earnings announcements rather decreases with a higher share of investment 
assets prior to adoption. The expectation is that a gain in transparency concerning these spe-
cific assets increases the information value. This might indicate that investments mostly con-
sisting of traded financial assets are still perceived as non-transparent in the transition. 
 
Overall, our results cast doubts on the perception that earnings announcements in accordance 
with IFRS alone are able to convey significantly more information to the markets for banks in 
Europe. In fact, the informational and institutional environment seems to play a crucial role in 
the information value of earnings announcements which is in line with prior research.  
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4 Mandatory IFRS Adoption of European Banks and the Ef-
fects on Information Asymmetry  
4.1 Introduction 
Improving the information efficiency of capital markets is a major goal of financial reporting. 
The basic perception is that a change to a “higher quality” accounting system leads to higher 
information efficiency. One main criticism is that the research results concerning voluntary 
transition to higher quality accounting standards leading to higher information efficiency and 
market liquidity might possibly be driven by a self-selection bias (e.g., Hung and Subra-
manyam 2007; Daske et al. 2008). This means that only firms that expect to profit from the 
transition will change their accounting systems and might not necessarily represent the gen-
eral market. The situation changed in 2005, when the application of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) became obligatory in consolidated accounts for capital market 
oriented companies in Europe. Empirical research on this strand of literature faces several 
problems. Firstly, there is an omitted variables problem. In fact, some studies acknowledge 
that differences in institutional backgrounds and incentives strongly interfere with each other 
and the potential positive effects of financial reporting (e.g., Ball, Robin and Wu 2003; 
Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz 2006). Secondly, there is a problem of practical relevance for em-
pirical studies: In order to find a suitable peer group to test the findings research has to find 
comparable firms that do not have to apply mandatorily IFRS accounting rules yet. However, 
most of the highly developed economies around the globe have already implemented interna-
tional accounting standards or have comparable local GAAP accounting rules in force, e.g., 
U.S. GAAP. Hence, the remaining countries not yet having implemented international stan-
dards might not be directly comparable (e.g., Daske et al. 2008, p. 1086) which gives rise to 
concerns about the potential risk of comparing apples and oranges.  
 
Considering these facts, a reasonable approach is to compare an identical set of firms prior to 
and after the changeover to IFRS in a comparable institutional setup. This also might limit the 
power of statements concerning time-dependent changes in information asymmetry proxies. 
The change of these proxies over time can be accounted for, at least partly, by explicitly con-
trolling for time. As mentioned above, cross-country comparisons of firms for which in one 
country the application of IFRS is not mandatory are not necessarily feasible without restrict-
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ing conclusions. In this study, this problem can be faced by also including benchmark firms 
from the same countries that did not have to change the accounting regime after 2005.70 
 
Bank transparency seems to be relevant considering the vulnerable interrelations in the 
worldwide banking system. Prior investigations of the transition often excluded banks be-
cause of their different balance sheet structures and earnings’ sources in comparison to other 
industries (e.g., Cuijpers and Buijink 2005, p. 493). However, in this investigation, we claim 
that if there is a difference in capital market efficiency through IFRS adoption it should be 
measurable best by the investigation of banks. Allegedly, a bank’s business is especially 
opaque to markets and financial statements do not sufficiently explain the sources of earnings 
and risks in comparison to financial statements from other industries, which is also reflected 
in an opaque asset structure (e.g., Morgan and Stiroh 2001; Morgan 2002; Chipalkatti 2005; 
Ianotta 2006). In other words, if capital markets do reward increasing transparency, banks 
should benefit more than firms from other industries if the application of IFRS leads to lower 
opacity of assets. Firstly, the stronger fair value orientation for financial assets and liabilities 
often uses market prices thereby uncovering hidden reserves, and importing volatility in con-
solidated balance sheets (e.g., Soderstrom and Sun 2007, p. 689).71 Furthermore, the true and 
fair view principle of IFRS is supposed to reduce earnings management and discretionary 
degrees of freedom, leading to a further increase in information efficiency of capital markets. 
Both effects interact and are not mutually exclusive. Assuming efficient capital markets, one 
might argue that the true and fair view principle does not convey new information to the mar-
ket because the market has already incorporated the fair values of the assets in the market 
price of the firm (Schildbach 2009, p. 582). Assuming inefficient markets, one might argue 
that capital markets do not have information about the structure and riskiness of individual 
bank’s assets. However, fair value does not necessarily mean that market prices are used.72 
Additionally, other assets and liabilities are not valued at fair value at all. Therefore, in this 
study, we expect capital markets to be efficient in that they do evaluate the information re-
ceived correctly. An implication is that information asymmetry is reduced in the application 
of higher quality accounting standards that are closer to the true and fair view principle. 
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 For example, banks that do not have to prepare consolidated accounts in accordance with IFRS.  
71
 This volatility has then to be caused by market risk, since firm-specific risks can be diversified. Furthermore, 
increasing volatility in earnings and assets structure might reduce the financial stability of a bank which is also a 
point worth considering. 
72
 Fair values can also be deducted from mark-to-model approaches which probably contain information not 
available to capital markets before publication. 
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This study extends the existing literature in several ways. We try to fill the gap in research for 
obligatory transitions and the effect on banks. Additionally, data for empirical investigations 
of the time after the obligatory transition is now available enabling new insights which were 
not available to prior research. Furthermore, this study concentrates on the change in informa-
tion efficiency proxies for banks in Europe only. This assures a relatively stable and homoge-
nous institutional background. Furthermore, we try to clarify whether the potential benefits 
are really attributable to the change in accounting systems or rather an effect of the still ongo-
ing capital market integration in general. We provide answers in respect of both questions for 
research dealing with accounting regimes and banking institutions in general, and with the 
cost and benefits of the IFRS transition in particular. 
 
The investigation covers different approaches and dimensions of information asymmetry and 
the impact on market valuations: At first, the implications of a mandatory change in account-
ing systems on information efficiency and market liquidity are investigated. Secondly, the 
direct relation between accounting measures of equity and equity valuations as well as value 
relevance of accounting measures, in general, is covered. Thirdly, the last part adds to the 
literature on IFRS transition on mandatory adoption in the European Union and Europe. One 
advantage is that a large dataset of 151 European banks is analyzed for all three dimensions in 
this investigation. This allows a complete and comprehensive picture of the impact of the 
IFRS adoption on European banks.  
 
Overall, the results provide mixed evidence. They indicate a significant influence of IFRS on 
bid-ask spreads and the price impact of trades whereas trading volume or the number of zero 
returns seem to be unaffected. However, a significant influence of the accounting system on 
asset and equity valuation as suggested by previous studies cannot be confirmed. The first 
mandatory application of IFRS in the European Union seems to introduce confusion initially. 
However, except for price sensitivity, the mandatory application of IFRS has a limited impact 
on information asymmetry measures. Rather, banks located in member states of the European 
Union seem to benefit for some measures of information asymmetry. Additionally, an early 
voluntary adoption of IFRS seems not to be a significant advantage over mandatory adoption. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides the related literature. Section 4.3 
introduces the hypotheses. Section 4.4 describes the dataset and the methodology. Section 4.5 
presents the results and a discussion. Section 4.6 concludes. 
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4.2 Related Literature 
Depending on the definition of accounting quality, three streams of literature in the investiga-
tion of transition effects on accounting quality can be distinguished. An increase in account-
ing quality can be measured, e.g., as a reduction in cost of equity capital for firms, or via an 
improvement in information efficiency.  
 
The first stream concentrates on accounting regimes in force and tries to relate them to meas-
ures of cost of equity capital while controlling for alternative influences (e.g., Daske 2006). 
Hail and Leuz (2006) employ a cross-country analysis to identify the reasons for differences 
in cost of equity capital. They find that firms from countries with stricter enforcement, more 
stringent regulations and higher disclosure requirements experience a significantly lower cost 
of equity capital. Furthermore, over 35% of cross-sectional variation in cost of equity capital 
seems to be related to firm risk proxies, e.g., firm size, volatility, book-to-market ratio, and 
country-specific factors such as inflation and macroeconomic variability (Hail and Leuz 2006, 
p. 487). Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) study the effects of disclosure on cost of equity capi-
tal on banks via a disclosure index in order to measure the extent of the impact of increased 
disclosure. They show that increases in disclosures are more pronounced for European banks 
if measured by cost of equity capital.  
 
The second stream identifies a relation between financial reporting and information asymme-
try and market liquidity. A larger strand studies the effect of voluntary transition to interna-
tional accounting standards (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Cuijpers and Buijink 2005). In-
formation efficiency is then measured by proxies such as bid-ask spreads, stock price volatil-
ity, and forecast dispersion. Higher quality financial reporting mirrored in increased disclo-
sure of financial information should be reflected in lower estimation risk and a reduction in 
adverse selection costs enabling investors to better differentiate between the quality of firms 
(Daske et al. 2008, pp. 1091-1092). Chipalkatti (2005) concentrates on the mandatory bank 
disclosures introduced in India in 2000 and studies the effect on spreads and asymmetric in-
formation costs. He identifies lower spreads and costs in the aftermath of the new regulation. 
Platikanova (2007) investigates market liquidity effects of the IFRS adoption in several Euro-
pean countries and finds that cross-country differences in information asymmetry are pre-
dominantly reduced after transition to IFRS in Europe. Christensen, Hail and Leuz (2013) 
investigate the mandatory IFRS application and the impact on market liquidity and find that 
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concurrent changes in reporting enforcement seem to be highly relevant whereas accounting 
regime changes alone seem to have limited impact on market liquidity.  
 
Two approaches are closely related to this paper. The first one is applied by Leuz (2003). He 
investigates differences in information asymmetry by comparing bid-ask spreads, turnover 
and forecast dispersion, and puts these measures in relation to differences in accounting re-
gimes, while controlling for institutional and firm-specific factors. Concretely, Leuz (2003) 
studies the impact on information asymmetry measures of U.S. GAAP versus IFRS annual 
results in Germany’s New Market. He finds no evidence for a significant difference between 
both accounting systems which he interprets as both accounting systems being comparable in 
reducing information asymmetries since the institutional background and settings are un-
changed. The second approach rests on the investigation by Daske et al. (2008). They also 
investigate changes in information asymmetry measures. Additionally, they study the impact 
on equity valuation using Tobin’s Q. Contrary to Leuz (2003) comparing IFRS and U.S. 
GAAP, they study the effects in relation to the obligatory IFRS transition in a worldwide 
sample comprising data from 2001 to 2005. One result is that even though mandatory adopt-
ers are able to report liquidity increases, voluntary adopters benefit more around the manda-
tory adoption date. Furthermore, Tobin’s Q does not change significantly for mandatory 
adopters. Daske et al. (2008) also point out that effects such as reporting incentives and the 
institutional background may play an important role in the observations which might cast 
doubts on the clearness and immediacy of the IFRS impact. 
 
In our paper, these approaches are modified in order to clarify the question whether the transi-
tion to IFRS leads to any positive influence on information asymmetry measures for banks in 
the longer run after the application. Furthermore, we use a relatively stable institutional envi-
ronment reducing the possible influences of concurrent effects. Therefore, the implications on 
information asymmetry and market liquidity measures, and equity valuations of the manda-
tory application of IFRS in European banks are at the heart of this investigation in order to 
generate a more comprehensive picture from all the different angles mentioned above.  
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4.3 Hypotheses 
4.3.1 Reduction of Information Asymmetry 
Theory suggests that reductions in information asymmetry through disclosure will increase 
the future liquidity of a firm’s securities (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991, p. 1326). Under the 
prerequisite that IFRS provide higher quality information for investors than local GAAP fi-
nancial statements, the dissemination of information contained in IFRS financial statements 
suggests a reduction in information asymmetry and an increase of liquidity for financial mar-
kets. The rationale is that the increase in available information makes it easier for investors to 
implement the information in their valuation models and evaluate the respective firm, thereby 
reducing estimation error and raising information efficiency and market liquidity. Another 
argument is that banks especially are often supposed to be difficult to understand concerning 
their business and often intransparent to investors and, therefore, difficult to evaluate (e.g., 
Morgan and Stiroh 2001; Morgan 2002; Ianotta 2006). Additionally, their highly regulated 
disclosures do not necessarily meet the information needs of investors. This is supposed to 
change with the application of accounting standards that better serve the information require-
ments of capital markets. Furthermore, the changeover to IFRS enables a wider circle of in-
vestors to compare firms across country borders in order to serve a reasonable allocation of 
funds.73 This also increases stock turnover after transition to IFRS. All these arguments in-
crease information efficiency. Therefore, the terms reduction in information asymmetry and 
an increase in market liquidity are applied synonymously in this paper. Hence, the first hy-
pothesis to be tested is: 
 
H1: Information asymmetry decreases and market liquidity increases after the transi-
tion to IFRS. 
 
There are several proxies in literature capturing information asymmetry. Two of them often 
used are bid-ask spreads and turnover (e.g., Leuz 2003; Daske et al. 2008). To measure mar-
ket liquidity, the number of zero returns (Daske et al. 2008) and the price impact of trades 
(Amihud 2002) are applied. Concretely, a decrease in bid-ask spreads can be interpreted as an 
increase in information efficiency, whereas this also holds true for a higher stock turnover 
                                                 
73
 However, this argument is only valid if institutional environment is comparable. In the European area, we 
assume that this requirement can be regarded as fulfilled. 
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level.74 The price impact of trades and a lower number of zero returns are measures for market 
liquidity. A decrease in price sensitivity and a smaller number of zero returns across the sam-
ple period is an indicator for increased information efficiency and market liquidity.75  
4.3.2 Equity Valuation 
Another point often addressed in empirical studies concerning information asymmetry is the 
fact that higher transparency increases firm value. Among others, Lang et al. (2003) find that 
cross-listings in the United States increase market values of the respective firms. The cross-
listing can therefore be interpreted as a commitment to higher transparency if other informa-
tion environments lead to lower transparency. One fact often at the focal point of debates is 
that financial statements in accordance with international accounting standards are often per-
ceived as being more transparent if the information facilitates better forecasts of a firm’s fu-
ture value. However, this depends on the prerequisite that financial statement information is 
decision-relevant for investors, i.e., the information is not superseded by more timely infor-
mation (Barth, Beaver and Landsman 2001, p. 80).76 Concretely, it should be easier for inves-
tors to predict future cash flows on the basis of the information contained in the financial 
statements according to IFRS. This, in turn, would decrease the uncertainty in the forecasted 
measures and increase information efficiency. The superior ability to forecast future cash 
flows should be reflected in systematically higher equity valuations, since the risk premiums 
in the discount factors are reduced. Additionally, fair value accounting allows investors to be 
better informed about the fair value of many bank assets which leads to lower uncertainty. 
This, on average, leads to higher equity and asset valuations. 
 
H2: Equity and asset valuation is higher for firms preparing financial statements ac-
cording to IFRS. 
 
As a proxy for asset valuations, Tobin’s Q is used. It is measured as the market value of assets 
in relation to their book values.77 A higher average valuation of assets should be reflected by 
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 For example, Grammig, Schiereck and Theissen (2000) empirically show that turnover is a good measure to 
capture information asymmetry effects since the risk to trade with (better) informed traders is negatively associ-
ated with higher trading volumes (see Leuz 2003, p. 454). 
75
 There are other factors influencing these measures. For example, bid-ask spreads can be driven by order proc-
essing costs and inventory holding costs (Leuz 2003) and not only by adverse selection costs which is the inter-
esting component to measure information asymmetry (Platikanova 2007). This issue is addressed in section 
4.4.2. 
76
 However, they admit that accounting information may also only be value-relevant, i.e., reflected in equity 
valuations without being decision-relevant (Barth, Beaver and Landsman 2001, p.80). 
77
 Originally, Tobin’s Q is the relation of replacement costs of assets in relation to their book values. However, 
since the replacement costs are not measurable from an external point of view, the proxy of market values of 
assets to book value of assets is used, as outlined by Daske et al. (2008). This approach leads to a close relation 
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an increase in Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, Tobin’s Q also captures a firm’s cost of capital besides 
the effect on investments (Daske et al. 2008, p. 1115). An alternative measure is the Price-to-
book Value, which puts the market value of equity in relation to the book value of equity of a 
specific firm. 
4.3.3 Impact of Mandatory Adoption in the European Union 
As outlined above, most studies acknowledge that institutional factors play a major role in the 
determination of information efficiency of capital markets and only a limited impact can be 
attributed to the mere change in accounting systems (e.g., Barth, Landsman and Lang 2008). 
Armstrong et al. (2010) find that the stock market perceives the IFRS introduction positively 
by showing lower information asymmetry in reaction to events increasing the probability of 
the IFRS introduction. They find that banks especially show an even stronger reaction which 
they explain with higher transparency through the application of IAS 39. The impact of the 
mandatory adoption versus the voluntary adoption of IFRS has often been addressed in recent 
literature. Daske et al. (2008) observe that voluntary adopters are able to benefit more than 
mandatory adopters. For voluntary adopters, one could argue that the information supply of 
markets for these firms improves. However, this result could be the consequence of a self-
selection bias, i.e., only firms anticipating potential benefits use the new accounting system 
voluntarily (e.g., Hung and Subramanyam 2007; Daske et al. 2008). Furthermore, comparabil-
ity across firms might not be significantly increased if not all banks change to international 
standards. At least, the voluntary adoption could then be interpreted as a signal for a commit-
ment to more transparency for investors (e.g., Daske et al 2008, p. 1094). On the other hand, 
the mandatory adoption increases comparability across sectors and country borders by creat-
ing a level playing field when it becomes obligatory to report consolidated accounts in accor-
dance with IFRS for firms with listed equity in the European Union for fiscal years starting in 
2005.78 This reduces information asymmetry and increases market liquidity for all firms in a 
market.  
 
H3: The mandatory adoption of IFRS has a negative impact on information asymmetry 
and a positive effect on market liquidity. 
 
Therefore, this hypothesis seeks to investigate the difference between mandatory and volun-
tary adopters and might be considered a special variant of hypothesis H1. 
                                                                                                                                                        
between Price-to-book value and Tobin’s Q since it can be shown that the difference between both measures 
depends ultimately on the respective leverage ratio.  
78
 See Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002. 
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4.4 Dataset and Methodology 
4.4.1 Dataset 
The constituents list of the market portfolio Datastream Banks Europe with 173 banks is used 
as reference. Our dataset comprises observations of 151 European banks over a period of 8 
years from 2001 to 2008.79 The identification of the transition year is carried out via the cod-
ing of the accounting systems available in Datastream.80 Additionally, for banks without data 
available, we try to complete missing transition dates manually. In the sample, there are 128 
banks changing to IFRS or already applying IFRS during that period. Table XX describes the 
composition of all banks in the sample according to their location and the total number of 
observations for each accounting regime. Furthermore, the table indicates whether the banks’ 
countries are members of the European Union as of 2003.  
 
Most of the observations concerning the transition date are from 2005. However, sometimes 
banks changed their accounting system in 2006 because of differences in the fiscal year pe-
riod. They are then coded as first-time adoption in 2006. If the banks changed to IFRS before 
IFRS became obligatory in a specific country, they are included in the subsample ‘Voluntary 
Adopters’. For some banks, the transition is not available due to two reasons. 23 banks have 
not yet changed to IFRS since they, e.g., do not have to prepare consolidated annual accounts 
in accordance to IFRS. The reason is that in several countries IFRS are not mandatory for 
individual accounts.81 These banks are then left in the sample as benchmarks, if data is avail-
able. Observations of 22 banks are excluded from the dataset: For 17 banks, information 
about the transition is not available or not clearly identifiable via the Datastream coding, since 
the definitions of the underlying accounting systems are ambiguous. Another reason is that 
the banks switched to U.S. GAAP. In five cases, the index additionally contained preferred 
shares of some banks. Hence, the initial dataset comprises a maximum of 1208 observations. 
However, due to data availability, the working samples in the following are smaller. 
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 The constituents list as of June 2009 is used. 
80
 A similar procedure is used by Hail and Leuz (2007) and Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008). See also footnote 85. 
81
 Another reason might be that some banks are allowed to prepare their financial statements in accordance with 
IFRS after 2005 if certain criteria are met. E.g., in Switzerland, banks are allowed to continue to report under 
national GAAP (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008, p. 118-120). 
  
 81 
Table XX: Descriptive Statistics of Banks' Origins and IFRS Adoption 
Country Banks per Index EU2003
Country Member Voluntary Mandatory na ny Total Local Member
Adopters Adopters GAAP in % IFRS in % Total
Austria 7 2 2 3 2 0 7 13 2.1% 27 4.6% 40 Y
Belgium 5 3 0 3 1 1 5 20 3.2% 12 2.1% 32 Y
Bulgaria 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 N
Cyprus 4 3 2 0 2 0 4 1 0.2% 15 2.6% 16 N
Czech Republic 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.0% 8 1.4% 8 N
Denmark 7 2 1 5 0 1 7 34 5.4% 22 3.8% 56 Y
Finland 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 4 0.6% 4 0.7% 8 Y
Faroe Islands 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 N
France 11 3 0 10 0 1 11 48 7.7% 40 6.9% 88 Y
Germany 6 3 2 3 1 0 6 13 2.1% 27 4.6% 40 Y
Greece 10 6 0 9 1 0 10 36 5.8% 36 6.2% 72 Y
Hungary 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.0% 8 1.4% 8 N
Ireland 2 2 0 2 0 0 2 9 1.4% 7 1.2% 16 Y
Italy 21 7 1 18 2 0 21 78 12.5% 74 12.7% 152 Y
Liechtenstein 2 0 1 1 0 0 2 6 1.0% 10 1.6% 16 N
Luxembourg 2 0 0 1 1 0 2 4 0.6% 4 0.7% 8 Y
Malta 4 0 4 0 0 0 4 2 0.3% 30 5.2% 32 N
Monaco 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 1.3% 0 0.0% 8 N
Netherlands 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 0.6% 4 0.7% 8 Y
Norway 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 4 0.6% 4 0.7% 8 N
Poland 14 5 1 13 0 0 14 59 9.4% 53 9.1% 112 N
Portugal 5 3 0 5 0 0 5 20 3.2% 20 3.4% 40 Y
Romania 3 1 3 0 0 0 3 4 0.6% 20 3.4% 24 N
Russian Federation 4 2 3 1 0 0 4 6 1.0% 26 4.5% 32 N
Slovenia 3 1 3 0 0 0 3 8 1.3% 16 2.7% 24 N
Spain 11 6 0 11 0 0 11 44 7.0% 44 7.6% 88 Y
Sweden 5 4 0 4 1 0 5 16 2.6% 16 2.7% 32 Y
Switzerland 21 2 3 0 2 16 21 136 21.7% 16 2.7% 152 N
Turkey 13 8 3 0 7 3 13 29 4.6% 19 3.3% 48 N
United Kingdom 5 5 0 5 0 0 5 20 3.2% 20 3.4% 40 Y
Sum 173 73 31 97 22 23 173 626 51.8% 582 48.2% 1208 
Banks Maximum Firm Year Observations
This table provides descriptive statistics for the entire sample from 2001 to 2008, separated per countries. It consists of 626 (582) observations pre (post) IFRS adoption. The first column provides the number of banks per country contained in the Datastream Banks Europe
index. The second column 'Index Member' indicates the number of banks that are members of the large cap index on the main trading market. The columns 'Voluntary Adopters' and 'Mandatory Adopters' indicate the number of banks that voluntarily or mandatorily changed the
accounting system to IFRS. The columns 'ny' ('na') provides the number of banks that either did not yet switch ('ny') to IFRS, or banks for which data is not available or not applicable ('na') . The next columns segregate the maximum total firm year observations into local
GAAP or IFRS observations, and the maximum number of observations in the sample for each country. The last column indicates whether the country is a member state of the European Union as of 2003. 
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4.4.2 Methodology 
4.4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
At first, data about the dependent variables is gathered. In order to identify any influence of 
IFRS accounting on information asymmetry, four information asymmetry and market illiquid-
ity measures are used: share turnover, bid-ask spreads, zero returns, and price impact of 
trades, the latter three as outlined by Daske et al. (2008), with minor modifications which are 
explained in the following. 
 
The bid-ask spread measure is calculated as the natural logarithm of the average daily spread 
divided by the midpoint. It is calculated over an 11-month period starting four months before 
the end of the fiscal year and ending at month +7 relative to the financial year end.82 This 
rather large period is chosen in order to account for both an information impact on markets 
before the official release of results and the fact that markets might need some time to process 
the information of financial statements. This approach also controls for the possibility that 
markets reward the transition before the actual adoption of the new accounting rules takes 
place. Some studies suggest that the investigation of spreads is too simple, since spreads con-
sist of several components, such as inventory holding costs, order processing costs, and ad-
verse selection costs (e.g., Platikanova 2007, p. 14). A division into single components is not 
always easy and the procedures often lack significance. Platikanova (2007, p. 32) finds that 
the adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads varies roughly around 25% - 35% of total 
spreads in her investigation. Therefore, taking just the total bid-ask spread as proxy and con-
trolling for firm-specific effects seems to be sufficient in a study focusing only on Europe.83 
Furthermore, the focus of this study is to find a relation between the transition to IFRS and the 
development of bid-ask spreads. Therefore, it is not of primary interest which of the compo-
nents of bid-ask spreads is affected. The basic expectation is that the implementation of IFRS 
in banks leads to an increase in transparency. These transparency gains are mirrored in de-
creasing bid-ask spreads, ceteris paribus.  
 
The second measure is Turnover (e.g. Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Leuz 2003). It denotes the 
natural logarithm of the daily mean turnover of shares in relation to total number of shares 
                                                 
82
 Daske et al. (2008) use a broader period for their impact study starting at month -5, i.e., five months before the 
fiscal year ends, and ending +7 months in the subsequent year. 
83
 Some other studies use the bid-ask spreads as direct measure of information asymmetry and do not account for 
single components, as for example inventory holding costs, e.g., Daske et al. (2008). 
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over the investigated 11-month period around financial year ends. The rationale is that turn-
over, or trading volume, captures the investors’ willingness to buy and sell firm shares, which 
should be inversely related to information asymmetry (Platikanova 2007, p. 20). Furthermore, 
the risk to trade with (better) informed traders is lower for stocks with very high trading vol-
umes (Grammig, Schiereck and Theissen 2000). 
 
The third measure is the number of zero returns. Zero Returns is calculated simply by count-
ing the number of daily zero returns of stocks and dividing them by the number of all possible 
trading days during the 11-month period around fiscal year end. It measures the trading activ-
ity in a specific stock (e.g., Daske et al. 2008). The IFRS implementation is expected to have 
a positive influence on the trading activity for the same reasons already mentioned for turn-
over.  
 
The last measure to identify the influence on information asymmetry and market liquidity is 
Price Impact of trades. This price sensitivity measure is described by Amihud (2002) and is 
implemented, for example, by Daske et al. (2008). It assesses the liquidity of a stock. It is 
defined as the absolute value of daily price change in percent divided by the daily trading vol-
ume in currency units (Daske et al. 2008, p. 1133). The approach is slightly changed in this 
study to become independent of the currency component. In a European setup, there are sev-
eral currencies and exchange rate changes could have an adverse influence on the results. 
Therefore, price impact is calculated as the natural logarithm of the mean value of the abso-
lute daily price change in percent divided by the trading volume in percent of total stocks out-
standing and is measured over the 11-month period. In this measure, higher values represent 
higher price sensitivity and greater illiquidity of a stock. Therefore, the expectation is that the 
increase in disclosure leads to a decreasing price impact of trades. 
 
All four information asymmetry and illiquidity measures (IAIM) are related via multivariate 
regression models to the IFRS measure, while controlling for market microstructure and 
bank-specific attributes. The continuous dependent and independent variables are all gathered 
from Datastream and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% quantile in order to control for ex-
treme values and outliers (e.g., Ball, Kothari and Robin 2000; Daske et al. 2008). The number 
of observations varies between the single variables. Furthermore, only dependent variables 
with more than 50% of all possible observations are used.84 
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 An exception is the number of zero returns where this procedure would lead to a bias. 
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4.4.2.2 Information Asymmetry 
To test H1, the idea is that we want to identify any significant influence of IFRS accounting 
on the IAIM while controlling for concurrent effects that also might contribute to an en-
hancement of IAIM. Basically, the approach employed by Leuz (2003) is used which is modi-
fied to meet our data requirements, i.e., we also include index membership and additional 
control variables. In order to study a possible influence of the IFRS application, the basic 
model to be tested on the four asymmetric information and illiquidity measures (IAIM) is: 
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with 
 
Share Turnoverit  the natural logarithm of the monthly average turnover in shares at the 
end of month +7, 
Market Valueit the natural logarithm of the market value of equity of a specific bank’s 
stock at the end of month +7, 
Free Floatit  the number of stocks that are not closely held, as share of total stocks at 
the end of month +7; 
IFRSit  a dummy variable equal to one, if the bank reports in accordance with 
international accounting standards,  
Stock Price   the natural logarithm of the daily stock price variance over the 
Variabilityit   11-month period,  
EU2003it dummy variables equal to one if a bank is located in a country that is a 
member of the European Union as of 2003,  
Indexit a dummy variable equal to one if the bank’s stock is a constituent of the 
main stock market index (“blue chip index”) of a country,  
Controlsj dummy variable controls for firm-fixed and period-fixed effects. 
 
The data for the analysis is gathered via Datastream, except for Index and EU2003 for which 
we manually tried to identify a bank’s index membership at the end of 2008 or the member-
ship of a bank’s country in the European Union as of 2003, respectively. For Share Turnover, 
Market Value, and Free Float, we apply lagged variables to ensure that all available informa-
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tion is completely reflected. The country identification is conducted via the ISIN codes. Fur-
thermore, IFRS is identified using Datastream.85 In case of missing data or ambiguity, we 
manually try to complete the dataset. Otherwise, we drop the observations to prevent mis-
specifications. 
 
The natural logarithm of all IAIM is used, except for Zero Returns. In the regressions on 
Turnover and Price Impact as IAIM, the independent variable on share turnover is excluded 
from the regressions in order to prevent the possibility of collinearity between independent 
and dependent variables. The reason is that Price Impact also contains a turnover component. 
 
As outlined in H1, the IFRS adoption is expected to reduce information asymmetry and in-
crease market liquidity. Therefore, the expectations on bid-ask spread regressions are that 
Share Turnover and Market Value exhibit a negative sign since higher turnover and market 
values are commonly associated with decreasing bid-ask spreads. Market Value also controls 
for other disclosures of a bank that could have influence on the results.86 The coefficient on 
Free Float is also expected to be negative since a higher share of free floating stocks means 
that changes in market values are based on a broader basis of market participants and lead to 
higher market efficiency. We expect the IFRS dummy variable to be negative, indicating a 
reduction in spreads and higher information efficiency. The coefficient on Stock Price Variab-
lility is expected to exhibit a positive sign since a higher volatility is positively associated 
with uncertainty and leads to higher information asymmetry concerning the future develop-
ment of stocks. The dummy variable EU2003 is expected to be negative due to two reasons: 
Firstly, an EU membership of the countries reflects commitment to minimum standards of the 
institutional setup within the Eurozone. Secondly, the inclusion of the EU dummies accounts 
for concurrent effects of other influences on information asymmetry measures, e.g., sinking 
country risks and institutional background which might also be reflected in bid-ask spreads. It 
is sufficient to distinguish between EU members and non-members as country-specific factors 
become less important in increasingly integrated capital markets.87 The expectation for the 
coefficient on Index is that it exhibits a negative sign, since a bank’s membership in the main 
stock market index of a country ensures a higher market transparency for that specific stock. 
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 For the coding identification, we use a comparable approach to Hail and Leuz (2007, p. 49-52). For example, 
the IFRS dummy takes the value of one, if the data is coded “International Standards” or “IFRS”. A similar ap-
proach is also used by Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008, p. 486-487), see also footnote 80. 
86
 For this connection and a discussion, see Leuz (2003, p. 461). 
87
 See Hail and Leuz (2006, p. 520), citing further literature and giving a more general discussion. 
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For the regression on Turnover, the expectation is that the coefficients on Market Value and 
Free Float are positive, since information supply of large banks induces higher turnover and a 
higher share of publicly available stocks also positively influences turnover. The coefficient 
on Stock Price Variability is expected to exhibit a positive sign, since greater variability in 
stock prices is positively associated with trading volume (e.g., Leuz 2003, p. 458). The coeffi-
cients on the dummy variables IFRS, EU2003, and Index are assumed to have a positive sign. 
The commitment to the application of IFRS, the adoption of the European rules, and the index 
membership should be positively related to turnover. 
 
For both regressions on Zero Returns and Price Impact as IAIM, the expectation is that Share 
Turnover and Market Value are negatively related to the market illiquidity measures, since 
both coefficients reflect indirectly a market’s attention with respect to a specific stock.88 
Large firms are more at the center of attention than smaller stocks and, hence, are more liquid 
even before the transition to IFRS. The coefficients on Free Float, EU2003, and Index are 
expected to exhibit negative signs, since all variables reflect a different perspective of the 
level of capital market integration. Therefore, the level of capital market integration besides 
the effect of preparing IFRS financial statements is measured. The coefficient on IFRS is as-
sumed to be negative. The rationale is that the IFRS application increases the market liquidity 
for a bank’s stock.  
4.4.2.3 Equity Valuation 
As hypothesized in H2, equity valuations by the market participants are expected to increase 
after transition to IFRS. The second set of regression models tries to identify the effect of 
IFRS on equity valuations and puts them into relation with the application of IFRS in Euro-
pean banks using two Market Valuation Measures (MVM).  
 
The first measure is Tobin’s Q which is commonly defined as the replacement cost of assets 
divided by their book values. Since replacement costs of assets are not directly observable 
from an external perspective, usually the market value of assets is used (e.g., Daske et al., 
2008). Tobin’s Q is calculated as the total assets less the book value of equity, plus the market 
value of equity, divided by the total assets.89 This ratio shows the favorability of a bank com-
pany in relation to its single asset components. Basically, if the replacement costs are lower 
                                                 
88
 As mentioned above, in the regressions on Zero Returns and Price Impact, Share Turnover is excluded as an 
independent variable. 
89
 Alternatively, it can also be calculated as market value of equity plus book value of debt, divided by total as-
sets. For the relation to Price-to-book Value, see footnote 77. 
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than their corresponding book values, the liquidation value is higher than the expected future 
cash flows generated by the assets. Through the modification mentioned above, Tobin’s Q 
puts a firm’s prospects in relation to its book values. The higher the market’s expectations are 
about future cash flows generated by the firm, the higher is Tobin’s Q (e.g., Daske et al. 2008, 
p. 1138). 
 
The second measure is Price-to-book Value. It is calculated as the market value of equity di-
vided by the book value of equity. It measures the market’s expectations about the bank’s 
proceedings, i.e., the market participants’ forecasts of discounted future cash flows in relation 
to the book value of equity. Higher values might be interpreted as higher growth expectations 
which might become clearer through increasing transparency.  
 
As already mentioned in H2, the expectation for both measures is that the application of IFRS 
leads to a higher equity valuation since the firm’s prospects are increasingly predictable and 
comparable and therefore more valuable to investors. In other words, the forecast of expected 
future cash flows is no longer adversely influenced by frictions and is more valuable due to 
useful information conveyed by IFRS financial statements.  
 
Concretely, there are two specifications used in the analysis. The first regression on the MVM 
includes, in addition to the IFRS dummy, as in prior literature the following control variables: 
financial leverage, firm size, and stock price variability (e.g., Lang et al. 2004; Daske et al. 
2008). We use the logarithm of the market value instead of the often used total assets to con-
trol for firm size. We are aware that this might lead to distortions. Therefore, in order to ascer-
tain the validity and stability of results, Index is included instead of MarketValue to control 
for the size of a bank in an alternative model specification.  
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Leverageit the relation of (total assets – book value of equity) to total assets at the 
end of the financial year. 
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All other variables are defined as above. The expectation is that the sign on the coefficient of 
MarketValue is positive, since a higher valuation of equity is positively related to higher 
price-to-book values and higher asset valuations. The exhibited sign on Leverage is assumed 
to be positive, since a highly leveraged bank is rather able to yield a higher return on equity, 
ceteris paribus. In the alternative model specification, the coefficient on Index is assumed to 
exhibit a positive sign, since the investors’ attention is higher towards banks that are members 
of the national large cap index. Likewise, the stock price variability is higher for banks with 
ex ante higher growth expectations. Furthermore, the coefficient on IFRS is expected to be 
positive, there are higher growth expectations due to clearer information conveyed to the 
markets by IFRS accounting in banks. 
4.4.2.4 Impact of Mandatory Adoption  
In this section, the impact of the way of the IFRS adoption on banks is tested, as outlined in 
H3. The basic idea is to identify the relation between the voluntary or mandatory adoption of 
IFRS and the development of market efficiency, evaluated using information asymmetry and 
market liquidity measures. Additionally, the model controls for the fact that some banks are 
located in member states of the European Union which might have a concurrent influence on 
effects. In order to determine whether the mandatory transition also has any impact on the 
asymmetric information and market liquidity measures, the following analysis is carried out. 
With this specification we try to clarify whether voluntary adopters experience a different 
behavior of IAIM when the application becomes mandatory in a country. Banks that do not 
have to change to IFRS are also included since they do not prepare mandatorily consolidated 
accounts in accordance to the new standards. This prevents any selection bias in favor of 
IFRS adopters by including this control group. 
 
As dependent variables, we use the IAIM already introduced from the above analysis: bid-ask 
spreads, turnover in shares, number of zero returns, and price impact of trades. Comparable 
approaches are well specified in research (e.g., Daske et al. 2008; Florou and Pope 2009). In 
order to distinguish between effects for mandatory and voluntary adopters, as well as to dif-
ferentiate effects according to EU membership, the regression specification is as follows: The 
dummy variable Voluntary is introduced, if a bank uses IFRS before the application of inter-
national standards becomes obligatory in a specific country. It is equal to one for all financial 
statements according to IFRS for voluntary adopters. The dummy variable Mandatory is used 
if the financial statements have to be mandatorily prepared in accordance with IFRS, i.e., for 
each year when IFRS has to be used for consolidated accounts in a specific jurisdiction. First 
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Mandatory denotes all obligatory first-time applications of IFRS, i.e., the first fiscal year end 
with financial statements that have to be obligatorily prepared according to IFRS. As already 
introduced above, EU2003 captures the effect for banks being located in a country that is an 
EU member as of 2003 which might also interfere with IFRS application and we also assume 
to have negative effects on bid-ask spreads, zero returns and price impact, and a positive ef-
fect on turnover. Moreover, we introduce an interaction term to account for incremental ef-
fects on the market efficiency measures. The coefficient on Voluntary*Mandatory describes 
the incremental effect on voluntary adopters when IFRS become mandatory in a country. In 
the interaction term setting, the coefficient on Mandatory captures the effect of all mandatory 
applicators, i.e., when Voluntary is zero. Likewise, the coefficient on Voluntary measures the 
effect of all voluntarily prepared financial statements before the application becomes manda-
tory. 
 
In order to control for time-dependent influences and bank-specific effects, the regression also 
takes into account firm-fixed and period-fixed effects. These indicator variables capture 
common effects on dependent variables in a specific year or a specific bank that are not nec-
essarily related to the transition in accounting systems (e.g., Daske et al. 2008, p. 1098). Addi-
tionally, control variables to account for specific effects unrelated to IFRS transition are also 
included that have already been introduced above, i.e., Share Turnover, MarketValue, Free 
Float and Stockprice Variability. The specification is as follows: 
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The information asymmetry and market illiquidity measures (IAIM) are used as dependent 
variables. In order to prevent collinearity problems, Share Turnover is excluded as an inde-
pendent variable in the regression on Turnover and Price Impact as dependent variables, as 
already outlined above. Controls represents all control variables mentioned before as well as 
firm-fixed and period-fixed effects. 
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4.5 Results of the Empirical Investigation 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table XXI provides descriptive statistics for the dependent variables applied in this investiga-
tion. On average, for about one out of five trading days, there is no price information avail-
able for a stock in the dataset. However, the median is only about 12.2% indicating that there 
are some banks that are irregularly traded which seems to be caused by banks located in 
smaller countries. These values are within expectations and are comparable to prior studies 
between about 15% and 30%, on average (e.g., Hail and Leuz 2007, p. 40 or Daske et al. 
2008, p. 1104). Bid-ask spreads are on average 0.98% which is somewhat lower if compared 
to previous studies which might however be explained by the fact that later periods are inves-
tigated and banks might be slightly more liquid than firms from other industries.90 Daily share 
turnover amounts on average to 0.31% of a bank’s total stocks outstanding which is compara-
ble to the findings of Leuz (2003). However, the median value of daily share turnover 
amounts to 0.13% only. This shows that the distribution is slightly skewed indicating some 
firms are strongly traded whereas the majority of banks is below the average value. The aver-
age price impact of trades is 80.61. However, the median is far lower with only 10.98. This 
observation is in accordance with the low daily trading volumes and indicates that several 
stocks are highly price sensitive. However, these figures are not necessarily comparable to 
prior studies since the calculation is modified, as outlined above. The Price-to-book Value 
amounts on average to 1.73 which is in line with prior investigations. Tobin’s Q is on average 
1.06 which is close to the median value (1.04). Both values indicate that the market values are 
just a little above their respective book values of assets. Both values are lower than in prior 
studies, for example, Daske et al. (2008, p. 1104) with a mean (median) of 1.44 (1.12). How-
ever, the fact that only banks are covered in this investigation has to be kept in mind which 
might explain these differences, whereas Daske et al. (2008) study firms from various indus-
tries. The lower values might also be explained by the fact that bank-specific assets are often 
more closely related to their respective market values than assets of firms from other indus-
tries, making evaluations easier which might be reflected in a lower Tobin’s Q. 
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 For example, Leuz (2003) finds mean bid-ask spreads between 1.72% and 2.26% whereas Hail and Leuz 
(2007) find yearly median spreads for IFRS adopters and non-IFRS adopters between 0.9% and 1.2% for 2004 
and 2005. 
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Table XXI: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables 
Dependent Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. First Quartile Third Quartile
Zero Returns 1127 19.93% 12.24% 0.210 6.33% 25.00%
Bid-ask Spreads 911 0.98% 0.55% 0.016 0.28% 0.98%
Turnover 1014 0.31% 0.13% 0.007 0.03% 0.38%
Price Impact 959 80.61 10.98 241.345 3.793 48.874
Price-to-Book Value 1011 1.73 1.60 0.77 1.16 2.16
Tobin's Q 880 1.06 1.04 0.09 1.01 1.08
This table presents descriptive statistics for the respective dependent variable under investigation. Zero Returns depicts the number of daily zero returns, in percent of total trading days over the
observation period of 11-months. Bid-ask Spreads is the average spread during the observation period, i.e. from month -4 to +7 after the annual results date. Turnover denotes the daily mean
turnover, as share of total number of shares outstanding, measured over the 11-month period. Price Impact is the price impact of trades, measured as the relation of daily price changes divided by
the daily trading volume over the period under investigation. Price-to-book Value denotes the relation of market value of equity to the book value of equity. Tobin's Q is measured as total assets
less book value of equity plus market value of equity divided by total assets (e.g., Daske et al. , 2008). To account for extreme values, all values, except Zero Returns , are truncated at the 1%-
and 99%-quantile. Values are only used in the calculations if there are at least 50% of all daily observations available during the 11-month period. N denotes the number of observations for each
variable.
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Table XXII provides information about dependent and independent variables in the sample 
according to the accounting regime in force, i.e., local GAAP or IFRS. In Panel A, bid-ask 
spreads are significantly lower for the IFRS subsample for both means and medians. The 
same impression can be reported from ZeroReturns for which, on average, about a 25% lower 
trading inactivity can be reported. Turnover seems to be higher for banks using IFRS on aver-
age. For the median values an 80% higher trading level can be reported. Even though not be-
ing significant in differences, the mean of the price impact of trades is lower on average for 
the IFRS group indicating a decreased price sensitivity. However, it has to be borne in mind 
that all effects in this table simply report the comparison of the IFRS observations to the local 
GAAP observations and do not control for concurrent influences, such as time-dependent ef-
fects. For both equity valuation measures, Price-to-book Value and Tobin’s Q, higher means 
and medians can be reported. Testing for differences confirms the perception of working with 
two different subsamples for both measures.  
 
The comparison of the dependent IAIM yields lower information asymmetry proxies for Bid-
ask Spreads, Zero Returns, Price Impact, a higher information asymmetry proxy for Turn-
over, and slightly higher equity valuation measures. In order to clarify whether the transition 
to IFRS or other effects such as the ongoing capital market integration, can be held responsi-
ble for the observed differences, we use the proxies introduced above in the analysis. 
 
In Panel B, as independent control variables, we find a higher Stock Turnover, which is meas-
ured at the end of the period under investigation, i.e., month +7 after the fiscal year end. A 
large and significant difference between the subsamples can also be reported from the market 
values of the companies for which the average market value is nearly twice the value under 
local GAAP seven months after fiscal year end. However, as already outlined above, it has to 
be kept in mind that the market values are very often strongly influenced by time-dependent 
factors such as business cycles. The share of free floating stocks (Free Float) is marginally 
higher for IFRS (64.15% versus 63.43% in local GAAP) with regard to means. However, me-
dian values are 1.5% higher under local GAAP which seems to have no influence. Shareprice 
Variability is higher for the IFRS subsample and significant in differences for both means and 
medians. Leverage indicates slightly higher leveraged banks with regard to means under 
IFRS. However, this cannot be observed from the comparison of median values indicating a 
slight reduction in liability quotas.  
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Table XXII: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Panel A: Dependent Variables
Dependent Variables Local GAAP N IFRS N
Bid-ask Mean 1.07% 501 0.86% 410 -0.21% **
Spread Median 0.63% 0.45% -0.17% +++
Turnover Mean 0.27% 525 0.35% 489 0.08% *
Median 0.09% 0.17% 0.08% +++
Zero Mean 22.89% 572 16.89% 555 -6.01% ***
Returns Median 16.88% 8.44% -8.44% +++
Price Impact Mean 83.04             481 78.17               478 -4.86 
Median 12.08             10.02               -2.06 
Price-to- Mean 1.66               547 1.80                 464 0.14 ***
Book Value Median 1.54               1.68                 0.14 +++
Tobin's Q Mean 1.05               517 1.07                 363 0.02 ***
Median 1.03               1.05                 0.01 +++
Panel B: Control Variables
Stock Mean 0.23% 503 0.32% 391 0.09% **
Turnover Median 0.06% 0.14% 0.07% +++
Absolute Mean 6,187.19        550 11,066.70        430 4,879.51 ***
Market Value Median 1,089.81        3,330.87          2,241.06 +++
Free Mean 63.43% 510 64.15% 502 0.72%
float Median 66.50% 65.00% -1.50%
Stock Price Mean 0.00035         570 0.00081 545 0.00046 ***
Variance Median 0.00018         0.00039 0.00021 +++
Leverage Mean 91.44% 564 92.77% 501 1.33% **
Median 94.02% 93.74% -0.28%
Difference
This table presents descriptive statistics for the respective dependent variables in the investigation, separated
according to accounting regimes in force and measured over the total period under investigation (2001-2008). Bid-ask 
Spreads is the average spread during the observation period, i.e. from month -4 to +7 after the annual results date.
Turnover denotes the daily mean turnover, as share of total number of shares outstanding, measured over the 11-
month period. Zero Returns depicts the number of daily zero returns, in percent of total trading days over the
observation period of 11 months. Price Impact of trades is the relation of daily price changes divided by the daily
trading volume over the period under investigation. Price-to-Book Value denotes the relation of market value of
equity to the book value of equity. Tobin's Q is measured as total assets less book value of equity plus market value
of equity divided by total assets (e.g., Daske et al. 2008). Stock Turnover is the monthly average turnover in shares at
the end of month +7 after financial year end. Absolute Market Value is measured as market value of equity of a
specific bank at the end of month +7. Free Float denotes the number of stocks that are not closely held, as share of
stocks outstanding. Stock Price Variance is the daily volatility measured of a total return index over the 11-month
period. Leverage denotes the quota of total liabilities to total assets in percent. To account for extreme values, all
dependent variable values, except Zero Returns, are truncated at the 1% and 99%-quantile. The independent variable
Stock Turnover is also truncated at the 1% and 99%-quantile. Values are only used in the calculations if there are at
least 50% of all daily observations available during the 11-month period. Testing for differences in means and medians
is done using an ordinary t-test (two-sided) and a Wilcoxon signed rank test, respectively. ***,**,* indicate
significance according to a two-sided t-test on the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level. +++,++,+ indicate significance according to a
Wilcoxon signed rank test on the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level.
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4.5.2 Information Asymmetry and Market Liquidity 
In the following, the results of the two model specifications testing the information asymme-
try proxies, i.e., bid-ask spreads and on stock turnover, and the illiquidity measures Zero Re-
turns and Price Impact are presented. Overall, we find a quite high explanatory power in all 
model specifications in Table XXIII. However, this effect is not uncommon in models con-
trolling for firm-fixed as well as period-fixed effects and is in line with prior investigations 
(e.g., Hail and Leuz 2007; Daske et al. 2008).91 
 
Table XXIII shows the regression of Bid-ask Spreads (Model I). One basic finding is that all 
coefficients except the coefficient on Market Value exhibit the predicted signs. However, this 
coefficient estimate is not significant. The coefficient on IFRS is significant, indicating a 
negative influence on bid-ask spreads, even after controlling for period-fixed and firm-fixed 
effects and in presence of the concurrent control variables. However, the effect of IFRS is 
much lower in comparison to the effect of being located in an EU member state which seems 
to play a major role.  
 
Inspecting the model specification on Turnover (Model II) leads to a different impression. 
The coefficient on the IFRS dummy does not suggest any significant impact on turnover. 
Contrary to expectations, the coefficient on Free Float is negative and lacks significance. Ad-
ditionally, the coefficient on stock price variability is positive and highly significant. This 
observation is in line with the notion that greater stock price variability is related to higher 
turnover in stocks (e.g., Leuz 2003). The coefficient on the natural log of the market value is 
significantly negative which seems counterintuitive at first glance. This might be interpreted 
as lower trading volumes in growing market capitalization, ceteris paribus. Panel B suggests 
a strong correlation of Index and EU2003 which might explain the observation. Most banks 
having high trading volumes are larger banks that are members of the main stock market in-
dex. Hence, most of the size effect might by absorbed by both of those control variables. 
Therefore, we carry out some robustness checks. As outlined below, this leads to comparable 
results in relation to the effect of IFRS. The coefficient on the index membership dummy is 
highly significant and exhibits a positive sign which provides evidence that the attention of 
the stock market towards large banks is reflected in higher turnover, even after controlling for 
a bank’s absolute market value.  
                                                 
91
 See Wooldridge (2003), p. 466. We rerun the regressions without firm-fixed effects leading to considerably 
lower explanatory power with an adjusted R² between 0.368 and 0.614, confirming this effect. 
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Table XXIII: Regression Analysis of Information Asymmetry Measures 
Panel A: Multivariate Regression Analysis
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Bid-ask Spreads Turnover Zero Returns Price Impact
Constant -1.62879 *** -6.03375 *** 0.57103 *** 4.32906 ***
(-3.24 ) (-9.06 ) (4.49) (5.27) 
Share Turnover (-) -0.08759 *** (-) -0.01073 ***
(-4.58 ) (-2.72 )
Market Value (-) 0.00272 (+) -0.34034 * (-) -0.01157 (-) 0.18077 
(0.03) (-1.98 ) (-0.88 ) (0.85) 
Free Float (-) -0.00408 *** (+) -0.00076 (-) -0.00003 (-) -0.00046
(-3.01 ) (-0.30 ) (-0.20 ) (-0.17 )
IFRS (-) -0.19497 ** (+) 0.22539 (-) 0.01208 (-) -0.44033 **
(-2.02 ) (1.38) (0.85) (-2.39 )
Stock Price (+) 0.15702 *** (+) 0.20732 *** (+) -0.03612 *** (+) 0.23210 ***
Variability (3.31) (3.47) (-3.90 ) (3.76) 
EU2003 (-) -1.73908 *** (+) 1.23464 *** (-) 0.07183 ** (-) -2.69042 ***
(-5.89 ) (2.80) (2.23) (-4.69 )
Index (-) -1.56489 *** (+) 2.36545 *** (-) -0.76726 *** (-) 1.42306 ***
(-3.69 ) (3.56) (-33.78 ) (3.01) 
Adj. R² 0.788            0.866            0.834            0.861            
F-Stat 19.440          37.000          27.800          34.900          
Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N Banks 119               136               135               133               
N 647               815               781               781               
Firm-fixed effects, included included included included
Period-fixed effects
Panel A presents the results of an ordinary least square (OLS) regression on different measures of information asymmetry. Bid-ask Spreads is the natural logarithm of the average bid-
ask spread measured as difference between bid and ask prices divided by the midpoint, and measured over the 11-month period under investigation. Turnover denotes the natural
logarithm of the daily mean turnover of shares in relation to total number of shares over the investigated 11-month period. ZeroReturns is calculated by counting the number of daily
zero returns of stocks and dividing them by the number of all possible trading days during the 11-month period. Price Impact is the natural logarithm of the mean value of absolute
daily price change in percent divided by the trading volume in percent of total stocks outstanding.
Share Turnover is the natural logarithm of the monthly average turnover in shares at the end of month +7. Market Value is the natural logarithm of the market value of a specific bank.
Free Float denotes the number of stocks that are not closely held, as share of total stocks. IFRS is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank reports in accordance to international
accounting standards. Stock Price Variability is the natural logarithm of the daily stock price variance over the 11-month period. EU2003 is a dummy variable. It is equal to one if a
bank is located in a country that is a member of the European Union as of 2003. The values in parentheses denote the t-values of robust standard errors. N denotes the number of
observations. We also control for firm specific and time fixed effects using dummies (not reported). Standard errors are adjusted for intra cluster correlation in banks. F-Statistics are
reported according to standard OLS regressions for purpose of comparison. ***,**,* indicate significance according to a two sided t-test on the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level.
Panel B displays the correlation matrix for independent and dependent variables in the regression analysis. The table displays the correlation table for the regressions on Bid-Ask 
Spreads , Turnover , Zero Returns , and Price Impact  as dependent variable. * indicates signficance on the 5%-level. 
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Table XXIII (contd.): Regression Analysis of Information Asymmetry Measures 
Panel B: Correlation Tables
Bid-Ask Spreads 1.000
Share Turnover -0.537 * 1.000
Market Value -0.641 * 0.487 * 1.000
Free Float -0.283 * 0.235 * 0.218 * 1.000
IFRS -0.232 * 0.105 * 0.278 * 0.029 1.000
S. P. Variability 0.156 * 0.144 * 0.179 * -0.093 * 0.281 * 1.000
EU2003 -0.271 * 0.098 * 0.282 * 0.163 * 0.067 0.039 1.000
Index -0.490 * 0.576 * 0.729 * 0.210 * 0.186 * 0.250 * 0.218 * 1.000
Zero Returns 1.000
Share Turnover -0.462 * 1.000
Market Value -0.498 * 0.504 * 1.000
Free Float -0.151 * 0.228 * 0.175 * 1.000
IFRS -0.255 * 0.080 * 0.254 * 0.036 1.000
S. P. Variability -0.308 * 0.135 * 0.131 * -0.058 0.262 * 1.000
EU2003 -0.183 * 0.116 * 0.285 * 0.175 * 0.027 0.016 1.000
Index -0.393 * 0.568 * 0.705 * 0.202 * 0.171 * 0.224 * 0.197 * 1.000
Turnover 1.000
Market Value 0.508 * 1.000
Free Float 0.223 * 0.166 * 1.000
IFRS 0.124 * 0.276 * 0.026 1.000
S. P. Variability 0.169 * 0.134 * -0.060 0.269 * 1.000
EU2003 0.197 * 0.301 * 0.175 * 0.041 0.026 1.000
Index 0.583 * 0.718 * 0.194 * 0.195 * 0.228 * 0.214 * 1.000
Price Impact 1.000
Market Value -0.505 * 1.000
Free Float -0.290 * 0.161 * 1.000
IFRS -0.077 * 0.259 * 0.035 1.000
S. P. Variability 0.138 * 0.148 * -0.056 0.275 * 1.000
EU2003 -0.168 * 0.257 * 0.166 * -0.002 0.021 1.000
Index -0.529 * 0.707 * 0.198 * 0.180 * 0.239 * 0.177 * 1.000
EU2003Market ValueShare Turnover Free Float S. P. VariabilityBid-Ask Spreads Index
Zero Returns Share Turnover Market Value Free Float IFRS S. P. Variability EU2003
IFRS
Index
Turnover Market Value Free Float IFRS S. P. Variability EU2003 Index
Price Impact Market Value Free Float IFRS S. P. Variability EU2003 Index
 
Turning to the model on Zero Returns (Model III), the results indicate that the coefficient on 
IFRS has no significant impact. Therefore, as in the Model on Turnover (Model II) we cannot 
refute the hypothesis that IFRS has no effect on trading activity in general. The coefficient on 
stock price variability is negatively related to Zero Returns, which means that a larger stock 
price variance is associated with a sinking number in Zero Returns. The explanation might be 
that stocks that are traded less often show lower variances, ceteris paribus. Contrary to expec-
tations the coefficient on EU2003 is, counterintuitively, slightly positively related to Zero 
Returns. This would mean that banks in EU member countries exhibit a slightly higher num-
ber of Zero Returns, all else being equal. However, this might also be an interference with the 
coefficient estimate on the dummy variable controlling for index membership for which we 
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report a highly significant negative effect on Zero Returns. Both of the variables are posi-
tively correlated which might result in this observation. 
The multivariate regression model of Price Impact of trades (Model IV) does yield a highly 
significant influence of IFRS. All coefficients except the coefficient on the variables control-
ling for market value and index membership exhibit the predicted signs.  
 
Taken together, the results indicate a relation between IFRS accounting and information 
asymmetry and market liquidity measures, if measured by bid-ask spreads and the price im-
pact in support of H1, even after controlling for possible concurrent effects, such as general 
market conditions or time-dependent effects. However, a systematical influence on the num-
ber of potential trading days without trading as well as a positive influence on turnover cannot 
be confirmed given the results above. Rather, general market conditions seem to have a supe-
rior influence. Therefore, there is mixed evidence of IFRS accounting having an impact on 
information asymmetry and market liquidity measures.  
 
Robustness Checks 
Since Market Value and Index are highly correlated, see Panel B of Table XXIII, we also run 
regressions excluding either Market Value or Index. This yields comparable results in relation 
to our coefficient estimates on IFRS which seem relatively stable for all tested specifications.  
4.5.3 Equity Valuation 
The results of the regression analyses on equity valuation measures are presented in Table 
XXIV, Panel A. Both regression specifications of Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable yield no 
significant relation between asset valuation and IFRS accounting. The coefficients of the con-
trol variables on stock price variability, market value, and index membership exhibit the ex-
pected signs. The coefficient on Index suggests that index members have a significantly 
higher Tobin’s Q, all else being equal. This might be caused by the fact that larger banks are 
more highly leveraged in comparison to smaller banks. 
 
A different impression can be reported from the regression results on Price-to-book Value. 
For both specifications, the coefficient on IFRS exhibits a negative and significant sign, 
meaning that IFRS is negatively related for both alternative specifications, after controlling 
for market control variables and firm-specific and period fixed effects. This is contrary to our 
expectations and indicates that Price-to-book Value is lower for banks using IFRS, all else 
being equal. A reason might be that book value of equity is higher according to IFRS. The 
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result is in line with prior results for example from Daske et al. (2008, p. 1115) who find a 
positive impact on equity valuations only after controlling for anticipation of the mandatory 
application. They also point out that the observations may be adversely influenced as a conse-
quence of accounting effects since higher book values of equity and assets under IFRS might 
decrease the equity valuation measures. An adverse influence caused by time-dependent ef-
fects such as business cycles, should be neutralized, at least partly, by controlling for period-
fixed effects. The remaining coefficients of the control variables for market value and lever-
age exhibit the expected signs and are partly significant, indicating a relationship to equity 
valuation if measured by Price-to-book Value. The coefficient on Stock Price Variability is 
significantly negative related to Price-to-book Value in one specification which seems coun-
terintuitive. However, this might be caused by the interference of the variable controlling for 
index membership.  
 
To summarize this section, the positive impact of IFRS accounting on asset and equity valua-
tion of the market cannot be supported, refuting H2. Pae, Thornton and Welker (2008) find 
that the mere anticipation of greater transparency associated with the IFRS introduction might 
increase the value of a firm with high agency costs. This might imply that the positive effect 
of IFRS introduction is anticipated by the market so that the actual transition might have no or 
even a negative impact on equity valuations.  
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Table XXIV: Regression Analysis of Asset and Equity Valuation Measures 
Panel A: Multivariate Regression Analysis
Tobin's Q Tobins's Q PTBV PTBV
Constant 0.37769 ** 1.18349 *** -4.34610 *** 0.37958 
(2.29) (7.55) (-4.98 ) (1.41) 
Market Value (+) 0.09269 *** (+) 0.79124 ***
(9.77) (9.34) 
Leverage (+) -0.02549 (+) -0.11823 (+) 0.22639 (+) 1.22902 **
(-0.19 ) (-0.69 ) (0.38) (2.29) 
Stock Price (+) 0.00581 ** (+) 0.00321 (+) 0.01245 (+) -0.06739 **
Variability (2.48) (0.92) (0.37) (-2.08 )
IFRS (+) 0.00108 (+) -0.01131 (+) -0.29656 *** (+) -0.43660 ***
(0.12) (-0.92 ) (-3.15 ) (-3.49 )
Index (+) 0.02619 ** (+) 0.21222 
(2.00) (0.43) 
Adj. R² 0.815        0.697        0.734        0.617        
F-Stat 27.340      14.900      17.390      12.020      
Prob 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 870           870           880           1,005        
N Banks 135           135           138           138           
Firm-fixed effects, included included included included
Period-fixed effects
Panel B: Correlation Tables
PTBV Index
PTBV 1.000
Market Value 0.270 * 1.000
Leverage 0.046 0.148 * 1.000
Stock P.Variability 0.132 * 0.136 * -0.118 * 1.000
IFRS 0.221 * 0.319 * 0.058 0.243 * 1.000
Index 0.187 * 0.744 * 0.158 * 0.220 * 0.221 *
Tobin's Q Index
Tobin's Q 1.000
Market Value 0.121 * 1.000
Leverage -0.373 * 0.165 * 1.000
Stock P.Variability 0.162 * 0.145 * -0.122 * 1.000
IFRS 0.125 * 0.328 * 0.010 0.247 * 1.000
Index 0.082 * 0.749 * 0.176 * 0.219 * 0.217 * 1.000
IFRSLeverage 
Market Value Leverage Stock P. Variability IFRS
Market Value Stock P.Variability
1.000
Panel A presents the results of an ordinary least square (OLS) regression on different measures of information asymmetry. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets less the book
value of equity, plus market value of equity, divided by total assets. Price-to-book Value (PTBV ) is calculated by the market value of equity divided by the book value. Market 
Value is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of month +7. Leverage denotes the relation of debt as share of total assets. IFRS is a dummy variable equal
to one if the annual financial statement is prepared in accordance to IFRS. Index is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank is constituent of the main stock market index of a
country. The values in parentheses denote the t-values of robust standard errors. N denotes the number of observations. We also control for firm-specific and period-fixed effects
using dummies (not reported). Standard errors are adjusted for intra cluster correlation in banks. F-Statistics are reported according to standard OLS regressions for purpose of
comparison. ***,**,* indicate significance according to a two sided t-test on the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level.
Panel B displays the correlation matrix for independent and dependent variables in the regression analysis. The upper (lower) table displays the correlation table for the regressions
on Tobin's Q (PTBV) as dependent variable. * indicates significance on the 5%-level. 
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4.5.4 Influence of Mandatory Transition on Banks Located in EU Member Countries 
In Table XXV, the results of the multivariate regression on mandatory transition are pre-
sented. The coefficient on First Mandatory has a significant adverse effect for most specifica-
tions, indicating an unfavorable effect on information asymmetry and market liquidity meas-
ures. A reason might be the adjustment to the new accounting system for many market par-
ticipants in terms of both intertemporal comparability and comparability between firms. As in 
the prior section, explanatory power is relatively high in all regressions. Only in the regres-
sion of Price Impact, the coefficient estimates on Mandatory become significant. The coeffi-
cients on Voluntary yield that voluntary adopters do not report a distinct influence on IAIM as 
well. Obviously, EU2003 has a significant effect on all IAIM. 
 
Model I in Table XXV, which captures the effect on bid-ask spreads, indicates that the man-
datory first-time adoption has a positive impact. We find no evidence that mandatory adopters 
might experience a negative impact on spreads as well as no impact on spreads turning to vol-
untary applications prior to mandatory usage of IFRS and, again, later, when IFRS has to be 
mandatorily applied. The first mandatory results presented according to the new standards 
significantly increase spreads which is in line with expectations. Taken together, the evidence 
suggests that the first mandatory annual results conveyed temporary confusion to the markets.  
 
The regression on turnover is displayed in Model II of Table XXV. FirstMandatory seems to 
have no significant effect at all. Likewise, the coefficients Voluntary and Volun-
tary*Mandatory seem to have no significant effect on turnover, contrary to Mandatory which 
seems to have a significant positive effect. This indicates that mandatory adopters seem to 
experience a significant incremental increase in Turnover. However, banks located in EU 
member countries as of 2003 experience a significant positive effect on Turnover which 
seems to be one dominating effect. This result is in line with the results from previous studies 
(e.g., Daske et al. 2008). An explanation is that the transparency and comparability of these 
markets is generally higher which implies that measured effects are strongly influenced by the 
general equalization of the institutional background in the EU.  
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Table XXV: Multivariate Regression Analysis of Information Asymmetry Measures with  
Control Variables 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Bid-ask Spreads Turnover Zero Returns Price Impact
Constant -2.27042 *** -4.75548 *** 0.63588 *** 4.42543 ***
(-3.79 ) (-4.38 ) (4.37) (2.84) 
First Mandatory 0.24528 ** -0.54498 -0.02340 0.71947 *
(2.05) (-1.65 ) (-1.65 ) (1.95) 
Voluntary -0.17692 -0.14375 -0.01481 -0.12807
(-0.95 ) (-0.28 ) (-0.57 ) (-0.21 )
Mandatory -0.19961 0.92325 * 0.01159 -1.15623 **
(-0.89 ) (1.73) (0.43) (-2.10 )
EU2003 -0.21352 0.82689 ** -0.68122 *** -2.43346 ***
(-0.37 ) (2.16) (-17.53 ) (-4.19 )
Voluntary*Mandatory 0.01645 -0.27410 0.01438 0.62574 **
(0.12) (-1.36 ) (0.93) (2.19) 
Stock Turnover -0.08308 *** -0.01106 **
(-3.61 ) (-2.51 )
Market Value 0.04761 -0.19363 -0.01779 0.12278 
(0.43) (-1.33 ) (-1.17 ) (0.57) 
Free Float -0.00463 *** -0.00093 -0.00001 0.00076 
(-3.06 ) (-0.34 ) (-0.05 ) (0.27) 
Stock Price Variabilty 0.11692 ** 0.22464 *** -0.03035 *** 0.19388 ***
(2.15) (3.75) (-2.90 ) (2.83) 
Adj. R² 0.784 0.887 0.813 0.877
F-Stat 18.81 *** 43.48 *** 23.94 *** 39.06 ***
Prob 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N Banks 100 116 116 115
N Observations 559 701 688 687
Firm-fixed effects, included included included included
 Period-fixed effects
This table presents the results of an ordinary least square (OLS) regression on different measures of information asymmetry. Bid-ask Spreads is the natural logarithm of the average bid-ask
spread measured as difference between bid and ask prices divided by the midpoint, and measured over the 11-month period under investigation. Turnover denotes the natural logarithm of
the daily mean turnover of shares in relation to total number of shares over the investigated 11-month period. ZeroReturns is calculated by counting the number of daily zero returns of
stocks and dividing them by the number of all possible trading days during the 11-month period. Price Impact is the natural logarithm of the mean value of absolute daily price change in
percent divided by the trading volume in percent of total stocks outstanding. As independent variables are defined as follows: First Mandatory is a dummy variable equal to one if the
financial statements are the first financial statements mandatorily prepared in accordance to IFRS. Voluntary is a dummy variable if a banks initially applies IFRS voluntarily, starting in the
period of the first voluntary IFRS application. Mandatory is a dummy variable equal to one if a bank mandatorily applies IFRS for each year of mandatory application. The interaction term
Voluntary*Mandatory captures the incremental effect for voluntary adopters after IFRS become mandatory in a country. StockTurnover is the natural logarithm of the monthly average
turnover in shares at the end of month +7. MarketValue is the natural logarithm of the market value of a specific bank. FreeFloat denotes the number of stocks that are not closely held, as
share of total stocks. Stock Price Variability is the natural logarithm of the daily stock price variance over the 11 month period. The regressions are also include firm-fixed and period-fixed
effects which are not reported. The values in parantheses denote the t-values of robust White cross-section standard errors and account for correlation within clusters. F-Statistics are
reported according to standard OLS regressions for purpose of comparison. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%-,5%- or 10%-level. N Observations (N Banks ) denotes the number of
observations (banks).
 
Zero Returns indicates that the first mandatory application seems to have no significant effect 
on the number of zero returns. Likewise, for the coefficient estimates on both Voluntary and 
Mandatory as well as Voluntary*Mandatory no significant effect can be reported. Analo-
gously to prior observations, being located in an EU member country of 2003 is significantly 
negatively associated to the number of zero returns. In general, the observations on Zero Re-
turns confirm the results from the prior sections suggesting no significant influence of IFRS 
on this measure. 
 
Model IV presents the results for the price impact of trades. The result is consistent with the 
perception that the obligatory first-time IFRS adoption, i.e., the first mandatory annual results 
reported under IFRS, seems to introduce additional confusion in the market at first which is 
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reflected by a significantly positive effect on Price Impact. On the one hand, mandatory 
adopters experience a significant incremental decrease indicating a favorable effect on Price 
Impact. On the other hand, the overall effect is significantly weaker for voluntary adopters 
when IFRS become mandatory. The strongest negative and highly significant effect can – 
again as in most models on other IAIM – be reported from EU2003 indicating a strong influ-
ence by the general market background. 
 
To summarize, the analysis in this section leaves an ambiguous impression. The results indi-
cate that the first-time mandatory adoption of IFRS introduced confusion into markets ini-
tially. In total, the effect of voluntary adoption suggests no sustained impact for each group of 
IFRS adopters, whereas mandatory adoption partly seems to have an impact on Turnover and 
Price Impact. One strong result is that the EU2003 membership of the countries which con-
trols for the general institutional background and market situation seems to have a sustained 
effect on the IAIM. This result of the analysis could also be interpreted as the general institu-
tional background and the relatively homogenous market of EU member countries as of 2003 
enhancing information asymmetry and market liquidity of banks more than the homogeniza-
tion of accounting systems. 
 
As robustness check, we also rerun the regressions omitting the interaction term which is not 
reported. This confirms our main results with an impact of Mandatory on Turnover and Price 
Impact, and none of the coefficient estimates on Voluntary being significant, suggesting no 
significant impact for voluntary adopters. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
We investigate a large sample of over 151 European banks over an 8 year period (2001-2008). 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first investigation studying the effect of mandatory 
adoption of IFRS on a large sample of banks in Europe. The basic goal was to clarify whether 
the changeover to IFRS has a positive influence on information asymmetry and market liquid-
ity measures which then could be interpreted as a market efficiency improvement. Further-
more, the study tries to give an answer to the question whether the IFRS transition influences 
the market valuation of European banks. Previous findings suggest that the results should be 
even more pronounced for banks since this group should experience larger transparency gains 
during transition. The last question to be answered is whether mandatory adopters of IFRS 
benefit more than voluntary adopters. The study is separated into three sections.  
 
Firstly, the impact of IFRS accounting on information asymmetry and market efficiency 
measures is studied. The results yield a significant negative influence on bid-ask spreads and 
a significant reduction of price impact throughout the period under investigation. However, 
both of the other measures do not indicate significant lower information asymmetry or market 
illiquidity. 
 
Secondly, the investigation on asset and equity valuation does not offer evidence for banks 
preparing their financial statements in accordance with international standards having signifi-
cantly higher asset and equity valuations. The finding suggests a negative influence for some 
equity valuations which seems to be confusing. This result leaves two possibilities for inter-
pretation which are open to further discussion. First, IFRS accounting might not provide mar-
kets with superior information in order to enhance bank evaluations. Second, banks might 
already be transparent to investors even before the transition to IFRS, not leading to addi-
tional significant transparency effects. 
 
The third section concentrates on the effect of mandatory versus voluntary adoption. The re-
sults offer mixed evidence. Sustainably greater benefits on IAIM effects for voluntary adopt-
ers as in prior investigations (e.g., Daske et al. 2008) cannot be confirmed on the basis of the 
observations. Rather, we get a contrary impression with mandatory adopters partly benefiting 
from the IFRS adoption. However, according to our results being a voluntary adopter after 
IFRS become mandatory seems to have a slightly unfavorable effect on IAIM. Moreover, we 
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find that being located in the European Union alone improves information asymmetry and 
market liquidity which seems to have a leading effect on information asymmetry measures. 
 
Taken together, the results indicate that IFRS might have an effect on information asymmetry 
and market liquidity measures when measured using bid-ask spreads and price impact. How-
ever, we find no sustainable evidence for enhanced market valuations of banks after transition 
to IFRS. Market efficiency partly increases after mandatory adoption of international stan-
dards which is in line with the results of Horton, Serafeim and Serafeim (2013). However, 
even though we accounted for firm-specific risks and a broad variety of other concurrent mi-
croeconomic influences, it cannot be ruled out that the observations are, at least in part, driven 
by the ongoing market integration in the European Union and an increase of the investor base 
rather than the change in accounting rules.  
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5 IFRS Application of European Banks and the Effects on  
Accounting Quality 
5.1 Introduction 
The controversial discussion around the introduction of IFRS in Europe led to a wide variety 
of opinions concerning the ability of IFRS accounting to generate superior information. Some 
arguments in favor of the new standards are that the change in accounting systems leads to 
more transparency, more market efficiency, and lower cost of equity capital for the firms. 
However, from a company perspective, the introduction of a new accounting system is only 
favorable if the benefits of the application, i.e., the arguments mentioned above, outweigh the 
costs of implementing and maintaining the new accounting system. Furthermore, e.g. in Ger-
many, very often the old accounting systems also have to be kept since the IFRS accounting 
system does not necessarily release the companies from the obligation to prepare individual 
financial statements in accordance with local GAAP standards.  
 
One central advantage that would legitimate IFRS accounting is if it considerably improves 
the accounting quality. There are several definitions of accounting quality. Accounting quality 
can be defined as the financial statement information reflecting more precisely the real under-
lying economic situation of that firm, i.e., its “true” firm value. Since the “true” firm value 
cannot be observed, the observable market values are used as a proxy. Accounting quality is 
therefore often referred to as “value relevance” of accounting measures.92 Additionally, the 
superior stringency of IFRS is often claimed to convey clearer information to the market in a 
way that it is less prone to subjective influences on reported earnings of a firm’s management. 
Therefore, the remaining discretionary degrees of freedom for earnings management can also 
be interpreted as a measure of accounting quality. These circumstances might enhance the 
investors’ ability to make reasonable investment decisions, thereby, improving capital market 
efficiency. 
 
Banks are often excluded in studies investigating the benefits of the IFRS transition since they 
embody a special industry. However, banks often contain more financial assets and liabilities 
which are publicly traded in comparison to firms of other industries. For example, the intro-
duction of IAS 39, which plays a major role in the financial statements of banking institutions, 
                                                 
92
 For an extensive literature overview, see, e.g., Barth et al. (2001). 
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leads to changes in the valuation of many financial assets and liabilities. A body of literature 
finds that banks’ fair value disclosures of asset and liability securities and loans have higher 
value relevance in contrast to their respective book values (e.g., Barth 1994; Barth, Beaver 
and Landsman 1996; Mozes 2002). Furthermore, Barth et al. (1996) also show that for US 
banks even differences between fair values and book values of bank loans are value relevant. 
In a comparable setting, Eccher, Ramesh and Thiagarajan (1996) observe that the obligatory 
requirements of SFAS 107 to publish fair value information about specific items, e.g., fair 
value disclosures of net loans, might have additional, albeit lower value relevance than securi-
ties. Nissim (2003) finds that banks might overstate reported fair values which are supposed 
to represent the intrinsic values of loans. Taken together, an implication of these results would 
be that accounting systems measuring a larger share of assets at fair value have higher value 
relevance than accounting systems that rely on valuation at cost. However, from the perspec-
tive of banking supervision, this might also have negative implications in terms of increasing 
regulatory capital volatility. This makes the investigation of changeover effects on banks par-
ticularly interesting since many European banks have been using rather conservative valuation 
measures, e.g., at (amortized) cost, prior to transition to IFRS. Therefore, the relation between 
the market value and the assets and liabilities might be stronger in banks after transition to 
IFRS which allows more fair value accounting for many banking-specific assets and liabili-
ties.  
 
The contribution to the existing literature is threefold. Firstly, literature suggests that the ap-
plication of IFRS has ambiguous effects on value relevance and earnings management.93 
However, in our study the effect might become clearer since the institutional setup is held to 
be comparable using only data of banks in Europe. Secondly, another argument is that empiri-
cal research often concentrated on the voluntary adoption so far due to data availability. The 
mandatory adoption in 2005 in many European countries enables us to study the development 
over a larger period after the application of IFRS became mandatory. The investigation of 
voluntary and mandatory adopters in one large sample over a decade (1999-2008) might have 
other implications since the sample does not suffer from a self-selection bias caused by the 
investigation of voluntary adopters only. Thirdly, until today, the effects on banking institu-
tions have been widely neglected in literature. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
investigation concentrating on value relevance of accounting measures and earnings manage-
ment for European banks before and after mandatory transition to IFRS. The advantage of this 
                                                 
93
 For a discussion, see Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008, p. 472-473). 
  
 107 
study is that we use a variety of accounting quality measures taking different perspectives and 
analyze a homogenous dataset in order to clarify whether the accounting information is really 
superior in terms of value relevance and earnings management. 
 
Concretely, we study whether IFRS accounting is really more value relevant in that the ac-
counting information, i.e., financial statement items, are better reflected in market values of 
equity. Furthermore, we analyze whether IFRS are more stringent in that they reduce discre-
tionary degrees of freedom for a firm’s management to manage earnings which might then be 
interpreted as higher accounting quality. We find no sustainable evidence suggesting a higher 
value relevance of earnings and book value of equity for banks applying IFRS. However, 
there is evidence that some financial assets such as specific investments and loans, might have 
higher value relevance under IFRS. The test for incorporation of economic income in ac-
counting income does not provide evidence of a significantly faster reaction of earnings under 
IFRS. Furthermore, the incorporation of economic losses in accounting income seems not to 
be more pronounced for local GAAPs. The set of tests concerning earnings management 
yields no sustained evidence that earnings management is lower for IFRS. In general, these 
results suggest a rather weak impact on value relevance and earnings management of IFRS 
accounting standards. 
 
The remainder is organized as follows: Section 5.2 provides related investigations and their 
results. Section 5.3 introduces the hypotheses and the methods used. Section 5.4 describes the 
dataset. Section 5.5 presents the results and a discussion. Finally, section 5.6 recapitulates the 
main results and offers a conclusion. 
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5.2 Related Literature 
There are two streams of literature investigating the topics relevant to this paper. The first 
stream studies the relevance of accounting measures for market values. Most empirical inves-
tigations relate to the Ohlson (1995) model. Based on the valuation premise of a company’s 
market value being the present value of expected dividends and a clean surplus property, Ohl-
son (1995) derives a relation between book value of equity, the present value of expected ab-
normal earnings and the market value of a company.94 The quality of an accounting system 
might be defined by its value relevance; concretely, the combined explanatory power R² of 
book value of equity and earnings for the market value of a firm (e.g., Harris, Lang and 
Möller, 1994). Another idea is that a stronger slope coefficient, i.e., pricing weight between a 
firm’s accounting amounts and its market value, might be interpreted as information value of 
an accounting item to be more relevant over another (Bartov, Goldberg and Kim 2005; Hung 
and Subramanyam 2007). Usually, empirical studies on this topic make use of association 
study approaches to investigate the valuation effects in the long term (Mölls and Strauß 2007, 
p. 958).  
 
Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997) study the long-term effects of value relevance for a period 
of 40 years (1953-1993) for firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ and find that the 
combined value relevance of book value of equity and earnings increases over time if meas-
ured by explanatory power. Furthermore, they identify a shift of value relevance from earn-
ings to book value of equity. Several studies concentrate on the value relevance of earnings 
and equity under different accounting systems (e.g., Ashbaugh and Olsson 2002; Bartov, 
Goldberg and Kim 2005; Hung and Subramanyam 2007). Ashbaugh and Olsson (2002) com-
pare different accounting-based valuation systems for firms that are cross-listed in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. They conclude that the earnings capitalization model, i.e., 
earnings to explain market prices, is the best valuation model when reporting under IAS. Bar-
tov, Goldberg and Kim (2005) compare German GAAP, U.S. GAAP, and IAS for a large 
sample of German firms. They show that the value relevance of German GAAP earnings is 
lower. However, this observation does not hold true for firms writing losses which could be 
interpreted as the specific information needs of creditors becoming more important in such 
situations. Furthermore, they find no significant difference between the value relevance of 
U.S. GAAP and IAS earnings which gives support to the hypothesis that U.S. GAAP is not 
                                                 
94
 For an extensive discussion, see for example Dumontier and Raffournier (2002, pp. 129-131) and Mölls and 
Strauß (2007, pp. 958-959) 
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superior in terms of value relevance for capital markets. Hung and Subramanyam (2007) in-
vestigate the value relevance of IFRS and German GAAP measures of book value of equity 
and earnings. They observe that the combined value relevance measured by explanatory 
power is slightly higher for German GAAP measures. Comparable to Collins, Maydew and 
Weiss (1997), they also determine a shift in relevance from earnings to book value of equity 
in the transition from German GAAP to IFRS. They deduce the reason is that IFRS income is 
more transitory whereas book value of equity is more important in the valuation under IFRS. 
However, it has to be kept in mind that Hung and Subramanyam (2007) compare the restated 
financial statements according to IFRS with the financial statements initially provided under 
German GAAP. This means that the financial statement information has already been con-
veyed to the capital market when the restated information is made public. Hence, the informa-
tion content of the restated IFRS information is not necessarily new and comparable to the 
originally prepared information when comparing IFRS accounting measures and the original 
market values, which possibly might adversely influence the results.  
 
Capkun et al. (2008) investigate the mandatory transition effects for a large European sample 
for the same set of firm years. Their results yield that IFRS earnings reconciliations add value 
relevant information for markets. Paananen and Lin (2009) find that the mandatory implemen-
tation of IFRS led to a decrease in value relevance in Germany. They identify standard 
changes and new standards around the mandatory adoption date as the most likely explana-
tion, rather than new adopters being responsible for this reduction. Taken together, research 
provides mixed evidence of accounting measures according to international accounting stan-
dards exhibiting higher accounting quality by providing higher value relevance.  
 
The second stream of literature focuses on earnings management. Earnings management is 
defined in literature as the management’s modification of information about economic per-
formance in order to mislead stakeholders or to influence contractual outcomes, i.e., to con-
ceal the true firm performance or the private control benefits of the management (e.g., Healy 
and Wahlen 1999, p. 368; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 2003, p. 506). The basic perception is 
that more stringent accounting rules reduce the possibility of discretionary choices for man-
agement, thereby reducing earnings management. This leads to higher transparency for capital 
markets so that a company’s situation becomes more evident to investors. Conversely, one 
could also argue that these discretionary degrees of freedom might also yield meaningful in-
terpretations in that this modified information better reflects the true economic situation and 
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therefore increases comparability. Based on these conclusions, a wide range of empirical stud-
ies investigates earnings management (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Leuz, Nanda and 
Wysocki 2003; Glaum, Lichtblau and Lindemann 2004, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2005; 
Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz 2006; Paananen and Lin 2009). The baseline conclusion is that 
there is evidence for the presence of earnings management and that, beside the accounting 
system in use, firm characteristics such as firm size or leverage also play a role. Furthermore, 
intense earnings management is favored by, for example, small stock markets, high ownership 
concentration and weak legal enforcement (Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 2003) as well as strong 
book-tax conformity (Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz 2006). In view of these facts, Meek and 
Thomas (2004, p. 32) remark that the mere change in accounting standards is unlikely to im-
prove information value. Similarly, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) find that earnings 
management is not reduced for German firms voluntarily adopting IFRS prior to mandatory 
adoption. Three recent studies investigating earnings management concentrate on the IFRS 
adoption in Europe (Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008; Chen et al. 2009; Paanen and Lin 2009). 
They suggest that earnings management is still present after the IFRS introduction or that 
earnings management and loss avoidance has even increased in some cases. In general, the 
studies conclude that differences in institutional factors or changes in the standards might also 
be responsible for the observations. Gebhardt/Novotny-Farkas (2011) investigate the manda-
tory adoption of IFRS of European banks and the impact on loan loss provisioning as possi-
bility for income smoothing. They find that this possibility is reduced after transition to IFRS 
and strongly depends on other institutional factors like the stringency of banking supervision. 
 
Taken together, the results of the aforementioned studies suggest that very often the effects 
are not clearly attributable to specific qualities and are also influenced by a wide variety of 
institutional prerequisites or an increase in capital market integration. However, this study is 
one of the first to investigate potential benefits of the IFRS transition of European banks on a 
long-term basis after the new standards became mandatory using a relatively homogenous 
institutional setup comprising European banks only. Furthermore, we try to identify the influ-
ence of IFRS and separate effects by explicitly controlling for other competing influences in 
our analysis. 
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5.3 Hypotheses and Methodology 
5.3.1 Hypotheses Development 
5.3.1.1 Value Relevance, Earnings Management, and Accounting Quality 
There are several approaches to measure an increase in accounting quality. This paper con-
centrates on two measures: value relevance and earnings management. Value relevance is 
given as the ability of financial statement information to capture and reflect information, re-
gardless of the source, that is measured through the contemporaneous market price of a firm 
(Francis and Schipper 1999, p. 325).95 The relation between value relevance and accounting 
quality is that a higher association of accounting items’ amounts and the market value of a 
firm might be interpreted as a better and more reliable reflection of a firm’s true economic 
condition and, therefore, as higher accounting quality (Barth, Beaver and Landsman 2001, 
cited in Barth, Landsman and Lang 2008, p. 477). Furthermore, higher accounting quality, 
i.e., tighter accounting standards, increases earnings quality which is measured by the vari-
ability of reported earnings and the reflection of earnings in market value changes reducing 
accounting earnings management (Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005, p. 1102).  
5.3.1.2 Value Relevance of Equity and Earnings 
As already outlined, an increase in value relevance can be mirrored by accounting information 
that better reflects the market value of a firm. This relation, however, rests on several assump-
tions: Firstly, publicly available information, which might also be included in financial state-
ments, has to be used by investors to find the market price of a firm. In other words, the semi-
strong form of the efficient market hypothesis is implicitly assumed (Fama 1970). Critics 
might argue that the market price reflects expectations about future cash flows and that ac-
counting primarily reflects past events (e.g., Mölls and Strauß 2007, p. 956). However, 
through the increased application of market prices in the valuation of assets and liabilities 
under IFRS, expectations about future developments are implicitly included in financial 
statement information. This line of argumentation will be extended in the next section. Sec-
ondly, rational expectations of market participants are also assumed to hold true, i.e., inves-
tors do not make systematic errors in the valuation of a firm. Both assumptions are necessary 
to meet the requirement that the market value of a firm can be used as best proxy for the 
“true” underlying firm value (Mölls and Strauß 2007, p. 956). As outlined in the previous 
section, the model approach of Ohlson (1995) is used as theoretical underpinning of the em-
                                                 
95
 There are alternative definitions of value relevance (e.g., Francis and Schipper 1999, p. 325-327). However, 
this definition is well-established in literature.  
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piricial studies on that topic. In order to operationalize the model, value relevance of account-
ing information is measured by the association of the book value of equity and earnings with 
market values (e.g., Hung and Subramanyam 2007). IFRS accounting with principle-based 
standards increases value relevance of book value of equity and earnings. If principle-based 
accounting such as IFRS, is of higher quality we should be able to observe higher value rele-
vance: 
 
H1: The value relevance of book value of equity and earnings is greater for banks us-
ing IFRS. 
 
5.3.1.3 Value Relevance of Financial Statement Items 
One change in accounting assumptions caused by the transition is the change from a rather 
conservative accounting model under local GAAP to a “true and fair view” under IFRS.96 For 
example, one crucial change is the fact that after the adoption, many assets and liabilities can 
be evaluated at fair value (Pellens, Jannett and Schmidt 2009, p. 415). If there are differences 
between fair values of single assets, i.e., market values in case of assets valued mark-to-
market, and their corresponding book values sourcing in historical cost, predictions about 
expected future cash flows cannot be carried out using book values (Mozes 2002). This ap-
plies, for example, to the valuation of loans or to the valuation of securities to some extent. 
Therefore, if IFRS financial statement items do exhibit higher value relevance, the association 
to a bank’s market values should be stronger because a higher share of financial assets make 
use of these valuation premises.  
 
 H2: The value relevance of a single financial statement item is higher for banks using 
 IFRS. 
5.3.1.4 Earnings Management 
The probability of earnings management increases with more accounting discretion available 
to a firm’s management, ceteris paribus. In other words, accounting quality might be higher 
for accounting systems, i.e., stringent accounting rules and standards, limiting discretionary 
choices for a bank’s management (Ewert and Wagenhofer 2005, p. 1102). For the purpose of 
this study, we define earnings management as the possibility for the bank’s management to 
influence the results within the legally binding limits of the accounting rules in force. High 
                                                 
96
 See for the principle of „true and fair view“ the EU-endorsed IFRS Framework, section 46. 
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frequencies of small profits might be interpreted as management’s loss avoidance (e.g., 
Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). This finding suggests that after transition to an accounting 
system of higher quality, the number of small losses increases and the number of small profits 
decreases, since less discretion in accounting rules reduces the management’s possibility to 
avoid small losses. Furthermore, less discretion also implies that realized profits and losses in 
economic income are incorporated faster into accounting income, and that economic losses 
are more strongly related to accounting losses in general.97 
 
For example in German GAAP, banks were able to create hidden reserves during good peri-
ods and resolve these reserves in bad times. This possibility of considerable discretion for 
management in reported earnings is explicitly excluded under IFRS since this would contra-
dict the true and fair view principle in IFRS.98 Therefore, the corresponding hypothesis is: 
 
 H3: Earnings management is lower for banks using IFRS. 
 
5.3.2 Methodology 
5.3.2.1 Value Relevance of Equity and Earnings 
H1 is tested using several measures of accounting quality. The first test to analyze this rela-
tion is based on the approach outlined by Ohlson (1995) and implemented, for example, by 
Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997), and Hung and Subramanyam (2007). We also use the 
annual net income as proxy for (future) earnings. 
 
=itMVE εββββ ++++ ∑ jjitit ControlsNIBVE 210      (1) 
with 
 
MVEit   market value of equity, measured six months after financial year end, 
BVEit    book value of equity, measured at the financial year end, 
NIit    net income, measured at the financial year end, 
Controlsj dummy variables, accounting for firm-fixed effects, and period-fixed  
  effects. 
 
                                                 
97
 An exception might be, for example, the valuation at lower of cost or market in Germany. 
98
 See IASB Framework as of 2001, section 37. 
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The basic idea is to measure the value relevance by explanatory power of book value equity 
and earnings for the market value of a company and is estimated for both subsamples, i.e., 
local GAAP and IFRS, separately. However, direct tests for significance are not feasible in 
this case.99 Therefore, we concentrate on the coefficient estimates. If they are significant for 
one accounting item, one might claim that there is a strong association between the account-
ing measure and market value, which might in turn be interpreted as an accounting item hav-
ing value relevance.  
 
A second regression is also included in order to unambiguously test whether the accounting 
information under IFRS has higher value relevance if compared to local GAAP. Therefore, 
the following modified regression for the total sample is estimated, including interaction 
terms on IFRS net profit and book value of equity. We concentrate on the significance of in-
teraction terms in order to detect superior value relevance of the IFRS accounting system. A 
significant interaction term, i.e., a significant differential effect, might be economically inter-
preted as a stronger relation between the accounting item and the market value (Bartov, Gold-
berg and Kim 2005, p. 105). 
 
=itMVE  
 
εβ
ββββββ
∑ ++
+++++
jj
ititititititit
Controls
IFRSNIIFRSBVEIFRSNIBVE ** 543210
  (2) 
with 
 
IFRS  dummy variable equal to one if the financial statements are prepared in  
  accordance with international accounting standards, and zero otherwise. 
 
All other variables are defined as in model (1). A positive and significant coefficient estimate 
of β4 or β5 indicates that the association of book value of equity or net profit is significantly 
stronger under IFRS accounting rules than under local GAAP rules, indicating higher value 
relevance. 
                                                 
99
 Testing the significance in differences of R² for two independent samples does not make sense if different 
samples, i.e., non-identical dependent variables, are used (e.g., Bartov, Goldberg and Kim 2005, p. 105). This 
would be the case when comparing IFRS and local GAAP samples. 
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5.3.2.2 Value Relevance of Single Financial Statement Items 
In order to test H2, the following modified model tries to capture the effect of specific finan-
cial statement items that might have an influence on the market value of a bank. These regres-
sions analyze whether the respective IFRS equivalents are of higher value relevance. The fol-
lowing model is applied to the total sample: 
 
=itMVE εβββββ +++++ ∑ jjitititit ControlsIFRSItemIFRSItem *3210   (3) 
with  
 
 MVEit  market value of equity, measured six months after financial year end t, 
 Itemit  the respective financial statement item of bank i at time t, i.e., 
  TAit  total assets at the end of period t,  
  INVit    total investments less other investments, as of financial year 
    end t,  
  NTLOANSit  loans, net of depreciation and amortization, 
  NTDEBTit  net debt of a bank at the end of period t,  
  CFit  net cash flow from operating activities in period t,  
  REVit   revenues in period t, 
  BVEit    book value of equity, measured at the end of period t, 
 IFRSit   dummy variable equal to one, if the financial statement is prepared in 
   accordance with IFRS in period t, and zero otherwise, 
 Controlsj dummy variables, accounting for firm-fixed effects   
   and period-fixed effects. 
 
As in model (2), the advantage of the procedure is that the information effect of IFRS on a 
specific item is directly observable (β3), meaning a change to the slope coefficient when IFRS 
is applied. Item represents the respective financial statement item under investigation for 
which the expectation will be outlined in the following. INV represents the investments in 
securities made by a bank.100 These positions are often valued at lower of cost or market value 
under local GAAP accounting regimes. After transition, some of the items are valued at fair 
                                                 
100
 Investments (INV) is defined using the definitions from Datastream: ‘Total Investments’ (WC02255), less 
‘Other Investments’ (WC02250). It comprises all different kinds of securities from public or private issuers held 
by a bank. See also footnote 67.  
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value.101 If Investments under consideration of fair values have higher value relevance, as 
suggested by Barth et al. (1996), the coefficient on the interaction term (β3) should exhibit a 
significant positive sign. 
 
NTLOANS is the total amount of loans to customers, less deduction reserves for loan losses.102 
In Germany, for example, the value of a loan is the face value outstanding, less allowances for 
loan losses. Under IFRS, the loans classified as loans and receivables are usually measured at 
amortized cost by discounting future cash flows by the effective interest rate.103 Therefore, the 
expectation is no significant coefficient on the interaction term since the valuation processes 
are not significantly different.  
 
NTDEBT is the total debt of the bank, less cash holdings and due from banks.104 Under IFRS, 
debt not categorized at fair value has to be valued at amortized cost105 which might be differ-
ent to the treatment according to many national GAAPs. By reason of the positive effect of 
the evaluation for some classes of debt using fair values, the expectation is a positive coeffi-
cient on the interaction term. The rationale is that IFRS use more fair values and convey supe-
rior information concerning the riskiness of debt as a consequence which offers superior in-
formation value for readers of financial statement information.  
 
We also employ CF (operating cash flow) and REV (revenues) which are supposed to be less 
influenced by differences in accounting. CF represents all cash flows from operating activities 
whereas REV is defined as all revenue from interest revenue, commission and trading fees as 
well as other operating income.106 Therefore, we do not expect any significant difference in 
measurements and value relevance of these items. However, we expect a strong relation be-
tween operating cash flows, revenues, and the market value of a bank.107 
                                                 
101
 This effect is amplified by the realization concept, i.e., profits are only recognized if they were realized under 
many local GAAPs (Ernst and Young 2005, p. 1). For a general overview of accounting conservatism, see De-
maria and Dufour (2007). 
102
 For the definition, see also Datastream ‘Net Loans’ (WC02276). In addition to loans, it also includes, e.g., 
lease financing. 
103
 See IAS 39.46. 
104
 For the definition of ‘Net Debt’, see also Datastream definition DWND. 
105
 See IAS 39.43. 
106
 See also Datastream definitions ‘Revenues’ (WC01001) and ‘Net Cash Flow from Operating Activities’ 
(WC04860). 
107
 For a discussion of the value relevance of cash flows and other performance measures, see Mölls and Strauß 
(2007, p. 966-970).  
  
 117 
5.3.2.3 Earnings Management 
In this section, the development of earnings management is tested as outlined in H3. There are 
several approaches in literature to detect earnings management. One stream of literature pre-
dominantly concentrates on accruals (e.g., Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995; Leuz, Nanda 
and Wysocki 2003, Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz 2006) whereas another investigates timeliness 
of earnings (e.g., Ball, Kothari and Robin 2000; Hung and Subramanyam 2007). Another 
stream applies predefined thresholds on the ratio of profit and losses in order to determine the 
influence of earnings smoothing (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Jeanjean and Stolowy 
2008) or compares additionally the propensity to avoid losses (e.g., Glaum et al. 2004).  
 
In this paper, the last two approaches are chosen in order to draw a comprehensive picture of 
earnings management in relation to the transition to IFRS. Firstly, the negative impact of 
stock market returns and their reflection in accounting earnings is measured. Secondly, we 
measure the frequency of small losses in relation to small profits in the full year financial 
statements. Based on this comparison, the third approach uses a centered asymmetry measure 
which allows direct comparisons across different earnings distributions, as outlined by Glaum 
et al. (2004). 
 
Timeliness of Earnings 
One aspect often discussed in the context of earnings management is timeliness of earnings. 
The question is whether the accounting measures reflect economic events instantaneously. 
Income timeliness is defined as the ability of net income to incorporate contemporary eco-
nomic events in a timely manner (e.g., Ball, Kothari and Robin 2000; Hung and Subra-
manyam 2007). Therefore, higher timeliness of earnings can be interpreted as lower earnings 
management. In order to measure the impact of negative events on net income, the following 
model is estimated which is a modified version of the model outlined by Hung and Subra-
manyam (2007, p. 646): 
 
=itNI εβββββ +++++ ∑ jjitititit ControlsNEGRETNEGRET *3210   (4) 
with 
 
 NIit  net income of firm i at the end of fiscal year t, scaled by prior year’s 
   three month lagged market value, 
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 RETit  the total stock return over a 12-month holding period, starting three 
   months after prior fiscal year end and ending three months after fiscal 
   year t,108  
 NEGit  a dummy variable equal to one if the return RET is negative, and zero 
   otherwise,  
 Controlsj dummy variables, accounting for firm-fixed effects  
   and period-fixed effects. 
 
Income timeliness is measured separately for both accounting regimes and evaluated by the 
explanatory power of the respective model. β3 denotes the incremental effect of negative news 
on accounting income. This can be interpreted as asymmetric income conservatism since it 
measures the incremental effect of unfavorable news relative to good news (Hung and Subra-
manyam, 2007, p. 646).  
 
Small Loss and Small Profit Relation 
The second approach for detecting earnings management is to compare the earnings relations 
under different accounting systems (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Leuz, Nanda and Wy-
socki 2003). The basic idea is that, around certain thresholds, earnings might not be as evenly 
distributed as would be expected if the outcomes were not actively altered by earnings man-
agement. It also includes the reluctance to report small losses (e.g., Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki 
2003, p. 511). As outlined above, earnings management is identified by comparing the ratio of 
small profits to small losses before and after transition to IFRS (e.g., Jeanjean and Stolowy 
2008). In accounting systems leaving a firm’s management smaller discretionary degrees of 
freedom, the ratio is expected to be lower. The rationale is that small losses cannot be hidden 
in more stringent accounting systems and accounting rules. This approach is able to detect for 
which accounting regime a firm’s management is better able to use discretion to reach certain 
thresholds or earnings targets.  
 
To compare the small profit and small loss relation, annual net income scaled by total assets is 
used. It is defined as small net losses in the interval [-0.01;0[ and small net profits in the range 
[0;0.01].109 As a robustness check, the profits and losses in the intervals  
[-0.005;0[ and [0;0.005], and [-0.0025;0[ and [0;0.0025] are also compared, respectively. Fur-
                                                 
108
 We lag the variables in order to account for a delay in the publication of annual results. Alternatively, we also 
run a robustness check using a time lag of six months yielding qualitatively unchanged results. 
109
 Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003, p. 511) use the same approach.  
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thermore, we also scale net income by revenues and use the intervals [-0.1;0.1], [-0.05;0.05] 
and [-0.025;0.025], respectively.110 Net income, total assets and revenues are defined as in the 
prior sections and measured at year end, respectively. According to H3, higher values for lo-
cal GAAP earnings relations are expected which might then be interpreted as higher earnings 
management under local GAAP. 
 
Loss Avoidance 
The third measure for detecting earnings management is an approach outlined in extension by 
Glaum, Lichtblau and Lindemann (2004). The idea of this approach is that the simple com-
parison of earnings relations is not unproblematic in several respects: Usually, all companies 
in public markets have to be profitable in the long run and have to report positive earnings. 
However, in unfavorable times small profits or small losses have to be reported which reduces 
the number of potential observations. In this case, from a marginal perspective, in the absence 
of any earnings management, the implicit assumption concerning the distribution of very 
small profits and very small losses around the zero-threshold is that the relation is expected to 
be 1.111 Thus, the centered asymmetry measure is more able to detect earnings management 
since it makes fewer assumptions concerning the underlying distribution. The advantage of 
the procedure of Glaum; Lichtblau and Lindemann (2004) is that it allows a direct comparison 
of the outcomes for both subsamples using IFRS and local GAAP. The procedure is defined 
as follows: 
 
    
pn
np
n
nn
A
−
=        (5) 
with  
   
 np  observations of small positive earnings  
 nn   observations of small negative earnings  
 npn  np + nn 
 
The distribution can be interpreted as a binomially distributed random variable if observations 
are independent. The relation is then standardized to A which can assume values in the inter-
                                                 
110
 Glaum, Lichtblau and Lindemann (2004), pp. 50-51, propose this approach, since scaling by net sales is less 
likely affected by specific GAAP characteristics than scaling by total assets. 
111
 Closely related is the difficulty to identify the interval width ex ante (Glaum, Lichtblau and Lindemann 2004, 
p. 52). In addition, they point out that the ratio of small losses to small profits is not defined if the frequency of 
the observations directly left of the threshold is zero. 
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val [-1;+1]. In the absence of any earnings management A assumes 0. The estimated standard 
deviation of A can then be computed.112 To keep things simple, we test the intervals already 
introduced in the direct comparison of the small loss and small profit distributions from 
above. We then separately compute the distribution of A for the subsamples of local GAAP 
and IFRS earnings. The difference between both distributions ADiff = ALGAAP – AIFRS and the 
standard deviation of ADiff are calculated in order to detect significant differences between 
both distributions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
112
 For an extensive description of the entire procedure, and details on the computation, see Glaum, Lichtblau 
and Lindemann (2004), p. 74. 
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5.4 Dataset 
In this study, the market portfolio Datastream Banks Europe is used. The index comprises 
observations of 173 European publicly traded banks over a period of 10 fiscal years from 
1999 to 2008, if available.113 In this study, the sample is restricted to banks from countries of 
the European Union and Switzerland, comprising 151 banks in total. The identification of the 
transition year is carried out via the coding of the accounting systems available in Data-
stream.114 Additionally, for banks without data available we try to identify missing transition 
dates manually. In the sample, there are 118 banks changing to IFRS during that period. 19 
banks have not yet changed to IFRS.115 These 19 banks are left in the dataset as benchmark 
samples. The inclusion also reduces concerns about intertemporal non-stationarity of the met-
rics (Barth et al. 2008, p. 481), since they also account for time-dependent changes for banks 
that do not adopt IFRS. The remaining 14 banks for which the exact transition date cannot be 
unambiguously identified or that exhibit inconsistencies are excluded from the regressions. 
Financial statement information as well as market value information for those banks over the 
whole period is gathered from Datastream, if available.116 To account for extreme values, for 
each variable used in the analysis, the two extreme percentiles of all data values are excluded 
(e.g., Ball et al. 2000, p. 9). 
 
Table XXVI presents the distribution of the maximum observations under local GAAP or 
IFRS, according to their country of origin. However, due to data availability working samples 
in the analysis can be smaller. The third column presents the number of observations for 
which the identification of the accounting system was not unambiguously identifiable. The 
last column depicts the number of banks from each country in the starting sample.  
 
                                                 
113
 The constituents as of June 2009 are used.  
114
 A similar procedure is used by Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008, p. 486-488).  
115
 For example, this is the case for banks that do not have to prepare consolidated financial statements. Another 
reason is, e.g., that Swiss banks do not have to publish their consolidated accounts in accordance with interna-
tional standards like U.S. GAAP or IFRS. Conversely, these banks are allowed to apply international standards, 
if they outline the main differences to the local accounting rules (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2008, p. 118-120). 
116
 However, due to data availability, the effective number of banks in the regressions is somewhat lower. 
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Table XXVI: Descriptive Statistics on Maximum Observations per Country 
Country
Total in % Total in % Total in %
Austria 21 1.39% 70 29 1.92% 20 1.32%
Belgium 38 28 1.85% 50 12 0.79% 10 0.66%
Bulgaria 10 0 0.00% 10 0 0.00% 10 0.66%
Cyprus 34 4 0.26% 40 16 1.06% 20 1.32%
Czech Republic 0 0 0.00% 10 10 0.66% 0 0.00%
Denmark 58 48 3.18% 70 22 1.46% 0 0.00%
Finland 6 6 0.40% 10 4 0.26% 0 0.00%
France 80 70 4.64% ## 40 2.65% 0 0.00%
Germany 30 20 1.32% 60 30 1.99% 10 0.66%
Greece 61 54 3.58% ## 36 2.38% 10 0.66%
Hungary 0 0 0.00% 10 10 0.66% 0 0.00%
Ireland 13 13 0.86% 20 7 0.46% 0 0.00%
Italy 128 116 7.68% ## 74 4.90% 20 1.32%
Luxembourg 16 6 0.40% 20 4 0.26% 10 0.66%
Malta 31 8 0.53% 40 32 2.12% 0 0.00%
Netherlands 10 6 0.40% 10 4 0.26% 0 0.00%
Poland 87 87 5.76% ## 53 3.51% 0 0.00%
Portugal 30 30 1.99% 50 20 1.32% 0 0.00%
Romania 17 10 0.66% 30 20 1.32% 0 0.00%
Slovenia 26 13 0.86% 30 17 1.13% 0 0.00%
Spain 66 66 4.37% ## 44 2.91% 0 0.00%
Sweden 30 24 1.59% 50 16 1.06% 10 0.66%
Switzerland 202 172 11.39% ## 18 1.19% 20 1.32%
United Kingdom 30 30 1.99% 50 20 1.32% 0 0.00%
Total 832 55.10% ## 538 35.63% 140 9.27%
Data N/A
21
2
1
2
4
14
21
5
5
151
10
5
11
3
3
1
11
6
5
1
1
4
1
7
Observations under 
Local GAAP 
Observations under 
IFRS Number of Banks
Total
7
This table provides descriptive statistics for the entire sample from 1999 to 2008. It consists of a maximum of 832 (538)
observations pre (post) IFRS adoption. It displays the absolute number of observations in the sample for each country. The last
column  reports the number of banks from each country in the sample.
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5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Descriptive Statistics on Variables 
Table XXVII provides descriptive statistics for the variables in this investigation. The market 
value of equity for firms reporting under IFRS is nearly twice the value of local GAAP firms 
which is not an uncommon observation in time series data. Therefore, in the regression analy-
sis, we use period- and firm-fixed effects in order to control for such effects. As in prior stud-
ies, IFRS net profit is higher than local GAAP profits (e.g., Hung and Subramanyam, 2007). 
However, with respect to all non-scaled figures in the descriptive statistics, we have to keep in 
mind that much of the effect might be attributable to a time-dependent effect, since IFRS are 
foremost applied in the second half of the sample. Therefore, the balance sheet items are also 
scaled by total assets to make comparisons feasible in the table.  
Book value of equity as share of total assets is, on average, lower for the IFRS subsample 
when it comes to means. However, the differences in medians provide a different impression. 
In consideration of the higher book value of equity according to IFRS, we could have ex-
pected a significant difference in the equity ratio. However, total assets are even higher for the 
IFRS subsample. As expected, the average share of investments, containing financial assets at 
cost and fair value, are significantly higher in means (medians) for the IFRS subsample with 
26.6% (21.9%) than for the local GAAP subsample with 17.7% (13.5%). This observation is 
in line with the results in Chapter 2 finding higher shares of financial assets valued at fair 
value under IFRS. Concentrating on liabilities, net debt is significantly lower in the local 
GAAP subsample for both means and medians. Return on equity is significantly higher for 
IFRS financial statements.  
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Table XXVII: Descriptive Statistics on Observations 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics on Market Value and Balance Sheet Structure
N N Total 
Market Value Mean 5,740.2         737       8,880.3         504       3,140.1         ***
of Equity (MVE) Median 1,019.5        2,548.6        1,529.1        +++
Book Value Mean 3,215.5         723       6,294.2         441       3,078.7         ***
of Equity (BVE ) Median 744.7           1,902.7        1,158.0        +++
Total Assets Mean 76,014.3       724       160,427.6     440       84,413.3       ***
(TA ) Median 11,834.9      29,189.6      17,354.8      +++
Net Income Mean 437.8            730       830.2            434       392.4            ***
(NI ) Median 75.7             219.3           143.6           +++
Panel B: Balance Sheet Structure Ratios
N N Total 
Book Value of Equity Mean 7.3% 719       6.7% 432       -0.6%
in % of TA Median 5.6% 6.0% 0.3%
Net Debt (NTDEBT ) Mean 29.6% 711       32.3% 430       2.7% ***
in % of TA Median 29.6% 33.7% 4.1% +++
Net Loans (NTLOANS ) Mean 81.7% 692       80.1% 332       -1.6%
in % of TA Median 81.3% 81.5% 0.2%
Investments (INV ) Mean 17.7% 424       26.6% 294       8.9% ***
in % of TA Median 13.5% 21.9% 8.4% +++
RoE Mean 10.7% 720       12.9% 444       2.2% ***
Median 10.3% 13.0% 2.7% +++
Local GAAP IFRS Difference
DifferenceLocal GAAP IFRS 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the entire sample from 1999 to 2008. The first two columns present the market values
and balance sheet structure for Local GAAP and IFRS full year results. The third column provides the differences and tests for
significance in differences for means and medians. ***,**,* indicate significance to the 1%-,5%-,10%-level of a t-test (two-sided),
whereas +++,++,+ indicates significance in differences testing for differences in medians using a Wilcoxon signed rank test.
 
Value Relevance of Equity and Earnings 
The question to be answered in this section is whether IFRS book value of equity and net 
profit have higher value relevance, as outlined in H1. Table XXVIII, Panel A, presents the 
results of the multivariate regression analysis of a bank’s market value on book value of eq-
uity and net income, as in model (1) and (2).  
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Table XXVIII: Value Relevance of Book Value of Equity and Earnings 
Panel A: Value Relevance of Equity and Earnings
Intercept BVE NI Adj. R² F-Stat. Prob. N Banks
LGAAP 4685.583 *** 0.555 ** 2.227 ** 0.97 0.00 included 697 111
(13.70) (2.27) (2.26) 
IFRS 5335.818 ** -0.673 *** 4.529 *** 0.94 0.00 included 420 104
(2.27) (-3.38 ) (7.56) 
Panel B: Relative Value Relevance of Equity and Earnings
Intercept BVE NI IFRS BVE*IFRS NI*IFRS Adj. R² F-Stat. Prob. N Banks 
5646.839 *** 0.170 5.086 *** 227.847 -0.013 -0.556 0.94 0.00 included 1117 124
(11.29) (0.59) (3.15) (0.62) (-0.05 ) (-0.31 )
Period-fixed, 
Firm-fixed effects
Period-fixed, 
Firm-fixed effects
εββββ ++++= ∑ jjititit ControlsNIBVEMVE 210
Panel A presents the coefficient estimates of a least square regression with robust standard errors on market value of equity for LGAAP and IFRS financial statement information. MVE is total market value measured six months after financial year end. BVE and NI 
are the book value of equity, and net income, respectively, at the financial year end.
Panel B presents the coefficient estimates for a least square regression on market value of equity for the total sample. IFRS is equal to one, if the bank reports their financial statements in accordance to international accounting standards, and zero otherwise. N denotes 
the number of observations in the respective subsample. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-level respectively, of a two-sided t-test. Only White-heteroscedasticity robust errors are reported. In the regression we control for intra-cluster correlation 
of bank-specific effects. F-Statistics probabilities are reported according to standard OLS regressions for purpose of comparison. The regressions include control dummy variables to control for time-specific and cross-sectional effects. 
εβββββββ ∑ +++++++= jjitititititititit ControlsIFRSNIIFRSBVEIFRSNIBVEMVE ** 543210
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Surprisingly, the coefficient on book value of equity is negatively related to market value of 
the bank and significant in the IFRS subsample. This observation corresponds with the per-
ception of a lower equity ratio being related to a higher market value. It could be argued that 
these observations are solely caused by the observations of 2008 leading to large losses for 
banks which should, however, at least partly be controlled for by the year dummies. Even 
though losing significance, omitting these observations leads to the same sign of the coeffi-
cient estimate on book value of equity. The coefficient on net income in the IFRS model is 
nearly twice the value for the local GAAP subsample, indicating a stronger relationship of net 
income and market value of equity. Hung and Subramanyam (2007) report a stronger relation 
of net income and market value for local GAAP for a sample of German industry firms. They 
interpret this result as local GAAP having a stronger pricing weight on net income whereas 
IFRS have a stronger pricing weight on book value of equity. The observations from this 
sample, however, are in contrast to their results, since there is a stronger relation between 
IFRS net profit and market value of a bank and the coefficient on book value of equity is 
negative for the IFRS subsample. However, a basic difference is that Hung and Subramanyam 
(2007) compare the restated annual accounts for one and the same year which might probably 
lead to distortions.117 In both regressions, there is a high R² which might be an indicator for 
collinearity. Analyzing multicollinearity using variance inflation factors (VIFs) confirms the 
presence of collinearity in the regression setting. However, this fact seems to be unproblem-
atic since the t-scores are still significant and, hence, do not lead to wrong conclusions due to 
increased variances of coefficient estimates.118 Additionally, a high explanatory power is ab-
solutely not an uncommon phenomenon in a regression controlling for period as well as cross-
section fixed effects.119 The comparison of R² yields slightly higher explanatory power of the 
local GAAP model which is in line with prior results (Hung and Subramanyam 2007). Testing 
for significance in difference between R²s is not feasible in this case, since the dependent 
variables are not identical.120 Therefore, in order to clarify whether IFRS book value of equity 
and net income is value relevant, we also apply a regression as outlined in model (2) for the 
total sample including the IFRS dummy variable, in Panel B of Table XXVIII. The coefficient 
on the IFRS dummy variable as well as the interaction terms on book value and earnings are 
                                                 
117
 Their results are only comparable to a limited degree, since the IFRS information is not publicly available 
when the original HGB statements are published. Hence, IFRS information cannot be incorporated in the market 
price simultaneously. 
118
 See Studenmund (2001), p. 259. 
119
 See Wooldridge (2003), p. 466. For example, Hung and Subramanyam (2007) yield adjusted R² of over 0.84, 
Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997) report R² peaking over 0.70, and Francis and Schipper (1999) up to 0.78 in 
comparable setups. Some of the studies investigating comparable relations do only account for country specific, 
industry specific or period-fixed effects and do not account for firm-fixed effects, albeit using panel datasets. 
120
 See Bartov et al. (2005), p. 105. See also Hung and Subramanyam (2007), p. 646. 
  
 127 
not significant, providing no evidence for a significantly different value relevance either for 
IFRS book value of equity or IFRS net income. Furthermore, these observations do not sug-
gest that the market value is systematically higher for IFRS banks, ceteris paribus, after con-
trolling for bank-specific and time-dependent effects. Taken together, the regression results on 
value relevance do not indicate superior valuation properties of IFRS equity and earnings and 
provide no indication in support of H1. 
5.5.2 Value Relevance of Financial Statement Items 
In order to test the value relevance of individual accounts as outlined in H2, the individual 
relation between single items and the value of a firm is identified. In this approach, the market 
value is regressed on balance sheet items via a multivariate regression model by which the 
individual relation between single items and the value of a firm is identified. Table XXIX 
presents the regression of market value on the single items, as described by model (3). As in 
the prior section, R² are also on a very high level indicating collinearity. On the one hand, as 
already mentioned, the R² is not an uncommon phenomenon in the presence of period-fixed 
and cross-section fixed effects.121 On the other hand, this observation indicates that much of 
the effects might be caused by other firm-specific qualities or time-dependent effects.  
 
In the regression on Investments only the interaction term Investments*IFRS is positive and 
highly significant. This implies that IFRS have significantly higher value relevance for the 
balance sheet items referring to investments whereas local GAAP have not. This might be 
caused by the fact that IFRS accounting rules enable fair value accounting for many assets 
contained in investments, which might be the main difference to some of the local GAAP 
accounting systems. This might lead to higher values in these balance sheet items which are 
better reflected in market values. Turning to Net Loans, the coefficient estimate and the inter-
action term is highly significant and positive as well, also indicating a higher value relevance 
of IFRS of the loans on the books. As outlined above, under local GAAP face values are often 
used whereas under IFRS most of the loans are valued using the effective interest method, 
probably leading to a change in value relevance. 
 
As in the previous regression analysis, the Book Value of Equity seems to be highly value 
relevant. However, the application of IFRS does not significantly change the value relevance 
                                                 
121
 We test a regression setting without controlling for these firm-fixed and period-fixed effects which results in 
relatively low VIFs and compare those to the standard regression VIFs including these effects. The result is that 
the presence of the control variables increases significantly the collinearity for the variables under investigation 
even though the average VIF remains at a low level.
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of this measure. For Net Debt, there is no evidence of it being value relevant at all for both 
local GAAP and IFRS. Unsurprisingly, the regression on Operating Cash Flow does not yield 
significant value relevance which is within expectations. Furthermore, a different impression 
can be reported from the coefficient on Revenue. It is highly significant, indicating a strong 
value relevance of this measure. However, IFRS does not have a significantly different impact 
on the market value of a bank. To summarize this section, the results suggest that IFRS bal-
ance sheet items on the asset side, i.e., investments and net loans might increase value rele-
vance, partly providing evidence in support of H2.  
  
  
 129 
Table XXIX: Value Relevance of Single Financial Statement Items 
Item Intercept Item IFRS Item*IFRS Adj R² F-Stat. Prob. N Banks
Total Assets (TA ) 7257.486 *** 0.014 1495.216 0.002 0.92        0.00 1125 124
(12.55) (0.80) (1.28) (0.28) 
Investments (INV ) 9024.653 *** 0.006 364.795 0.021 *** 0.95        0.00 696 114
(8.09) (1.30) (0.50) (3.73) 
Net Loans (NTLOANS ) 7500.723 *** 0.043 *** 409.257 0.016 * 0.94        0.00 998 122
(13.57) (5.01) (0.56) (1.98) 
Net Debt (NTDEBT ) 7932.571 *** 0.020 586.809 0.026 0.92        0.00 1120 124
(14.24) (0.79) (0.81) (1.49) 
Book Value of Equity (BVE ) 6631.886 *** 0.664 *** 1090.861 -0.072 0.92        0.00 1130 124
(14.36) (2.66) (1.21) (-0.46 )
Operating Cash Flow (CF ) 6782.840 *** 0.143 -1208.126 0.369 0.93        0.00 675 121
(4.78) (0.66) (-1.02 ) (1.50) 
Revenue (REV ) 7444.782 *** 0.304 ** 482.805 0.090 0.93        0.00 1009 123
(10.01) (2.28) (0.76) (1.11) 
included
included
included
included
included
Firm-fixed; 
Period-fixed effects
included
included
This table presents the coefficient estimates of panel least square regressions on market value of equity for single financial statement items. IFRS is a dummy variable equal to one, if the information is from financial statements prepared in
accordance to international accounting standards. t-values are in parentheses. N denotes the number of observations in the respective subsample. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% interval, respectively, of a two-sided t-
test. In the regression we control for intra-cluster correlation of bank-specific effects. Only White-heteroscedasticity robust errors are reported. F-Statistics probabilities are reported according to standard OLS regressions for purpose of 
εβββββ ∑ +++++= jjControlsIFRSItemIFRSItemMVE *3210
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5.5.3 Earnings Management 
5.5.3.1 Timeliness of Earnings 
Panel A of Table XXX presents the regression results of model (4) on timeliness of earnings. 
As outlined in H3, the expectation is to find lower earnings management for observations af-
ter the transition to IFRS. The coefficient on RETit is positive and highly significant for both 
specifications. However, concentrating on the coefficient capturing the incremental effect of 
negative earnings, one finding is that the coefficient is insignificant for both specifications. 
Comparable observations can be reported from the coefficient estimates of the interaction 
term for both the local GAAP subsample and the IFRS group. However, there is no evidence 
indicating that negative news is incorporated into accounting earnings in a more timely way 
under either accounting regime, in comparison to positive earnings, for which literature sug-
gests a stronger conditional conservatism for local GAAP (Hung and Subramanyam 2007).122 
This is in line with the expectation of local GAAP accounting to be more closely related to 
the principle of prudence than IFRS. The adjusted R² is a little higher for the IFRS regression, 
indicating a better specification of the model and, hence, higher income timeliness of IFRS. 
On the one hand, this observation suggests that, overall, economic events seem to be reflected 
faster in IFRS earnings, which would be in line with the results of Hung and Subramanyam 
(2007), and might offer evidence in favor of H3. However, for the reasons mentioned above, 
we have to be cautious when comparing the explanatory power of both models. On the other 
hand, we find no evidence that economic losses are reflected faster in accounting earnings 
under one accounting regime. 
                                                 
122
 As robustness check, the regression with lagged market values of +3 months is also tested, yielding qualita-
tively the same results.  
  
 131 
Table XXX: Earnings Management Measures 
Panel A: Timeliness of Earnings
Intercept RET NEG RET*NEG Adj. R² N Banks
LGAAP 0.046 0.029 *** -0.003 0.054 included 0.28 0.00 691 110
(1.31) (12.91) (-0.31 ) (0.81) 
IFRS -0.220 0.052 *** 0.007 -0.002 included 0.44 0.00 409 103
(-0.68 ) (3.31) (0.52) (-0.06 )
Panel B: Small Loss Avoidance - Ratio of Small Profits and Small Losses
Net Income to Total Assets Net Income to Revenues
[-0.01;0.01] Small Profits Small Losses Odds [-0.1;0.1] Small Profits Small Losses Odds
LGAAP 564 14 40.29 LGAAP 361 13 27.77 
IFRS 286 6 47.67 IFRS 133 4 33.25 
[-0.005;0.005] Small Profits Small Losses Odds [-0.05;0.05] Small Profits Small Losses Odds
LGAAP 259 9 28.78 LGAAP 110 10 11.00 
IFRS 104 5 20.80 IFRS 32 4 8.00 
[-0.0025;0.0025] Small Profits Small Losses Odds [-0.025;0.025] Small Profits Small Losses Odds
LGAAP 51 7 7.29 LGAAP 35 5 7.00 
IFRS 35 3 11.67 IFRS 9 3 3.00 
Panel C: Small Loss Avoidance - Centered Asymmetry Measures
Earnings to Total Assets [0.01;-0.01] [0.005;-0.005] [0.0025;-0.0025] Earnings to Revenues [-0.1;0.1] [-0.05;0.05] [-0.025;0.025]
LGAAP A 0.9516 +++ 0.9328 +++ 0.7586 +++ LGAAP A 0.9305 +++ 0.8333 +++ 0.7500 +++
STD A 0.0128 0.0220 0.0856 STD A 0.0189 0.0505 0.1046 
IFRS A 0.9589 +++ 0.9083 +++ 0.8421 +++ IFRS A 0.9416 +++ 0.7778 +++ 0.5000 
STD A 0.0166 0.0401 0.0875 STD A 0.0288 0.1048 0.2500 
Difference Diff A -0.0073 0.0246 -0.0835 Difference Diff A -0.0111 0.0556 0.2500 
(LGAAP- IFRS) Delta A 0.0214 0.0478 0.1360 (LGAAP- IFRS) Delta A 0.0355 0.1301 0.3541 
F-Stat. 
Prob.
Firm-fixed, 
Period-fixed 
effects
Panel A presents the results on the regression model on net profit. RET denotes the return of a specific stock, measured as change in percent over a period starting three months after prior financial
year end, and ending three months after the financial year end. NEG is a dummy variable equal to one, if the stock return measured over a 12 month period is negative, and zero otherwise. t-values are
in parentheses. N denotes the number of observations in the respective subsample. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% interval respectively of a two-sided t-test. In the regression
we control for intra-cluster correlation of bank-specific effects. Only White-heteroscedasticity robust errors are reported. F-Statistics probabilities are reported according to standard OLS regressions
for purpose of comparison. 
Panel B presents the relations of small profit to small losses for local GAAP and IFRS subsamples and different intervals, scaled by total assets, or revenues, respectively. The last column ‘Odds’
denotes the ratio of small losses to small profits, as in Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008). 
Panel C presents the small loss avoidance using the centered asymmetry measure outlined by Glaum et al. (2004), for the small profits to small loss relations, scaled by total assets, or revenues,
respectively. The last line indicates the difference between the subsamples of local GAAP and IFRS relations. As in Glaum et al. (2004), we consider the centered asymmetry measures to be
significant at the 5% (1%)-level if the centered measure differs more than 1.96 (2.58) standard deviations from zero. +++,++ indicate significance on the 1%-,5%-level, respectively.
εβββββ +++++= ∑ jjControlsNEGRETNEGRETNI *3210
 
5.5.3.2 Small Loss vs. Small Profit Relation 
The odds ratio reflects the relation of small earnings to small losses in a given interval. In the 
absence of earnings management, earnings are expected to be evenly distributed in very small 
intervals around the zero thresholds. Therefore, lower odds reflect typically a lower propen-
sity to manage earnings in financial statements. Concentrating on Panel B of Table XXX, one 
initial finding is that the odds are much higher than the results from previous studies. One 
reason could be that the sample size might play a crucial role. Another reason might be the 
fact that banks are more able to manage earnings than firms from other industries. The inves-
tigation of earnings scaled by total assets in the interval [-0.005;0.005] suggests lower odds 
for IFRS small earnings to small losses. However, both of the other intervals yield a higher 
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odds ratio under IFRS. As the odds ratios do not decrease in the transition to IFRS the results 
on the ratio of earnings to total assets yield that earnings management does not seem to be 
smaller. 
 
Turning to the ratio of earnings scaled by revenues yields another impression. For the larger 
interval, the odds are higher for the IFRS subsample whereas for both of the narrower inter-
vals the odds ratio is higher for the local GAAP subsample. This observation does not neces-
sarily indicate that IFRS earnings are less managed, which might have been interpreted as 
IFRS reducing management discretion. The results rather suggest that the interval width plays 
a crucial role in the results (e.g., Glaum, Lichtblau and Lindemann 2004). Taken together, the 
comparison of the odds ratio does not provide a clear cut picture that earnings management 
has declined due to the transition to IFRS. 
5.5.3.3 Loss Avoidance 
The last approach measures the degree of loss avoidance for the subsamples, as outlined by 
Glaum et al. (2004). Panel C of Table XXX presents the results of the comparison of several 
measures of A as in model (5). For all subsamples, the distributions are highly skewed to-
wards positive earnings and are significant. The robustness check of earnings scaled by reve-
nues yields a similar impression. Testing for significance in differences rejects the hypothesis 
of a two-group separation for all variants. Therefore, the results do not suggest significantly 
lower earnings management for the IFRS subsample and confirm our impression from the 
previous sections. Thus, since the alternative hypothesis of no change in earnings manage-
ment cannot be refuted, we find no sustainable evidence that IFRS annual financial statements 
have lower earnings management and hence no support for H3. 
5.5.4 Robustness Checks 
5.5.4.1 Return Model on Earnings 
This robustness check tries to answer the question whether a consideration of IFRS profits 
alone is more value relevant for changes in market value than profits from local GAAP re-
gimes. In order to clarify whether the relation is significantly stronger in comparison to local 
GAAP earnings, the following cross-sectional model is estimated, basically following Bartov, 
Goldberg and Kim (2005).123 
 
                                                 
123
 Bartov et al. (2005) scale net income by market value at year end whereas we scale net income by market 
value six months prior to year end in order to reduce the possibility of collinearity. 
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=itRET ∑ +++++ εβββββ jjitititit ControlsIFRSNIIFRSNI *3210    (6) 
with 
 RETit   12-month buy and hold stock return, starting six months after prior fis-
   cal year end and ending six months after fiscal year end,  
 NIit   net income as published in the financial statements at the respective 
   year end t, scaled by lagged market value of equity measured six  
   months before financial year end,  
 IFRSit   dummy variable equal to one if the bank prepares the financial state-
   ments in period t according to IFRS, and zero otherwise. 
 
The interaction term on β3 denotes the differential effect of financial statements in IFRS 
changing value relevance in comparison to local GAAP rules. A significant and positive coef-
ficient β3 indicates that the value relevance of IFRS is beyond that of local GAAP financial 
statement information.124 If the coefficient on β3 is insignificant, the null hypothesis that both 
accounting regimes are equally value relevant for the explanation of stock returns via earnings 
cannot be refuted. 
 
Table XXXI reports the results for the regression of stock returns on net profit from equation 
(6). Interestingly, none of the coefficient estimates is significant. The conclusion from this 
regression is that there is no evidence that IFRS earnings alone have significantly higher value 
relevance for changes in market value, hence offering no evidence in support of H1. 
Table XXXI: Return Model on Earnings 
Intercept NI IFRS NI*IFRS Adj. R² F-Stat. 
Prob.
N Banks
0.446 ** 1.960 0.092 -0.733 included 0.26 0.00 779 122
(2.59) (0.85) (0.87) (-0.49 )
Period-fixed, 
Firm-fixed effects
This panel presents the results on a least square regression on stock price returns. RET denotes the return of a specific stock, measured as change
in percent over a period starting six months after prior financial year end and ending six months after financial year end. Net Income (NI) is scaled
by market value of equity lagged six months after prior financial year end. t-values are in parentheses. N denotes the number of observations in the
respective subsample. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%-, 5%-, and 10%-level of a two-sided t-test, respectively. Only White-
heteroscedasticity robust errors are reported. The regressions include control dummy variables to control for time specific and cross-sectional
effects. Furthermore, in the regression we control for intra-cluster correlation of bank-specific effects. F-Statistics probabilities are reported
according to standard OLS regressions for purpose of comparison.
εβββββ +++++= ∑ jjititititit ControlsIFRSNIIFRSNIRET *3210
 
                                                 
124
 For this interpretation, see Bartov, Goldberg and Kim (2005), p. 105. 
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5.5.4.2 Bank Specific Items and Value Relevance 
In order to test the stability of our results, we run a robustness check on model (1) of value 
relevance of book value of equity and earnings on market value of equity using a time lag of 
three instead of six months. This leads generally to comparable and strong results, confirming 
our findings. Model (2) using interaction terms yields a significant coefficient on IFRS, mean-
ing that market value of equity is generally higher. However, book value of equity and earn-
ings are generally not better reflected in market values.  
 
As a robustness check on value relevance of specific financial statement items in model (3), 
we run regressions of market value on changes in financial statement items using the natural 
logarithm for market value, which are not reported. In general, this test yields slightly lower 
value relevance for many financial statement items under IFRS since several interaction terms 
become negative.  
 
Alternatively, we also split the sample into local GAAP and IFRS subsamples and run the 
regression on single financial statement items. This generally yields no contrary results except 
for the regression of market value on cash flows. In this case, we find a positive and signifi-
cant coefficient estimate of Operating Cash Flow for the IFRS subsample whereas for local 
GAAP, only an insignificant coefficient estimate can be reported. This might be interpreted as 
evidence for operating cash flows being included in valuation models for firms using IFRS 
whereas there is no evidence for this fact for firms using local GAAP. 
 
As a further robustness check, we also investigate whether changes in market value are attrib-
utable to changes in single financial statement items. The results show that additional value 
relevance of changes in IFRS financial statement items for changes in market values cannot 
be confirmed. 
 
Earnings Management 
We also run a robustness check on earnings management. It captures time-dependent influ-
ences in the timeliness of earnings regression, as in model (5). Therefore, instead of using 
time lags in the dependent variables of three months, we rerun the regressions with a lag of 
six months. This variation provides qualitatively the same, albeit somewhat weaker results.  
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5.6 Concluding Remarks 
We investigate a large sample of European banks over a decade. One central objective is to 
clarify whether IFRS accounting measures are of higher quality by providing higher value 
relevance and lower earnings management. Based on these considerations, we impose three 
hypotheses: Firstly, we hypothesize higher value relevance of earnings and book value of eq-
uity under IFRS. Secondly, there is higher value relevance for IFRS financial statement items. 
Thirdly, there is lower earnings management in IFRS financial statements due to fewer discre-
tionary degrees of freedom for a bank’s management. 
 
Firstly, we find no evidence suggesting higher value relevance for IFRS book value of equity 
and earnings for market value of equity, refuting H1. Secondly, for bank specific items, there 
is some evidence of higher value relevance for investments and net loans. This first observa-
tion might be explained by a higher share of financial assets in net investments and net loans 
that are evaluated at fair value. However, for the remainder of the financial statement items 
tested we find no significantly higher value relevance. Thirdly, with respect to earnings man-
agement we fail to find evidence of a faster incorporation of economic events in accounting 
earnings under IFRS, even though the model seems to fit better under IFRS. Furthermore, 
there is no indication of lower earnings management in banks after transition to IFRS which 
seems to be in line with prior research (e.g., Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008; Paananen and Lin 
2009). 
 
To summarize, the impact of transition to IFRS for European banks appears to have limited 
impact on the value relevance of accounting measures, and hardly any impact on earnings 
management. Therefore, there is no convincing evidence of IFRS information being of sus-
tainably higher quality in terms of higher value relevance and lower earnings management. 
Rather, this result suggests that IFRS accounting quality is not necessarily superior to local 
GAAP accounting quality if measured by value relevance. In consideration of the high cost of 
implementing and appliance of the new accounting rules, which have often to be used in addi-
tion to the local GAAP rules, one might be tempted to ask whether the application of IFRS is 
really beneficial for market participants. 
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6 Conclusion 
The basic question was whether IFRS are really superior in that they produce better information 
when compared to national GAAPs. We suspect that an analysis of banks in the European Union 
is a more promising approach than investigating just single countries. One reason is that many 
valuation and presentation premises are changed with the transition to IFRS. Another reason is 
that we are in a mostly stable and comparable institutional setup in Europe which allows more 
general inferences than just investigating specific markets or trying to obtain clear results from 
worldwide samples with many concurrent influences.  
 
Turning to the analysis, the first indication of the balance sheet and equity analysis of banks 
yields that there are changes in the structure of line items and the presentation of equity in the 
course of the transition to IFRS. Besides the changes being solely attributable to reclassifications, 
another reason might be that the changes in valuation methods also influence, at least in part, the 
new picture after transition. The logical follow-on question that has to be asked is whether these 
presentation changes have any implications for capital market participants. Therefore, in this 
study, we concentrate on the market perspective, i.e., we try to answer the question asked above 
for capital market participants to determine whether they benefit by the new information based 
on IFRS. There are several dimensions to measure the impact of any benefits from the transition 
to IFRS outlined in literature. We decide to apply three measures in order to create a comprehen-
sive picture of the IFRS impact on capital markets. 
 
Investigating abnormal market reactions to the publication of earnings announcements under dif-
ferent accounting regimes, we find that information value seems to increase over time. However, 
after taking into account concurrent influences, we cannot rule out that general capital market 
integration in the European Union over time could also be responsible for the observations of 
higher information value of earnings announcements. 
 
From a different perspective, we also study market efficiency and market liquidity and try to clar-
ify the influence of IFRS on these measures before and after mandatory transition. There seems 
to be a positive impact for two of our market efficiency and liquidity measures, i.e. bid-ask 
spreads and price impact, even after controlling for potential concurring effects. However, the 
investigation of equity valuation after transition does not yield any superiority of presenting in-
formation according to IFRS. Albeit there seems to be a favorable effect on some of our meas-
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ures for mandatory adopters, the investigation of mandatory and voluntary adopters further con-
firms the reasonable suspicion that rather the general capital market integration in the European 
Union than the transition to common reporting standards is accountable for different levels of 
market efficiency and liquidity.  
 
Therefore, the last section tries to directly relate accounting measures to the market valuation of 
banks and earnings management. We are only able to report weak evidence of a higher value 
relevance of some IFRS balance sheet items which might be attributable to changes in valuation 
methods. However, lower earnings management cannot be confirmed after the transition.  
 
To summarize, given the rather ambiguous results from above using a dataset with relatively sta-
ble institutional prerequisites, i.e., an investigation of banks in Europe, we cannot rule out that 
there are concurrent effects influencing our results to a greater or lesser degree, even though we 
expected the results to be especially strong using our investigation setup. However, our findings 
seem to be in line with prior research having difficulties detecting pure cause and effect relation-
ships in a rather dynamic environment. Based on our results however, the pure effect of the IFRS 
application appears to be rather limited for European banks which casts doubt on its favorability 
in light of cost-benefit considerations. 
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